AFTER GENOCIDE DISPUTE, FRANCE SMOOTHES RELATIONS WITH TURKEY
By Katrin Bennhold
International Herald Tribune, France
Oct 17 2007
PARIS: If the U.S. Congress has doubts about Turkey’s threats to punish
any country that calls the mass murder of Armenians at the hands of
the Ottoman Empire genocide, they need look no further than France.
Ankara circulated unofficial guidelines discouraging business with
French companies after Parliament here passed a first Armenia bill
in 2001; exports plunged by nearly 40 percent. When a second bill
– which would make it illegal to deny that the Armenians suffered
genocide – was drawn up last year, the Turkish government cut off
military relations with Paris, scrapping automatic overflight rights
and port access.
Now relations are slowly warming up again – and not because President
Nicolas Sarkozy, an outspoken opponent of Turkish membership in the
European Union, has softened his stance, but because his administration
has quietly made it clear that it will keep the second Armenia bill
from going to the second and final vote in the Senate.
"The issue is very sensitive and has the power to affect relations
with Turkey," warned Egemen Bagis, foreign policy adviser of Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The new French administration has appeared eager to mend relations
with Ankara. Within weeks of being inaugurated in May, Sarkozy sent
his top diplomatic adviser, Jean-David Levitte, to Turkey and in
September he met Erdogan on the margins of the UN General Assembly.
This month, it was Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner’s turn to travel
to Ankara where he and his counterpart started preparing a formal
summit of the two leaders.
There is a paradox here: Sarkozy’s predecessor Jacques Chirac
unequivocally favored Turkish membership in the EU. But it was under
Chirac that relations turned icy, following the first Armenia bill
in 2001 and the lower house vote approving the second in 2006.
The furor over the vote last week by a Congressional committee to
designate the Armenian killings as genocide has underscored the
extent to which the Armenia issue trumps any other in Turkey – even
EU membership, which Turkey has sought for decades.
Officially it is up to French lawmakers to decide the fate of the
second Armenia bill. It was approved by a majority in the National
Assembly, and now only needs signing off by the Senate. But the
president sets the voting agenda of the Senate and can stall the
legislation by simply not scheduling it, officials say.
In return, the Turkish government is considering reinstating France’s
permanent overflight rights and reinforcing business ties with France,
Bagis said.
But the shift in France’s Turkey policy goes further. Not unlike
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, who shifted her language once in
power, Sarkozy has backed away from blunt campaign demands to suspend
Turkey’s EU membership negotiation.
He has signaled that France would allow some 30 of the 35 negotiation
chapters to go ahead. He is even seeking a politically feasible way
of removing a clause from the constitution that demands a referendum
for every future enlargement of the EU – a clause that was added under
Chirac in a bid to reassure voters opposed to Turkey’s accession and
that has irked Ankara.
French officials say it is not in spite of his opposition to EU
membership, but because of it, that Sarkozy has been able to go on a
diplomatic charm offensive. As one French diplomat put it: "It takes
a president who is opposed to EU membership to create closer ties
with Turkey."
French public opinion remains overwhelmingly hostile to the idea of
Turkey joining the EU, fearing that a large, overwhelmingly Muslim
country would not be compatible with European values, overstretch
the bloc’s finances and send waves of poor migrants westward.
But Turkish goodwill matters for at least three of Sarkozy’s declared
strategic priorities: beefing up Europe’s defense capacity alongside
NATO, of which Turkey has been a member since 1952; building a
Mediterranean Union; and helping French industry win new business,
especially in the energy sector.
Turkey has the second-biggest army in NATO and is a regular contributor
to EU peacekeeping operations. Some 250 Turkish soldiers are in
Bosnia as part of an EU force and Paris has asked Ankara to join an
operation that will go to Chad. A Muslim country that is an ally
of Israel, Turkey is also crucial to uniting the countries around
the Mediterranean.
"There are a lot of reasons why Turkey remains a country of great
importance to France," said one ambassador from an EU country. "The
Turks are militarily competent and make a real contribution to
European missions."
At the same time, companies like nuclear power giant Areva and Gaz
de France are eager to win contracts in Turkey, which is not only
a bridgehead to the energy-rich regions of the Middle East and the
Caucasus but is also preparing to launch its own nuclear power sector,
an investment opportunity estimated by some at $10 billion.
Herve Novelli, the minister of trade, is taking at least a dozen
business leaders to Turkey in February.
Against that backdrop, Sarkozy and Erdogan appear to have struck
what the conservative daily Le Figaro last week called "a gentlemen’s
agreement": They have set aside a question that may only arise when
both leaders have left power.
"The membership question is 10 or 15 years away. Why let that get in
the way?" said Bagis. "Today there is a mutual will to mend relations."
The potential for misunderstanding remains. On the Turkish side,
many are hopeful that Sarkozy has actually softened his position on
the question of membership.
"I sense that Sarkozy wants to slowly turn from his anti-membership
stance to a more objective stance. But he can’t do it overnight,"
a senior Turkish diplomat said.
In Paris, meanwhile, Sarkozy and his administration insist that their
insistence on a close association with the EU for Turkey, rather than
outright membership, will win the day.
"In 10 years’ time the question will not even be asked anymore,"
predicted Henri Guaino, Sarkozy’s personal envoy on Mediterranean
affairs and long-time speechwriter. "Turkey is too big. It’s impossible
to absorb."
Whoever prevails, there are many on both sides who concur that Turkey
benefits from aligning its political and legal system with that of
European countries.
"The road to accession – democracy and human rights – is much more
important than accession itself," said Can Paker, a member of Turkey’s
biggest employers’ group. "Who knows what will happen in fifteen
years? Turkey may not even want to join Europe anymore."