THE PKK AND THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE RESOLUTION: U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE
By Soner Cagaptay

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, DC
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Oct 23 2007

On October 21, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) operatives carried out
an attack from northern Iraq into Turkey, killing twelve Turkish
soldiers. This incident followed the killing of more than thirty
people in recent weeks, including an incident in which the PKK pulled
a dozen civilians off a public bus and shot them. The Turkish public
has responded to the attacks by calling for incursion into northern
Iraq to eliminate PKK camps there.

Exacerbating these developments is the October 10 House Foreign
Affairs Committee vote in favor of the Armenian Genocide Resolution
(AGR), which recognizes the deportation of Ottoman Armenians during
World War I as genocide. Regardless of its intent, the AGR could
hold a number of negative consequences for U.S.-Turkish relations. In
addition to diplomatic tensions, the committee’s action may jeopardize
U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, increase the likelihood of a
Turkish incursion into northern Iraq, and increase the prospects of
Turkish-Iranian rapprochement.

Reactions to the AGR

Many Turks strongly object to the depiction of the Armenian incident
as genocide. Consequently, the U.S. resolution has led to a public
backlash in Turkey — where U.S. popularity is already at an all-time
low due in large part to Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) attacks that
continue to emanate from U.S.-controlled northern Iraq.

Turkey’s leaders have shown similar discontent in the resolution’s
wake. On October 11, Ankara recalled its ambassador from Washington
"for consultations," and on October 13, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan stated that U.S.-Turkish relations "could be cut off" if new
tensions emerge. On October 14, Chief of Staff Gen. Yasar Buyukanit
stated that U.S.-Turkish ties would "never again be the same" if the
committee passed the resolution. And on October 17, Erdogan received
authorization from the Turkish parliament to send troops to northern
Iraq in response to increased PKK attacks.

The Turkish public has been following the AGR debate closely. Despite
their overall negative response, most Turks have contained themselves
somewhat because they understand the distinction between a committee
vote and a full House vote. But if Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
succeeds in her expressed intent to bring the resolution before a
full vote before Thanksgiving, a serious public backlash will likely
unfold in Turkey, pushing the government toward even more concrete
measures against Washington.

There are some signs, however, that the AGR might stall. Since the
committee vote, seventeen House members have withdrawn their signatures
from the resolution, bringing the number of cosponsors down to 211 —
just under majority.

Short-Term Problems in Afghanistan and Iraq?

The Bush administration’s vociferous opposition to the AGR reflects
the crucial nature of Turkey’s collaboration with U.S. efforts in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. On October 15, Defense Secretary Robert Gates
responded to the committee vote by emphasizing this collaboration,
stating for example that 70 percent of all cargo en route to Iraq
and Afghanistan is sent through Turkey. Indeed, Ankara’s blanket
permission for U.S. logistical operations opens crucial land and air
routes for military equipment and personnel.

Consequently, Ankara can exercise leverage on several points in
response to the AGR.

Afghanistan. The most immediate of these levers are in Afghanistan.

Turkey has 1,150 troops in the country, as well as a reconstruction
team responsible for building infrastructure in Wardak province. The
Turkish military (in collaboration with France and Italy) is in charge
of security in central Afghanistan, including Kabul. In addition,
Turkey has led the International Security and Assistance Force twice in
Afghanistan — more so than any other NATO country — making Turkish
personnel a significantly experienced asset in the country. As a
short-term response, Ankara might demonstrate its discomfort with
the U.S.-Turkish alliance by reducing its commitments in Afghanistan.

Iraq. With regard to the Iraq war, the most important U.S. strategic
assets in Turkey are the Incirlik base in the south (a major cargo
and troop rotation hub) and the Habur crossing in the southeast (the
only border gate between Turkey and Iraq). Currently, the United
States has more than 1,100 troops at Incirlik, and the Habur gate
is the chief land supply conduit from Europe and Turkey into Iraq,
with more than 5,000 truck crossings per day.

The Turkish media has called for a reduction in U.S. capabilities at
Incirlik and Habur should the AGR pass in the House. On October 11,
the Turkish daily Milliyet, a pro-Western, mainstream newspaper, ran a
front-page editorial calling for an end to Turkey’s policy of providing
the United States with a blank check in using Incirlik. It may not be
possible to dismiss such rhetoric when America’s standing in Turkey
is at an all-time low — a recent Pew Center poll showed that only
9 percent of Turks had favorable feelings toward the United States.

Given rising Turkish casualties as a result of PKK attacks, it is
plausible that Turkey would have considered incursions into northern
Iraq even regardless of the AGR’s status. On Sunday, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice called on the Turkish government to "wait
for a few days" before taking action into northern Iraq, and Ankara
agreed. If the full House passes the AGR, however, there would be
increased public pressure on the government to act, making an Iraq
incursion more likely than not.

Aligning with Iran?

The AGR might also push Turkey closer to Iran. The PKK issue alone
has already moved the two countries closer together. Historically,
they have been adversaries, particularly since the 1979 Islamic
Revolution in Iran. Turkey’s secular democracy contrasted with
Iran’s authoritarian theocracy, which subsequently supported PKK
and Islamist terrorist action against Turkey. Since the Iraq war,
however, Iran has recalibrated its Turkey policy. In an effort to
break its own growing strategic isolation, Tehran has wooed Ankara
on a number of fronts. Iran has not only ceased supporting the PKK,
it has begun to actively combat the group. According to media reports,
Iran frequently bombs PKK camps inside Iraq. Turkish sentiment toward
Iran has warmed up significantly in response: according to a 2006
poll by the German Marshall Fund, 43 percent of Turks hold favorable
feelings toward Iran, compared to 34 percent in 2004.

For the time being, long-term Turkish-Iranian alignment appears
amorphous; for instance, Ankara has yet to finalize the countries’
bilateral July 2007 memorandum of understanding on energy
cooperation. The AGR could well solidify these and other nascent
signs of alliance, however.

Conclusion

If passed, the AGR would make it difficult for Turkish policymakers
to speak in favor of alignment with the United States, especially on
major foreign policy issues such as Iran and Iraq. Alternatively,
a stalled AGR would be an amicable gesture that could strengthen
America’s supporters in Turkey and perhaps even dissuade Ankara from
carrying out a politically complicated operation in Iraq.

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the Turkish Research
Program at The Washington Institute.