OBSERVATIONS ON: TURKEY
Martin Fletcher
New Statesman, UK
Oct 25 2007
Those wondering when Turkey will launch a military offensive against
Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq should heed the old rhyme: "Remember,
remember the fifth of November." Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish
prime minister, is due to visit Washington that day. It is scarcely
conceivable that he would order an incursion before that point.
To do so would involve sending troops from Nato’s second-biggest army
into a country controlled by Nato’s largest army, and destabilising
the only peaceful region of Iraq. Erdogan could expect a White House
welcome several degrees below zero. Why, then, is he sounding so
belligerent?
When I interviewed him for the Times this past weekend, he talked of
a military operation as if it was inevitable. He pointed out that the
Turkish parliament had voted 507-19 to authorise military action. He
said that Turkey had repeatedly asked the governments of the US and
Iraq to crack down on the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
but they had done nothing, and that Turkish patience was exhausted.
"Whatever is necessary will be done," he declared. "We don’t have to
get permission from anybody."
Such comments are designed to assuage the fury of Erdogan’s intensely
nationalistic countrymen following not only a rash of PKK attacks on
Turkish soldiers, but a move by the US Congress to define the mass
killing of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey during the First World War
as genocide.
More importantly, Erdogan’s belligerent rhetoric is intended to avert
the very action he threatens. He is trying to generate such alarm in
Washington and Baghdad that they tackle the PKK themselves.
Erdogan is no fool. He knows that the arguments against a Turkish
incursion into northern Iraq far outweigh those in favour. Such
a drastic move would cause a major breach with Washington, fuel
opposition to Turkish membership of the EU, split Nato and compound
the chaos in Iraq. It would reverse the progress Turkey has made
towards integrating its own Kurdish minority.
And it would stand scant chance of success. The Turkish army has
never been able to crush the PKK in its own territory, let alone in
the rugged terrain across the border. Erdogan has acknowledged that
24 previous cross-border operations gained nothing. In all likelihood
the 3,500 PKK guerrillas in northern Iraq would simply melt into the
mountains or seek to destroy the pipelines carrying Iraqi oil into
Turkey, while their comrades north of the border stepped up their
attacks on Turkish targets.
So far Erdogan’s strategy appears to be paying off. Washington did
launch what the US State Department called a "diplomatic full-court
press". President Bush, the secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice,
and the defence secretary, Robert Gates, all begged their Turkish
counterparts for restraint and promised US support. The Iraqi
government pledged its full co-operation. Envoys shuttled frantically
between capitals.
The outcome is still far from clear. Neither the US nor the Iraqi
government has surplus troops to send to northern Iraq. They are
instead pressuring Iraq’s Kurdish leaders to curtail PKK activities
in their semi-autonomous region, arguing that the relative security
they have achieved since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein will be at
risk if they alienate Turkey.
Is the regional government willing to crack down on fellow Kurds,
stop their cross-border raids and arrest their commanders? Does it have
the capability to do so? If the answers to those two key questions are
"no" – and they may be – Erdogan’s bluff will be called. His nation’s
anger will leave him with little choice but to follow through on his
threat, whatever the cost.