AZERBAIJAN: HEADING OFF JIHAD
ISA, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Nov 13 2007
2007-11-13 A spate of recent arrests and an alleged plot to attack on
western embassies in Baku are alarming indicators of rising Islamic
radicalization among Azerbaijan’s disenfranchised ethnic minorities.
While these groups appear to lack any concrete organization, the
government’s failure to address their needs and strengthen its
democratic institutions could buy them enough time to become a much
more serious threat.
Authorities in Azerbaijan have arrested an army lieutenant wanted
in connection with an alleged terrorist plot targeting the US and
British embassies and other facilities in Baku, according to local
news reports. Lieutenant Kamran Asadov and another man were arrested
on 9 November in a forest near Baku. Ten days prior to their arrest,
the pair had reportedly stolen several thousand dollars worth of cash
in a gas-station robbery. The authorities said the two had confessed
to the terror plot.
Earlier, on 2-3 November, the authorities arrested eight people,
including purported al-Qaida emissary Abu Jafar and confiscated four
crates of submachine guns. It was unclear if the two incidents were
connected.
According to local media reports citing official statements, Lieutenant
Asadov had deserted his military unit, taking with him grenades,
assault rifles and ammunition. The country’s security ministry
described him as a follower of Wahhabi Sunni Islam, which holds to
strict literal interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadith.
When the authorities initially announced they had thwarted a terrorist
attack, the US and British embassies responded to the potential
threat by temporarily closing down, while the offices of several
major international oil companies followed suit.
Azerbaijan exports around 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude
via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline operated by an international
consortium led by BP.
It was the first such plot uncovered in Azerbaijan, and the arrests
raise questions as to how organized the oil-rich country’s radical
Islamic forces have become, and regarding the threat they pose.
While the government is strictly secular and has close ties to
Washington, the public’s relationship with Islam, especially outside
the capital Baku, is a complicated one, as is the ethnic patchwork
in many regions.
For now it remains uncertain to what extent these radical groups pose
a threat to the country’s secular government, but what is clear is
that the country’s disenfranchised minorities who benefit little if
at all from the oil-rich nations resource revenues are increasingly
disillusioned.
Radical Islam is quickly stepping in to fill in the gap, and
while these groups appear to lack any concrete organization, the
government’s failure to address minority needs and to strengthen its
democratic institutions could buy them enough time to become a much
more serious threat.
Trouble in the north
The varied ethnic minorities that inhabit the north are increasingly
expressing their dissatisfaction with Baku. The northern province
retains the characteristics of a nearly separate country, inhabited by
Legzins, Nakhchivanis, "Armenian Azeris" (sometimes called "Yeraz"),
Georgians and Kurds. The Lezgins, who hail largely from Dagestan and
Azerbaijan, are, with several other minorities, particularly distant
from the centers of power.
According to ISA expert Karl Rahder, who spends much of his time in
the region, the Lezgin’s Sunni identity and the fact that they are
not Turkic Azeris widens this gulf. "The mix of foreigners (e.g.
Chechens) in the north as well as Azerbaijani ethnic and religious
minorities is something that Sunni radicals exploit cleverly, using
the resentment as a component of their power base. And in its extreme
form, you find certain Salafi (Sunni fundamentalist) groups spreading
hatred against Shia, claiming that it is an impure form of Islam,"
Rahder told ISA.
"What I’m suggesting," Rahder said, is that when Chechens and
Dagestanis filter into Azerbaijan to avoid pursuit by the Russian army,
they feel quite at home. And occasionally, they find a receptive
audience at Sunni mosques in northern regions such as Quba and
Zaqatala. And it is in the north where the occasional weapons cache is
(allegedly) found or where a shootout with police takes place from
time to time."
Rahder believes, however reluctantly, that radicalism in Azerbaijan
could spread because the people do not feel that they "own" their own
country. "They feel economically squeezed and totally disenfranchised
by rigged elections and systemic corruption. The perceived tribalism
of the elite families is fuel on the fire."
As such, he says, radical Islam is a "seductive and powerful
alternative to participation in a political system that
marginalizes these groups." Further to this, he points to the recent
self-proclamation of the northern regions of Zaqatala and Balekan as
an "autonomous republic" with its own flag. This, he says, could be
an emerging pattern.
Still, it is far from clear whether these groups are organized and
to what extent they pose a serious threat.
In Rahder’s opinion, "there is no network that is being activated or
even can be. The growing disaffection and resultant Salafi activity
are spontaneous and remain uncoordinated, in my view. If and when
things blow up (figuratively or literally), at least for now, it’s
going to be in fits and starts."
Iranian influence in the south
In the south, there is also evidence of ethnic alienation and rumblings
of discontent. While there is a close cultural and confessional bond
between Azerbaijan and Iran, Iranian influence in the country is
characterized by a complicated set of historical factors.
The Talysh minority, which lives mostly in the southern Astara and
Lankaran regions, are particularly sensitive to ethnic alienation.
And it is here, according to Rahder, and in other districts abutting
the Araz River, that Iran has established a sphere of influence.
Furthermore, he said, the village of Nadaran has become a sort of
"’Disneyland for Shiites,’ complete with busloads of pious tourists."
And Rahder surmise that Iran has things relatively under control in
the south. He says that some of his sources in the region attest to
the presence of Iranian-controlled sleeper cells in the country –
some of them linked to Hizbollah. "These cells may be activated when
the time is ripe."
"Certainly, if an American attack on Iran even appears to be aided by
Azerbaijan, these groups will go into action, moving against western
economic targets, embassies and Azerbaijani government facilities,"
Rahder said.
But for now, they are waiting patiently.
The government’s response
In the meantime, the administration of President Ilham Aliyev will
find heading off any jihadist trouble a serious challenge, despite
the fact that security forces are quick to crack down on any movements
or even potential movements that could threaten the secular government.
While police frequently break up alleged cells of jihadist activity,
a report earlier this month from Zaqatala that the dean of the Art
Department of the Azerbaijan Institute of Teachers suspended eight
female students for wearing hijabs was particularly telling and
indicative of the government’s growing anxiety.
"So they are nervous," says Rahder. "And they’ve got a right to be,
after all. Jihadists do use Azerbaijan as a sanctuary, and the Salafis
do hate the Shia, and Iran does have an interest in encouraging ethnic
and religious unrest in the south."
However, this decisive security action begs another question: Why don’t
they break up the Abu Bakr mosque – the largest mosque in the country
and a nexus of Salafi activity? Rahder points out that security forces
raided the much smaller Juma mosque in 2004, even though its leader
was a liberal Muslim with a human rights rather than a jihadist agenda,
though there were suspicions that the mosque’s imam, Ilgar Ibrahmoglu,
was taking orders from Tehran.
Rahder says the government has likely decided that it is in its best
interest to keep the Abu Bakr mosque and its congregation in plain
view, and that closing down the mosque would result in the creation of
private or "underground" facilities that would be much more difficult
to monitor.
In the meantime, while the government has embarked on some solid
projects aimed at improving life in discontented regions, not
nearly enough is being done. Rahder suggests a number of measures
to quell tensions in the long term, including: a new distribution
of oil wealth that would resemble the "Alaskan model" – i.e. give
everyone a share of the revenues and make the revenue stream completely
transparent. Alternatively, investment in infrastructure, job training,
education, etc. to attract further investment and provide a pool of
talented Azeris for new jobs would be beneficial, as would fostering a
genuine participatory democracy that embraces (instead of undermining)
the opposition.
Rahder refers to oil as a "resource curse" and key concern, arguing
that the State Oil Fund is anything but transparent.
As for democratic values: "Azerbaijan has been on the cutting edge of
democratic, Muslim secularism since the post-WWI period – or it was
prior to being absorbed by the USSR. This brief period shows that
Azerbaijan has a lot to teach the Muslim world, including Iran,"
says Rahder.
"And if Aliyev is smart, he will use this historical legacy to unify
the country and deprive the radical Islamists of their central premise:
that democracy is a sham in Azerbaijan and corruption is a permanent
fact of life."
For additional information about Azerbaijan, visit ISA’s Special
Reports service page.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
