U.S., TURKEY: THE (FUEL) TIES THAT BIND

Stratfor
Oct 15 2007

An attempt in the U.S. Congress to label the 1915 massacre of Armenians
at the hands of Ottoman Turks as genocide comes at an extremely tense
time in relations between Washington and Ankara — and an even worse
time in terms of military logistics.

The U.S.-Turkish alliance, already on shaky ground after Ankara’s 2003
refusal to allow the United States to invade Iraq from Turkish soil,
continues to suffer as a result of the debate in the U.S.

Congress over a resolution that labels the 1915 massacre of Armenians
by Ottoman Turks genocide. The concern for the U.S. military is that
Turkey could express its anger over the debate by closing its doors
to cargo and refueling operations — which would affect military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Of all the U.S. air cargo bound for U.S. forces in Iraq, 70 percent
passes through Turkey, as does 33 percent of the fuel. Incirlik Air
Base, long a major U.S. foothold in the region, is a major hub for
KC-135 Extender refueling operations, as it is well-positioned for
topping off the C-17 and C-5 cargo flights that haul most of the air
freight to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although air cargo traffic can be rerouted (at a price), and Baghdad
is within reach of a C-130 fully fueled at Germany’s Ramstein Air
Base, the U.S. military relies heavily on Ankara’s good graces for
the transfer of fuel — both in the air and on the ground — in order
to conduct its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Turkey also is the
only friendly airspace through which the United States can easily move
north to Europe, and it is the fastest route for medical evacuation
flights from Baghdad to military hospitals in Germany.

Should Turkey stop allowing U.S. ground fuel shipments into Iraq,
the United States would be forced to shift even more ground traffic
to the south, which would make the United States increasingly reliant
on an already heavily taxed supply chain into Kuwait (one always
vulnerable to a Shiite uprising in the south). It also would shift
the fuel metrics, requiring more gasoline for more trucks to drive
farther to deliver fuel, a process that was more economically —
not to mention safely and reliably — provided by the northern route.

This northern route looked faintly promising for another U.S. purpose
less than a month ago. At that time, Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan suggested that the United States might be allowed
to withdraw its troops to the north as the drawdown of Washington’s
surge begins. Although in practice this would not have been an easy
arrangement to hammer out — the Turks do not want an increased U.S.

military presence in the border region — it did offer an important
alternative exit strategy from Iraq. For now, this arrangement
looks lost.

Their shared NATO membership will hold the United States and Turkey
together to some extent — meaning the vital Turkish airspace likely
will remain open to U.S. forces — though powerful geopolitical forces
are at work in Ankara.

Turkey still could complicate U.S. logistics efforts through any
number of restrictions and administrative curveballs — and this would
hardly be unprecedented, even among fellow NATO members. Such actions,
however, would be distractions the Pentagon, whose resources already
are strained, does not need. The Turkish alliance and Incirlik Air
Base are cornerstones of the U.S. presence in an unfriendly region,
and Washington can ill afford to lose those now.