American Muslim, MO
Dec 2 2007
Turkey’s mlitary operation in Iraq: Limited incursion or full-scale
invasion?
by Abid Mustafa
On 2 December 2007 the Turkish military said Saturday’s operation was
the first since it had been authorized by the government to launch a
cross-border offensive, and that operations will continue `depending
on intelligence gathered.’ In some quarters there is apprehension
that this may mark the beginning of an all out invasion to occupy
northern Iraq. To understand the reality of this military adventure
it is important review the internal politics of Turkey, especially
the tussle between AKP and Turkey’s powerful generals.
The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) has become a thorn in Turkish
politics that raises its ugly head whenever domestic tensions surface
between the Turkish Government and Turkish Army. There are two power
centres in Turkey namely: the AKP dominated government and the
Kemalists who have a strong representation in the armed forces and
some of Turkey’s institutions. Both factions often represent
conflicting interests which are shaped by outside powers. The British
exercise influence over the Kemalists and the American hold sway over
AKP.
Disputes between the two camps have been simmering ever since Erdogan
nominated Abdullah Gul as a candidate for the post of the president.
The generals vehemently objected and fabricated clashes between the
domestic security forces and the PKK faction under the control of the
Turkish intelligence. The aim was to create an atmosphere of fear and
intimidation by exploiting the religious credentials of AKP’s nominee
Gul. In April 2007, just weeks before the first round of the
presidential elections, Turkey’s military brass upped the ante
against the AKP by threatening to invade Iraq to destroy PKK
guerrilla bases. The army was assisted in parliament by the Kemalists
who moved to deprive the parliament of the required quorum to proceed
with the presidential elections.
Erdogan boldly responded by announcing new constitutional amendments
for electoral reform (including election of the president by popular
vote, shortening the term form seven to five years, reducing the
voter age from 30 to 25 and allowing a second term). The parliament
passed the bill, despite the outgoing president Sezer’s
(pro-Kemalist) efforts to disrupt its passage. Eventually, the bill
was passed, but it could not be implemented in time. So Erdogan
obliged by the constitution had to call for a snap general election
in July 2007. The AKP won the election and also increased its
majority. Erdogan then used his new mandate to nominate Abdullah Gul
again as the government’s preferred candidate for the post of the
president.
The first round of voting was held on 20 August 2007 and Gul secured
341 votes. The second round was convened on 24 August 2007, and gave
him a vote count of 337. The third round was held on 28 August 2007,
and gave Gul 339 votes. There was a quorum this time, since most
opposition parties, most importantly the Nationalist Movement Party
(MHP), did not boycott the election. Abdullah Gül was finally elected
as Turkey’s 11th President. The generals frustrated by their efforts
to block Erdogen’s constitutional reforms and Gul’s election to the
presidency, began to publicly criticise Gul’s Islamic orientation.
They also refused to extend him full protocol at state functions.
The generals feared that the AKP government buoyed by its recent
success would unveil sweeping reforms that would affect both domestic
and foreign policy issues. The generals were also deeply suspicious
of Erdogen’s pro-American foreign policy programme which comprises
amongst other things – normalisation of ties with Armenia, acceptance
of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and an enhancement in Turkey’s
presence in the black sea region. So in an effort to hinder the
progress of Erdogen’s pro-American agenda, the generals set about
manufacturing another crisis along the Turkish-Iraqi border. They
timed their scheming to coincide with the passage of the Armenian
genocide bill in the US senate. This they calculated would enable
them to exert maximum pressure on Erdogen’s government. The generals
increased the military build up along Iraqi border to give the
impression that Turkey was planning an invasion rather than an
incursion into Northern Iraq. Below is a brief summary of the
events:-
Low level clashes between Turkish troops and PKK rebels had been
going on for sometime, and the government in Ankara had been urging
Washington to exert pressure on the Kurdish government in Northern
Iraq to halt the attacks. However, towards the end of September and
early October there was an escalation in bombings. On September 25 a
Turkish policeman was killed in an out post in eastern Turkey. On
September 28, 12 people, including 7 village guards, were killed.
Interestingly, the attack came a day after Turkey signed an
anti-terror agreement with Iraq and also a day after Erdogan gave his
speech to US Council of foreign relations where he discussed the
Armenian genocide resolution, PKK, Cyprus and membership of EU. Soon
after this incident, several press reports appeared blaming the
Turkish intelligence for carrying out the attacks. More killings
followed on October 7, when 13 soldiers were killed in Sirnak
province. The situation worsened on October 21, when 12 soldiers were
killed and 8 were abducted by PKK fighters. Throughout this period
the Turkish media and supporters of the army escalated the crisis and
piled pressure on the AKP led government. Funerals, pictures of dead
and wounded, and newspaper articles were used to whip up public
furore against the US and its inaction over PKK.
Faced with such a situation Erdogen in collusion with the Bush
administration moved quickly to diffuse the situation. Erdogen and
Washington’s strategy was to strongly condemn the attacks, adopt the
demands advocated by the army and at the same time work to restrict
the ambitions of the Turkish army. On October 7th, State Department
spokesman Sean McCormack said in a statement that the United States
condemned the attacks and stood with the Turkish people. He said,
`The United States is committed to working with Turkey to combat the
PKK and other terrorist groups. We will continue to cooperate with
the Turkish government to neutralize the PKK terrorist threat. We
call on Iraqi authorities to take effective measures against the
PKK.’
Thereafter pressure mounted on the Iraqi government to do more to
halt the attacks. But the reality of the Iraqi government is that it
has little influence over the Kurdistan region, where things are
managed by Jalal Talabani the President of Iraq and Barzani the
leader of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The government in
Ankara rejected assurances given by Malki, the Prime Minister of Iraq
that he would curb the activities of PKK. Turkey could not discuss
its demands directly with Barzani, as that would imply Ankara’s
recognition of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Hence, Erdogan
left it to the American to apply the necessary pressure. Meanwhile,
Erdogan tried to delay as much as possible parliament’s approval for
authorising military action against the PKK. Finally, on October 17,
Erdogen got the approval from the parliament, and the Turkish armed
forces started bombing suspected PKK sites.
Foreign Minister Ali Barbican’s also visited Iran, where Iranian
officials supported Turkey’s fight against PKK, but cautioned against
the military option. The Syrian foreign minister echoed similar
concerns. There were also demonstrations in KRG against Turkish
interference. Against this backdrop, both Erdogan and Barbican
stressed at every opportunity that an invasion of Iraq was not on the
agenda, but Turkey had the right to exercise its military option. The
regional opinion combined with statements from the EU and the US
against military action in Iraq, succeeded in putting doubts in the
Turkish military about a possible venture.
On November 2, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice promised
`effective’ action against Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. She
thrashed out a set of measures such as intelligence sharing and
communication between US and Turkish armed forces, which laid the
basis for Bush’s meeting Erdogan, on November 5. A day before the
meeting the US succeeded in coercing the KRG to hand over the
kidnapped Turkish soldiers to the Iraqi authorities.
In this way, Erdogen and the US have managed to reduce tensions. The
recent operation is an incursion and not an invasion as some had
forecasted. Given the understanding reached between Erdogen and Bush,
it is unlikely, that Turkey’s military leadership will risk an all
out invasion of Iraq. However this does not imply that the Turkish
army and the Kemalists have surrendered to the AKP. As long as the
AKP presses ahead with its pro-American reform agenda, it is more
than likely that army will exploit the Kurdish issue and the
religious credentials of the AKP to manufacture crisis to bring down
Erdogen’s government. This will continue until the AKP is either able
to penetrate the army or control it by amending the constitution.
Abid Mustafa is a political commentator who specialises in Muslim
affairs
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