Armen Ayvazyan: Instead Of Reading The Genocide Resolution Adopted I

ARMEN AYVAZYAN: INSTEAD OF READING THE GENOCIDE RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN US, THEY PLAY THE GAME OF "SHE LOVES ME, SHE LOVES ME NOT" IN ARMENIA

AZG daily
10 Oct 2007
YERKIR weekly
REGNUM News Agency
12.10.2007

This is the English version of the article originally published in
Armenian and Russian

The process of the international recognition of the Armenian
Genocide is at the threshold of a new phase: it is very possible
that the U.S. House of Representatives (and the Senate, with lesser
likelihood) will adopt the Resolution 106 on the Armenian Genocide,
introduced in the U.S. Congress in January. If it were to happen,
many other countries would adopt similar resolutions in a chain
reaction. However, what will follow then? That is the principal
question, which unfortunately has not been answered by the Armenian
political structures. And where could such an answer come from if the
currently achieved and discussed recognitions were not subjected to
a more or less adequate analysis? We are facing serious problems.

Above all is the problem of information and analysis (including
elementary awareness). The media reports daily on the process of
international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. However, who
in Armenia has seen or read the text of the very recent R106? Has
the Armenian press printed the actual resolution to enable its
serious and professional study by political forces, experts and
the public in general? Where is its official Armenian translation
provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia? Where is
the comparative analysis of this and previous resolutions adopted by
the U.S. Congress in 1975 and 1984 (the 148th and 247th resolutions,
respectively)? Nothing of this sort has been undertaken. Here, it will
only be noted that the R106 qualitatively differs from the 1975 and
1984 resolutions in its thorough historical and legal formulation (it
consists of 30 articles well supported by the facts and arguments). It
confirms the historical truth. It outlines the chronological framework
of the Armenian Genocide more comprehensively: from 1915 to 1923
(unlike the resolution adopted in 1975, which only noted the year of
1915). It clearly states the number of victims: 2 million deportees,
of whom 1.5 million were killed.

The resolution underscores a circumstance that is very important from
political and legal perspectives: "the Armenian Genocide… succeeded
in the elimination of the over 2,500-year presence of Armenians in
their historic homeland."

The problem of correct and sober assessment is particularly
sensitive. What would the adoption of this resolution mean to
Armenia? For example, Italy, Canada, Poland recognized the Armenian
Genocide, but what changes took place in their policies towards
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, or the problem of Artsakh? In reality,
nothing changed. Most importantly, to what extent can such resolutions
contribute to the most urgent task – the guarantee of the security
of Armenia?

The question of Genocide recognition was raised even before the
independence of Armenia and for decades it was the main field of
political activity of the Armenian Diaspora – the Spyurk. However,
today the situation of Armenia and Armenians has changed radically:
there is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the situation in Javakhq,
the Azerbaijani-Turkish blockade, the danger of the resumption of
war. In short, the problem of the physical security of Armenia is a
very real one.

However, the genocide recognition campaign, conducted without serious
research and planning, still remains the main aim of political activity
of the Diaspora, consuming huge amounts of national resources and
human potential at the expense of efforts on other important national
fronts. In their activities the Diaspora’s organizational structures
give an obvious priority to the international recognition of the
Genocide over current security problems of Armenia.

Armenia itself still separates the Karabakh problem from the process
of international recognition of the Genocide, and considers it apart
even from the Armenian Question at large. But the possible universal
recognition of the Genocide in the not-so-distant future will not
mean the vanishing of the Armenian Question from the international
political arena. Since the essence of the Armenian question is not
the international recognition of the Genocide, but the creation of a
mature Armenian state on such a territory, which would insure a safe,
viable existence and development of the Armenian civilization. From
that perspective there are no developed plans on further activities
of the Armenians.

In short, the Armenian political elite and society on the whole
display an irresponsible, almost childish approach to the question
of international recognition of the Genocide, one that resembles the
whimsical game "she loves me, she loves me not", in this case with
the refrain "she recognizes, she does not recognize". In the meantime,
a correct reorientation (regardless how difficult) of this process may
give immense political capital to Armenia and the Armenians in general.

It is long overdue that Armenia and Armenians evaluated similar
resolutions with their own (still not formulated) criteria, which
would correspond to the historical reality as well as national and
state interests. Below are five main criteria for such assessment:

~@¢Accurate indication of the chronology of the Genocide: 1894-1923;

~@¢Necessary mentioning of the fact that the Armenians were annihilated
in their homeland – the western part of Armenia;

~@¢Unambiguous indication of the state, which committed this
crime against humanity, i.e. Ottoman Turkey, as well as the direct
condemnation of its legal successor, the Republic of Turkey, for
denying the Armenian Genocide and committing hostile acts towards
present-day Armenia (the blockade, the refusal to establish diplomatic
relations, the information warfare, the military aid to Azerbaijan,
etc.);

~@¢Recognition of the responsibility of the Turkish state before the
Armenian state, the ultimate representative of the interests of the
Armenian nation, and the necessity of compensating, particularly,
the Republic of Armenia (implying, above all, the territorial
compensation);

~@ Mandatory linkage of the consequences of the Genocide with the
current geopolitical situation in the region. In other words –
the acknowledgement of the foremost effect of the Genocide on the
security of Armenia and the region.

The truth is that the Genocide created a territorial problem by
decreasing the historical area of habitation of Armenians to a
critically dangerous scale, threatening the very existence of the
nation. It is exactly in this context that one must view the issue of
liberation of Artsakh (thanks to which the borders of Armenia acquired
defensibility and minimally necessary strategic depth), as well as
the provision for the secure development of the Armenians of Javakhq.

The task of Armenian diplomacy is to skillfully tie the international
recognition of the Armenian Genocide to a just resolution of the
Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the achievement of lasting security
in the region. By recognizing the Genocide, the international
community is obligated to make the next logical step and recognize
the right of Armenians to Artsakh, including all of the liberated
territory. Meanwhile, in parallel with the increase in attention to
the issue of the Genocide in the publications of western media as
well as in the politics of certain countries, recently, there is a
notable tendency of strengthening pro-Azerbaijani positions regarding
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This may completely devalue the process
of international recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

The above-mentioned criteria regarding responsibility and compensation
have not yet been included in any of the resolutions adopted by
international institutions. The R106 is not an exception either. It
does not contain a clear and unambiguous condemnation of the current
Republic of Turkey.

Though by accepting the timeframe of the Armenian Genocide between
the years of 1915 to 1923, the resolution necessarily implies the
responsibility of the founders of this republic as well (they were
in control of the most of current territory of Turkey since 1920).

It is true that the last section of the resolution calls upon the
US President "to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States
reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues
related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in
the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide and the
consequences of the failure to realize a just resolution." However,
the fair statement about "the consequences of the failure to realize
a just resolution" is ambiguous.

A direct referring to the current geopolitical predicament of Armenia
as a consequence of the Genocide is absolutely needed.

Moreover, after meeting with the Turkish Ambassador on October 10th
of 2007 the second-ranking Democrat in the House, Majority Leader
Steny Hoyer, a supporter of the R106, expressed hope that Turkey would
realize it is not a condemnation of its current government but rather
of "another government, at another time." The Democratic Representative
Tom Lantos, the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
in turn, said he would soon propose a second resolution reaffirming
the US-Turkish alliance and friendship.

Anyway, time does not wait. It is today that Armenia must begin
the development and realization of the next phase of the policy for
overcoming the consequences of the Genocide. Tomorrow, when it will
have on the one hand the universal recognition of the Genocide and,
on the other, a dwindled and weakened Diaspora (as a result of an
accelerated process of assimilation) it will be too late.

The pragmatism of the foreign policy of Armenia means not the blatant
ignoring of the apparent animosity of Turkey, but the comprehensive
actualization of the Armenian Question, first of all with the help
of realistically thought out propositions regarding territorial
compensations to Armenia.

ARMEN AYVAZYAN Ph.D. in Political Science, Director of the "Ararat"
Center for Strategic Research

–Boundary_(ID_mNrQCXz2quEN2V4GtLrH1g)–