WHY TURKEY OPPOSES THAT TALK OF GENOCIDE
By Brent E. Sasley
Fort Worth Star Telegram, TX
Oct 17 2007
At first glance, one has to wonder why Turkey is so opposed to
labeling the massacres of the Armenians in the early 20th century as
genocide. After all, it was not Turkey but the Ottoman Empire that
committed the atrocities; Turkey as a country was not even around
then. And genocide is such a horrific crime, the worst of humanity’s
inhumanity, that to not recognize it when it is obvious seems callous,
ignorant and immoral.
But national identity infuses all countries’ foreign policies, and
this is made abundantly clear in the case of Turkey and the genocide
resolution recently passed by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Turkish identity is based on the guiding principles that the
country’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, laid out in the
1920s and 1930s. World War I had just ended; the Ottoman Empire was
dissolved; and the new country that was to become Turkey was itself
cut into pieces, with territory given to form a new Armenian state,
an autonomous Kurdish area and Greek, French, and Italian spheres of
influence. In addition, the Allies were set to take control of the
country’s finances.
Kemal led a resistance movement that drove out the Europeans and took
back control over the proposed Armenian and Kurdish territories.
Firmly believing that the survival of the country was dependent on the
Turks’ maintaining an uncompromising set of values, orientations and
borders, Kemal defined the new Turkish identity: strict borders that
would not be compromised (which included giving up Ottoman claims on
the new Arab states) and, more important, citizens who were defined
by their ethnic and linguistic "Turkishness."
Though vague, this formula precluded the Kurds from being recognized
as their own ethno-cultural nation — they were now simply referred
to as "mountain Turks." Equally important, Turkey’s value structure
would no longer be bounded by Islam, as the Ottoman Empire’s had
been; instead, it would be secular, with Islam no longer providing
the framework for political and social organization. Islamic laws,
previously the basis for Ottoman society, were removed and undermined.
Finally, the glory, greatness and near-infallibility of the Turkish
nation — including its pre-Islamic past — were emphasized. All of
these principles were enshrined in the constitution.
It makes sense to ask how this identity can possibly relate to the
question of recognizing the Armenian genocide. It is not the genocide
itself that Turkey fears recognizing (though it is reluctant to
accept what it sees as blame on behalf of the Ottoman Empire) but
rather what the consequences of that recognition might be.
Recognizing the genocide would be an admission of Turkey’s
imperfections. Recognizing that other nations have a claim against the
Turkish state would embolden others to make claims against the state
and lead to its breakup — the very thing that Turks, remembering
their post-World War I experience, fear most.
The Kurds would begin asking for recognition of their cultural
distinctiveness, which would strengthen continuing Kurdish claims for
autonomy in the southeast. Islamist groups would begin demanding that
Islam be allowed back into the public sphere, which would undermine
the secularism that much of the elite believe has made Turkey strong.
Thus, no claim against the state can be tolerated.
But despite this, Turkey will not completely harm its ties with the
U.S., for two reasons.
Turkish identity is complex, and more than just the ethnic-linguistic
make-up of its citizens. It also is based on a Western orientation:
Turkey has, since its creation in 1923, seen itself as part of
the Western world, with societal and political structures that
reflect this. To become a member of civilized international society,
Turkey’s identity had to be Western. This is why Turkey adopted the
Gregorian calendar and the Swiss civil code, enshrined secularism
in the constitution and did what it could to remove Islam from the
public sphere.
The nation has powerful strategic reasons to maintain a close
relationship with the U.S. Washington has been the biggest supporter
of Turkish membership in the European Union; it has provided crucial
diplomatic support for Turkey’s efforts to expand its influence
in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East; and it retains
dominance in international financial institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund, from which Turkey needs economic aid.
There will be — indeed, already has been — a backlash in Turkey
against the United States. But Turkey cannot harm its ties with the
U.S. too much; both its past orientation and its future needs make
it too difficult to do so.
Brent E. Sasley teaches Middle East politics in the Department of
Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington.
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