THE PERSIAN ABYSS: IRANIAN EVOLUTION: FACTS AND FANTASIES
by Reza Zarabi
Jerusalem Post
Oct 16 2007
One thing must be clear. By "Islamic government," nobody in Iran
means a political regime in which the clerics would have a role of
supervision or control [1].
In the fall of 1978, France’s preeminent philosopher, Michel Foucault,
penned those words absent of any understanding of Iran’s monarchial
power or the role of the cleric in Iranian life. Even a nominal
appreciation for the historical milieu of Western actions against
the country and how they shaped the Iranian psyche were foreign to
Foucault’s assessment of the uprisings. Instead, he drew his analysis
from a more familiar place, spawned from his theoretical persuasions
on the idea of man and what he can ultimately become. His optimism
was rooted not in what would result from a revolution in a particular
country but simply the idea of a revolution, of the common man’s
defiance against the injustice of an oppressive government.
Philosophies aside, this same delirium has now infected the current
Iranian debate but with more long-lasting and consequential effects
on the region as a whole. As an Iranian, I am sometimes mystified by
the jejune idealism and the pseudo-prescience that have become endemic
in the rhetoric of Washington policy makers and columnists regarding
Iran’s future. Yet, from propping up despots who inflict hell upon
their citizenry in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to aligning with fascists of
convenience like Saddam Hussein when he was decimating the unwanted of
his society and then going to war with that same tyrant once American
economic interests were threatened, and to being overtly complicit in
arming and training of Islamic psychopaths like Bin Laden who later
attacked the American mainland, it would appear that Washington may
attempt to reconcile its past failures by introducing a monumental
one, a grand finale, if you will. In this respect, one must inquire,
why would the current US strategy towards Iran be the successful
aberration in the stream of failures that make up American foreign
policy in the Middle East?
Washington’s checkered past
When viewing the panoramic of America’s relations with Middle East
nations, Washington seems to have prostituted its moral imperative
long ago. For decades, American ideology has been largely compromised
and in some instances outright abandoned for the sake of establishing
de-facto hegemony in the region. Although the era of colonialization
and the act of usurping another’s territory has long past, a method
commonly used by global powers to bring about the same results is
aligning oneself with undemocratic systems that will acquiesce to the
host country’s objective. This is clearly the paradigm that America
has adopted in the Middle East. In turn, financial assistance of all
kinds is provided by the American regime while human rights abuses
and even the most egregious acts are overlooked.
Up until the end of the 1970s, American policy in the Middle East
was primarily motivated by fears of Soviet expansionism and American
energy concerns. The disparity of the Middle East nations and the
complex rivalries and alliances that were in place for decades
forced Washington to adopt a foreign policy position of "being all
things to all peoples" in order to assure each respective country that
Washington would assist in the permanence of each regime, irrespective
of their proclivities. Within each Middle Eastern nation, the notion
of representative government, viable economic policies, and a modicum
of social freedoms for their populations were clearly absent. Yet,
what was remarkably ubiquitous was overt US support for each political
system, governments that ordinary Americans would never tolerate.
The mass protests and worker strikes in Teheran that eventually led
to the Iranian revolution put an end to the established US policy
for the Middle East. Having lost a powerful ally who consistently
acquiesced to American interests and having been demoralized by the
hostage crisis in Teheran, Washington made the calculated decision
to provoke and overtly support, with all its means, Teheran’s Western
neighbor Sadamm Hussein into attacking and possibly overthrowing the
incipient Iranian government.
At the same time, the tentacles of the Soviet Empire had reached deep
into a troubled Afghanistan. Fearing a communist outbreak and the
possibility of Soviet puppet states spreading throughout the Middle
East, the American government saw fit to arm, train, and assist what
was then known as the Mujahadeen. These were primarily radicalized
Islamicists from across the Middle Eastern spectrum yet because they
were doing Washington’s bidding, the US was only happy to offer the
necessary time, resources, and energy to their mission. However,
after the Soviet defeat in this fractured country and long after
the last CIA operative had gone back to Washington, elements of what
later became al-Qaida coalesced and began questioning why the American
government was propping up the tyrants who ruled their countries.
The Nascent Islamic Republic
The circumstances that gave rise to Khomeini and the velayat-e faqih
ideology were not anomalies to the conditions of other regional
nations. Within the region’s autocratic societies, whether the former
Shah’s Iran, the current Saudi system, or Mubarak’s Egypt, all and any
political opposition, civil institutions, or any non-governmental
organization are banned outright. As a result, every political
opposition to the status quo emanates from the only other entity
with the financial means and constituency to counter the autocracy,
in other words, the religious establishment. It was these circumstances
that made the Khomeinists the most powerful opposition to the Shah.
They were more organized, had more resources, and a loyal base.
The decades of rule under the Shah’s brutality and the 1953 CIA coup,
which vanquished Iran’s only experience with democracy, were still
fresh in the minds of Iranians. As Texas Congressman Ron Paul rightly
states, "They remember everything and we forget everything". It was
this Iranian paranoia and the animus against decades of American
involvement in the internal affairs of their country that drove
radicalized students to storm the US embassy in November of 1979.
The subsequent Iraqi invasion of Iran and the unabashed support that
Sadamm garnered from America in terms of weaponry, intelligence,
and financial aid further hardened Iranian notions of a US attempt to
control their nation. The salient role that America and other Western
nations had in supplying Iraq with chemical weapons that were later
used on Iranian soldiers and their unwillingness to condemn Hussein
for the atrocities augured well for the most reactionary elements
within the Iranian political arena in their attempts to solidify
power and marginalize all opposition. Even today, both clerics and
politicians amongst Iran’s conservative-wing evoke American complicity
with Hussein.
Yet after the 8-year war of attrition with Iraq, grandiose but empty
promises made by uneducated clerics who possessed not even a nominal
understanding of basic economics, and having undergone such a radical
social metamorphosis in so short of a time, the overwhelming majority
of Iran’s population along with elements of its political elite have
become disillusioned with the Islamic Republic. Although he and his
successor brought many changes to Iran, Khomeini’s promise that "no one
should remain homeless in this country," and that Iranians would have
free or relatively inexpensive telephone access, heating, electricity,
public transportation, and oil have yet to be realized [2]. In the
words of notable journalist and democracy activist Akbar Ganji, "There
has always been a gap between the ideals [of the Islamic Republic] and
their practice" [3]. As someone who initially supported the revolution,
he concludes that "every honest" revolutionary must reconcile with
the aftermath of the revolution, initially believing that the leaders
have betrayed the foundational tenets of the revolution, to realizing
the deficiencies of the revolution, and to finally accepting that the
ideology of the revolution was fundamentally flawed from the onset [4].
A Fool’s Errand
Although the US-sponsored sanctions against Iran have undoubtedly
hurt the nation, the ideological absurdity of the Islamic Republic
hierarchy is to blame for the country’s economic woes. When
considering a resource-rich nation with the economic potential of
Iran and then juxtaposing that to its current economic stagnation,
there is universal consensus that the culpability lies solely with
its leaders. Since coming to power, the Mullahs have not only missed
every opportunity to improve the economic conditions for their people
(i.e. courting foreign investment, reviving the tourism industry,
etc.) but have also alienated countries that once had natural ties
with the Iranian nation while attempting to build ties with nations
that have an inherent odium towards their people and government.
Take, for instance, Iran’s stance towards the Israeli-Palestinian
issue. No matter what result ensues, the nation of Iran, its leaders,
or its citizens will gain nothing from the outcome. In light of this,
one wonders why Iran would even involve itself in such a distant
affair? Understanding the worldview of the Islamic Republic government
and how incompatible its ideology is with its own survival will shed
light on why the Iranian nation is experiencing such massive economic
decline and so many unresolved security threats to its regime.
The Mullahs of Iran consistently portray themselves as the Vanguard
for the protection of Muslim rights, yet their own history states
otherwise. In nearly every conflict that has pitted a Muslim country
against a non-Muslim country, the government of Iran has seldom,
if ever, allowed its Islamic dogma to entangle itself within
the respective conflict. In 1988, when the ex-Soviet nations of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, a country that not only has religious ties
to Iran but is also ethnically linked to it, engaged in hostilities
towards each other due to Armenia’s territorial claims over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region in Azerbaijan, Iran was notably silent,
and in many ways, offered muted support to Christian Armenia due
to its own regional interests. When considering the Cyprus issue,
which involves the Christian country of Greece against Iran’s fellow
Muslim neighbor Turkey, Iran has silently supported Greece due to its
long-standing economic relations with that nation. Regarding Chechnya
and its separatist tendencies within the Russian Federation, the
Islamic Republic government has utterly failed to show the slightest
degree of sympathy to the war-torn enclave as Christian Russian tanks
bulldoze the homes of their fellow Muslim brethren. Within the former
Yugoslavia, when fellow Muslims were being butchered as a result of
Milosevic’s genocidal policies, Iran failed to dispatch any members
of Hizbullah or the Revolutionary Guards to their aid.
So why has the Islamic Republic chosen to entangle itself in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
Israel, unlike America, had no evident role in propping up the former
Shah. Unlike America and the overwhelming majority of the Arab World,
Israel overtly helped Iran by providing it with weapons in its war
with Iraq. Israel and Iran have never had any territorial dispute or
historical grievance against each other. Therefore, what has led the
Islamic Republic government to display such uncontrollable rancor
towards such a banal country?
It is here that the Islamic Republic’s ideology becomes an impediment
to its own development and ultimately a threat to its survival.
Iran’s animus towards Israel is spawned primarily by two reasons.
Iran, motivated by its paranoia of possible American involvement
in its internal affairs and American support for Israel, does not
view the Jewish state as a sovereign nation. It views Israel as an
American satellite, a nation that has a foreign policy so intertwined
with American objectives, that it, in essence, has become America’s
de-facto 51st state. Iran’s despots view any recognition of the
"Zionist entity" as a security threat to their regime, yet this belief,
which is only shared by Iran’s ruling conservative wing, is based on
a false construct. A proper historical analysis of the region clearly
indicates that it is in Iran’s strategic interests to have a Middle
East with a multi-ethnic presence to counter the historical rivalries
between Iran and the vast array of Arab governments. The presence of
countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Israel serve Iran’s interest.
The second false assumption that drives the Islamic Republic to an
anti-Israel platform is Iran’s goal to garner favor in the broader
Arab World in order to fully implement its designs over the Middle
East. Yet, for the better part of thirty years, Iran’s attempts to
curb Arab suspicions have largely failed and, in many instances, have
backfired. Today, it is not the Israeli government that is warning of a
"Shiite crescent", but the Sunni Arab nations to Iran’s west.
Within nations such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, there have
been a slew of Sunni clerics and government officials that not only
have excoriated Iran for its nationalist objectives but have made
statements suggesting that the Shia faith itself is a perversion
of Islam. In this respect, we see Iran’s anti-Israeli platform
undermining the Islamic Republic’s regional objective. Certainly
Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric has reaped a constituency in the Palestinian
territories, southern Lebanon, and other parts of the Arab world,
but one must question how garnering favor with taxi drivers in Cairo,
sandwich shop owners in Damascus, or college students in Amman will
serve Iran’s security and regional objectives?
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has recently attempted to expand these ludicrous
policies in Latin America by courting third-tier tyrants in developing
nations like Venezuela, Cuba, or Nicaragua. Yet, it appears that the
utter uselessness of these alliances to Iran’s economic development
and security concerns has yet to permeate the mind of the Iranian
president. America and Israel possess nuclear-tipped ICBMs that can
evaporate Tehran in 8 minutes yet Ahmadinejad feels that the annual
supply of mangos he receives from Chavez or the newly-shipped crates
of figs from Assad can somehow counter this threat.
If Iran’s regional policy was motivated by pragmatics, it would have
realized that a strong, tactical alliance with Israel would not only
counter American threats, but nullify the years of American sanctions
against the Islamic Republic. Israel, unlike the Arab world, is a
rich, technologically-advanced nation that could help Iran with its
internal development and act as a bulwark for the Iranian regime
against anti-Iranian actions from the American government. An
alliance with a nation like Israel would reap several economic
benefits for Iran but entities such as Lebanon, Palestine, Syria,
Cuba, and Venezuela are of no value, providing nothing but liability
risks to the Islamic Republic.
Israel, like Iran, is isolated and unpopular in the international
community and therefore needs as many allies as it could possibly
acquire, regardless of US concerns. Even now, if the Islamic Republic
would adopt a foreign policy that is aligned with its own strategic
interests, the Jewish state would welcome it. Israel, unlike the Arab
world, does not have an archaic rivalry with Iran and is indifferent
to the possibility of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, assuming
that its own security would not be threatened. Israel is certainly an
American ally, yet it ultimately is responsible for its own security
and if building diplomatic ties with certain rogue nations serves its
own regional interests, then it would not hesitate to take those steps,
regardless of who it may offend.
Had the Islamic Republic leadership not sacrificed its own security,
economic potential, and the technological advancement the country for
a misguided ideology, the prosperity of the Iranian state and Iran’s
role as a regional power would have long ago been realized.
Musharaff or Pinochet
Today, the Islamic Republic government is a sinking ship. What the
three decades of a US embargo, an Iraqi invasion, constant threats
of war, and harsh UN sanctions could not accomplish will most likely
materialize by reason of the Mullah’s own economic ineptitude. Yet,
in all probability, the notion of a democratic system being installed
the night the Mullahs fall is overly optimistic and should not be
entertained. Power, either economic or political, and the subsequent
wielding of it is seldom born in a vacuum. The years of governmental
encroachment upon economic, political, and social rights has left
a marginalized Iranian population with neither the economic potency
nor the political will to bring about a replay of 1979. However, the
gradual demise of the Mullahs has been underway for some time now
and because of the perpetuation of ineffective policies regarding
the economy and the nation’s security, a fifth column of power has
risen within the Iranian political arena. This latent force is the
Revolutionary Guards, and regardless of what happens in terms of a
possible war against Iran, the prospect of worker strikes and protests,
or any nominal democratic movement, it will be this entity, and most
probably only this entity, that will steer the nation in the future.
Many in the West still view the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) as a
group of hired mercenaries that are fully under the control of the
demagogues of the Islamic hierarchy. Although this was certainly true
for most of the 1980s, since Khomeini’s death and especially within
the last decade, the IRGC has played a critical role in not only
Iran’s military affairs but also in massive internal development
projects and increasingly in Iran’s attempts to revive a failing
economy. Because of the fiscal irresponsibility of Iran’s leaders,
it was announced earlier this year that the government would privatize
some of its national oil companies. Most Iranian economists understood
who would be acquiring these firms, for it was certainly not Shell
Oil or British Petroleum but most likely the IRGC.
What makes this group vastly different from Iran’s Mullah leadership
is that it is not composed of ideologues that base their fiscal and
national security policies on a religious book. The IRGC hierarchy
consists of economists, engineers, military strategists, chemist,
lawyers, special force reconnaissance units, and an espionage network
that rivals the Mossad or the CIA. As the Mullahs of Khomeini’s era
gradually meet their demise, there is growing speculation within Iran
that the IRGC might even play a more overt role in Iranian affairs,
both internally and externally. Although, it has spent the better part
of 3 decades defending the ideals of the revolution, at some point,
this powerful and ever-increasing autonomous group must reconcile
itself with the failures of the Islamic Republic system.
Whether there are those within the IRGC who are contemplating crossing
their proverbial Persian Rubicon is still a matter of debate. However,
the reality is that the policies of the Mullahs are endangering
the security apparatus of Iran’s power structure and because of the
fact that the IRGC leadership has essentially married this system,
it can no longer outsource the future security of the paradigm it
helped create to incompetent, uneducated clerics with no record of
success. If the policies that Khamenei and his ilk in the Council of
Experts eventually lead to an economic collapse or an imposed war on
Iran, a coup d’etat of some kind will most likely ensue.
Although Iran’s hierarchy has certain nuances that are unique
amongst its neighbors, this very scenario is all too common in the
Middle East, as nations such as Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, Qatar, Iraq,
Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran itself have previously experienced. It is
difficult to say what type of government will take form as a result of
an IRGC coup, yet the possibilities for both progressive and militant
extremes are present. Assuming that no war is imposed upon Iran and
for whatever reason, the IRGC decides to replace the government,
there is a strong chance of a Musharaff-style government taking
hold in Iran. Although Pervez Musharaff of Pakistan is by no means
a symbol of democracy or representative government, this change in
Iranian leadership could have many positive results for Iran and her
people. Yet if another war were introduced to this disheveled region
of the world, a military dictatorship of the same level of cruelty
as Chile’s Pinochet is all but certain.
The Waning of the West
Eventually, every era has its end and it is not unreasonable to
suggest that overt American influence within the broader Middle East
is now gradually diminishing. Within each respective population of the
Middle Eastern nations that constitute America’s allies in the region,
except for Israel, there is an undeniable detestation towards American
involvement in their internal affairs. From Egypt, to Jordan, to Saudi
Arabia, to the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms, the same dynamics that brought
about Khomeini are manifest within each society. In comparison,
a nation like Iran, having gone through the Islamic euphoria of
the post-revolution phase only to be disappointed by corruption and
repression that emanated from the highest levels of their government
is gradually shifting towards secular self-determination. America’s
oblivious attitude and lack of a counter policy will only precipitate
the inevitable.
With Iran, Washington has a chance to revert the damage caused by
its foreign policy within the region. Instead of labeling the IRGC a
terrorist organization, which only results in a reactionary response
with no substantial behavior change within Iran, the US should
be reaching out to elements within the IRGC, realizing that their
increasing power can act as the sole catalyst for change within Iran.
If they have done so in Pakistan, which holds a vehement anti-American
population, what makes them doubt that events in Iran would differ?
American self-image is not the pervading representation that
most people in the Middle East have towards it, whether they are
pro-American populations like that of Iran or anti-American populations
like Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Because of the chasm between its rhetoric
and action, the U.S. is primarily viewed as an opportunist whose
actions are clearly motivated by its own interests and not for
the betterment of Middle Eastern citizens. The chaos in Iraq and
the unfinished endeavor in Afghanistan have only further tarnished
America’s scarred reputation. After decades of the same foreign policy
in such an eclectic region, US policy makers should now understand
that to forfeit long-term goals of building democratic societies
for short-term economic and strategic gains is not only naïve but
detrimental to its own interests, both regionally and globally.
Notes
[1] html An excerpt
from Foucault and the Iranian Revolution Gender and the Seductions
of Islamism Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson First published in Le
Nouvel Observateur, October 16-22, 1978.
[2] l
[3] CNN interview with Akbar Ganji, January 15, 2007.
8195334668566075&q=akbar+ganji&total=24&am p;start=0&num=10&so=0&type=search& plindex=3
[4] Ibid.
–Boundary_(ID_TdhGXsI1nIqcHhx79k09fQ)–