Eurasia Daily Monitor
October 9, 2007 — Volume 4, Issue 186
`ACTION FOR ACTION’ ON THE CFE TREATY: OPPORTUNITY AND RISKS
by Vladimir Socor
Delegations from 30 countries signatory to the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) held an emergency brainstorming session on October
1-2 near Berlin amid Russian threats to abandon the treaty imminently.
Discussions are continuing in Vienna. With NATO unity less than ironclad on
how to preserve the treaty, the issue will be taken up bilaterally at a
meeting of the U.S. secretaries of state and defense with Russia’s ministers
of foreign affairs and defense in the coming days.
Russia is temporarily suspending its compliance with key terms of the
treaty and has announced its intention to break out of the CFE treaty
entirely, unless all signatory countries ratify the 1999-adapted treaty and
bring it into force within the next few months.
The treaty has not been ratified until now because of Russia’s
noncompliance with the 1999 Istanbul commitments – as part of the treaty
package – to withdraw its troops from Moldova and close three Russian bases
in Georgia. The Russian military deploys an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 troops
in Moldova’s Transnistria; is currently evacuating the Batumi and
Akhalkalaki bases in Georgia; and retains the third base, Gudauta, with a
Russian garrison of several hundred in nominally Abkhaz-controlled
territory. Russia insists on retaining its troops in Moldova as well as the
Gudauta base and to rush the treaty’s ratification regardless. In that
event, the three Baltic states – which are not signatories to the treaty –
would have to accede to it. This would enable Russia to negotiate with the
Baltic states and their NATO allies about placing limits on forces that
might be stationed on the Baltic states’ territories.
Thus, the treaty’s ratification under present conditions could result
in significant, unilateral Russian gains on both flanks. On the other hand,
some Western officials feel that failure to ratify could lead to still worse
consequences, removing the limits on Russian forces on the northern and
southern flanks, thus potentially allowing Russia to augment its forces
there. Adding their own perspective, German officials seem anxious to
preserve the treaty for the sake of political relations with Russia.
As was acknowledged at the June emergency conference in Vienna (see
EDM, June 8, 11, 13, 14, 18), the issue of Russian troops in Moldova is the
single largest obstacle to the CFE treaty’s ratification. Russia wants to
place on NATO and Moldova the onus of removing this Russian-made obstacle.
To circumvent it, the United States proposed at the Vienna conference
allowing some Russian troops to remain in Moldova and transforming the
existing Russian `peacekeeping’ operation into an international operation.
This U.S. proposal also aimed to maintain allied unity and keep Germany on
board.
At present, the U.S. State Department proposes a plan dubbed `Action
for Action’ and partly based on its Vienna proposal. The new plan would
kick-start a rapid process of ratification by all NATO countries and bring
the treaty into force until summer 2008. The twin goals declared in the
title are, `Achieving CFE [Treaty] Ratification and Fulfilling the Istanbul
Commitments.’
The document describes a final outcome that would see `withdrawal of
Russian forces from, and formal transfer of, the Gudauta base to Georgia,
with appropriate verification; OR [Russia] agreed another arrangement with
Georgia’ — by December 31, 2007.’ Further along, `Russia completes
withdrawal of all Russian forces [from] Moldova OR participates in a
smaller, transformed peacekeeping presence under OSCE (or conceivably other
multinational) mandate’ — by February 15, 2008.
Russian actions along those lines would be matched by Western actions
toward ratifying the treaty, in a quick step-by-step process under stringent
interim deadlines. Those interim deadlines would be: November 29/30 and
December 6/7, politically timed to the OSCE’s year-end ministerial
conference and NATO’s year-end ministerial, respectively; February 15, 2008,
spring 2008, and finally summer 2008 for the treaty’s entry into force.
In what seems to be an unprecedented link to domestic politics, the
U.S. proposal sets the timetable explicitly `to take account of
parliamentary calendars in a number of nations, including the United
States.’
The proposal entails significant opportunity and equally significant
risks. The desired outcomes in Moldova and Georgia would, if attained,
substantially improve the situation on the ground in Transnistria and at
Gudauta from a Western, Moldovan, and Georgian standpoint. Presumably,
Russia would consent to such changes as a small price for the larger,
long-sought overall gain of bringing the CFE treaty into force. If so, the
U.S. proposal could help to ease Russia’s troops out of Moldova.
However, three apparent weaknesses in the proposal could produce a
result opposite to that intended.
The first weakness concerns negotiating tactics. The proposal
explicitly announces retreats from CFE/Istanbul terms from the very start.
Instead of sticking to the goal of closing the Gudauta base, it states in
the same breath that a bilateral Russian-Georgian arrangement would be
acceptable, without any reference to its terms. However, one can hardly
expect Russia to negotiate with Georgia fairly or to resolve this issue at
all in such a bilateral setting.
On the larger troop issue, the proposal would legitimize a residual
Russian military presence in Moldova without any reference to the structure
or duration of the putative international presence.
The second weakness concerns the issue of mandate. Entrusting the
mandate to the OSCE would enable Russia to manipulate any mandate in its own
interest, given Russia’s track record of playing cat and mouse with the
OSCE. Following the organization’s dismal performance in Georgia on the
Border Monitoring Mission and on South Ossetia observation — both
operations at Russia’s discretion under OSCE rules — the idea of placing
Moldova under an OSCE dispensation seems deeply flawed.
The third weakness consists of inadvertently generating pressure on
the West (not to mention Moldova and Georgia) by linking the outcome and
timeline with unspecified Western election calendars. This obscure reference
may be read by Moscow as a euphemism for the U.S. presidential campaign and
perhaps an arms-control summit possibly desired that summer. If the Western
side signals that it is in a hurry for closure by a certain date, for some
additional considerations no longer or not necessarily linked to the arms
control issue at hand, Russia will simply run the calendar and hold out for
terms favorable to itself alone.
(`CFE: A Timeline for Achieving Adapted CFE Ratification and
Fulfilling the Istanbul Commitments,’ October 2007)
–Vladimir Socor
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress