WHY TURKEY’S ARMY WILL STAY HOME

THE KOREA HERALD
October 23, 2007 Tuesday
Korea

Just when the smoke from Turkey’s domestic political conflicts of
the past year had begun to clear, another deadly attack by Kurdish
separatists on Turkish soldiers has the government threatening military
attacks inside northern Iraq. That prospect raises risks for Turkey,
Iraq, and the United States. But there are reasons to doubt that the
situation is as dangerous as recent headlines suggest.

Turkey accuses Iraqi Kurds of harboring between 3,000 and 3,500 of
Turkey’s most active Kurdish militants – the PKK separatist guerillas
who are blamed for the deaths of 80 Turkish soldiers so far this
year. The trouble reached the boiling point on Oct. 7, when Kurdish
fighters killed 13 Turkish soldiers near Turkey’s border with Iraq.

The Turkish public has demanded action, and Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s government has responded. On Oct. 17, despite pleas
for patience and restraint from Iraq and the United States, Turkish
lawmakers voted 507-19 to authorize Erdogan to order cross-border
military strikes into Iraq at any time over the next year.

Erdogan has sent Iraqi Kurds a forceful message. But, for several
reasons, the Turkish military is likely to limit its operations to
small-scale incursions and air strikes on specific targets rather
than launch an all-out war.

First, the Turkish military has no interest in embracing the risks
that come with involvement in Iraq’s sectarian strife. A full-scale
invasion might well provoke Iraq’s own Kurdish guerrillas into
a prolonged and bloody battle with Turkish forces that can only
undermine support for Erdogan’s government at home and abroad.

Second, Turkey’s government hopes to keep the country’s bid to join
the European Union moving forward. An invasion of Iraq would bring
that process to a grinding halt. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana
has made plain that Europe strongly opposes any large-scale Turkish
military operation in Iraq.

Third, Turkey is well aware that an all-out attack inside Iraq is
exactly what Turkey’s Kurdish separatists want. What better way to
damage Turkey than to pull its military into conflict with Iraq,
the United States, and the EU? Erdogan has no intention of being
drawn into that trap.

With all that in mind, this latest move by Turkey’s parliament should
be seen more as an ultimatum to Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government to
expel the Turkish Kurds and an attempt to persuade the United States
to use its considerable influence there. That’s hardball politics,
not a declaration of war.

The parliamentary authorization itself is carefully worded to underline
Turkey’s limited aims. It stresses that Turkey’s military has no
intention of occupying Iraqi territory or threatening Iraqi Kurds
or their oil infrastructure. An attack would certainly make Iraq’s
Kurdish provinces less appealing for foreign investors. But Turkey
has no reason to attack the assets of foreign oil companies.

Iraq’s central government is aware of the risks, as well, and is
likely to exercise maximum restraint. A limited Turkish strike into
northern Iraq would probably elicit little reaction beyond public
condemnation and rhetorical assertions of Iraqi sovereignty.

Threats to Iraq’s oil infrastructure around the northern Iraqi city
of Kirkuk and other territory under the Kurdish Regional Government’s
control are minimal. Turkey’s government knows that any move to shut
down the 600-mile pipeline from Kirkuk to Turkey’s Mediterranean port
at Ceyhan would have little near-term impact, since most of Iraq’s
oil exports flow from the south, hundreds of miles from the country’s
border with Turkey.

Furthermore, the Turkish military can increase the pressure on Iraqi
Kurds with far less drastic measures. It can close the two countries’
principal border crossing, an important route for food, fuel, and
other goods headed for Iraqi Kurds. It could also cut exports of
electricity to northern Iraq.

Still, even small-scale military operations would generate risk. If
the PKK is able to launch a major attack on troops or civilians inside
Turkey, the public outcry might leave Erdogan with little choice but
to up the ante.

The issue is complicated further by Turkey’s refusal to negotiate
directly with the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. Such
talks, Turkey fears, would offer tacit acknowledgement that Iraqi
Kurds have won a degree of autonomy from Baghdad. That’s a bridge
too far for Turkey’s nationalists and its military.

There are risks for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki as well,
because Turkish military strikes on Iraq’s northern provinces could
undermine the Kurdish support on which his government increasingly
depends. Both Sunni Arabs and Kurds already resent al Maliki’s mild
reaction to Iran’s recent shelling of Iraqi territory – an attempt
to strike at Iranian Kurdish militants fleeing across its border
with Iraq.

There are also risks for the United States. Most supplies headed for
U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan move through the Incirlik airbase
in Turkey. With the threat that the U.S. House of Representatives
will approve a resolution that accuses Turks of genocide against ethic
Armenians nine decades ago, this is a particularly inopportune moment
for the two countries to be at odds over Iraq.

But, worst-case scenarios aside, a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq
can only serve the interests of Turkey’s Kurdish separatists. That’s
why cooler heads are likely to prevail. Limited cross-border operations
are increasingly likely. A war between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds is not.

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, a global political risk
consultancy. – Ed.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress