TURKEY: UNDISPUTED LEADER OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Arca Haber Ajansý, Occupied Northern Cyprus
Nov 29 2007

Although the Armenians and the Greeks played the Christian card quite
well in the 20th century and tried to push Turkey into the position
of the most underrepresented and discredited nation on earth, it
didn’t work well in the last century and won’t work in the 21st
century, either. The latest card player was Armenian camp-follower
Nancy Pelosi, who in fact put her personal interests above American
interests by pushing for passage of the so-called genocide resolution,
just like Armenian-Americans who think of Armenians’ interests above
those of Americans, unfortunately.

Since 2002, from the day the new driver, the Justice and Development
Party (AKP), took over Turkey’s steering wheel, a departure from the
country’s traditional foreign policy began and gradually quickened.

The new driver led the country to a brand new track, one more
temperate, social, constructive, modernistic and rather enterprising;
as opposed to the defensive and passive track of old.

This new track gradually led Turkey’s political prowess upward, and
Turkey is now becoming an important player in the Middle East, emerging
as an important diplomatic actor. Turkey’s greater activism in the
Middle East has also been reflected in its effort to strengthen ties
to Iran and Syria, and now Turkey’s political and economic relations
with neighboring countries are at the best levels ever achieved.

Ankara’s relations with Tehran and Damascus were strained in the 1980s
and 1990s, in part because Iran and Syria supported the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) in their effort to destabilize Turkey.

But relations have significantly improved in recent years, thanks
to the three governments’ shared interest in containing Kurdish
nationalism and preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish
state on their borders.

Turkey’s cooperation with Iran has intensified considerably,
particularly in the security sphere. During Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoðan’s visit to Tehran in July 2004, Turkey and Iran signed
a security cooperation agreement that branded the PKK a terrorist
organization. Since then, the two countries have stepped up cooperation
to protect their borders. Energy has been another major engine behind
the warming of Iranian-Turkish relations; Iran is the second-largest
supplier of natural gas to Turkey (after Russia).

Ankara’s policy toward Israel and the Palestinians has also undergone
a shift. Turkey had maintained a close relationship with Israel since
1996, especially in the defense and intelligence areas. Cooperation
had benefits for both sides: It gave Israel a way of breaking out
of its regional isolation and a means of putting pressure on Syria,
and it gave Turkey new avenues for obtaining weapons and advanced
technology at a time when it faced increasing restrictions on weapons
procurement from the United States and Europe.

But more recently, under the AKP’s leadership, Turkey’s outlook toward
Israel has begun to change and Ankara has begun to adopt a more active
pro-Palestinian policy.

This change started when Erdoðan decided to send 1,000 troops to
participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon — one of the
largest contributions of any European state.

Although not without risks, Erdoðan’s decision to contribute troops
to the UN mission had a number of important benefits. It both
underscored Turkey’s European credentials and showed that Ankara is
an important regional player. And along with Erdoðan’s criticism
of Israel’s military action, it allowed Turkey to demonstrate its
solidarity with key Arab governments in the region that supported
the peacekeeping mission.

The latest summit in Ankara held by President Abdullah Gul, between
Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas,
exemplifies the position and importance of Turkey in the Middle East.

Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia in particular have been
strengthened recently, as was highlighted by King Abdullah’s trip to
Turkey in August 2006 — the first visit of its kind in 40 years–
and then again in the second week of November 2007.

Turkey’s greater engagement in the Middle East is part of the gradual
diversification of Turkish foreign policy since the end of the Cold
War. In effect, Turkey is rediscovering the region of which it has
historically been an integral part. Especially under the Ottomans,
Turkey was the dominant power in the Middle East.

Turkey’s recent focus on the Middle East does not, however, mean
that Turkey is about to turn its back on the West. Nor is the shift
evidence of the "creeping Islamization" of Turkish foreign policy,
as some critics claim.

Turkey’s new activism is a response to structural changes in its
security environment since the end of the Cold War. And if managed
properly, it could be an opportunity for the Western world to use
Turkey as a bridge to the Middle East.

Both Ankara and the Western world — the EU and US — need to accept
that the war in Iraq has created new realities and unleashed new
forces that must be accommodated and that no satisfactory results
can be achieved in the region without Turkey’s assent.

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