Regnum, Russia
Dec 5 2007
Romanian Patriarchate’s activity aimed at Moldova’s absorption by
Romania: Konstantin Zatulin
`Obviously, the Romanian Orthodox Church headed by Patriarch Daniel
is today paving way for Romania by trying to lay claims to Christian
Orthodox believers in the region that has traditionally been an
object of rivalry between Russia and Soviet Union, on the one hand,
and Romania, on the other,’ stated director of the Institute of CIS
Countries, member of the State Duma committee for the CIS affairs and
relations with compatriots Konstantin Zatulin in an interview to
REGNUM on Dec 4 2007. Mr. Zatulin has commented on the situation
related to the installing new parishes of the non-canonical
`Bessarabian Archdiocese’ in the jurisdiction of the Romanian
Patriarchate, on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox
Church in Moldova and Transdniester.
`The decision to create dioceses the Romanian Orthodox Church in
Moldova, Transdniester, and Odessa Region is known to be breaking all
the Church canons. Bishops have not yet been appointed there,
however, which prevents Russian Orthodox Church from taking harsh
measures. It is clear that expanding the Romanian Orthodox Church to
the East is in the interests of those forces in Moldova who regard
the current independent status of their state as temporary. Those are
the politicians who initiated conflict with Transdniester following
the collapse of the USSR. Those are the political forces that have
for a long time already been fighting for abolishment of all Moldovan
uniqueness in order to justify the need of merger with Romania.
Obviously, this tendency in political life of Moldova is absolutely
contrary to the official course of its authorities, including
president Voronin,’ Mr. Zatulin says.
`There have been different periods in Voronin’s relations with
Russia. The fact that Moldovan-Russian relations are now improving is
the result of Vorinin’s facing a much greater danger: danger of
eroding of Moldova’s sovereignty from within by the pro-Romanian
political forces and dismantling Moldovan statehood in favor of
Romania.’
`Such action in the ecclesiastical domain are accompanied exactly by
these initiatives of the Romanian patriarch who is, in fact, trying
to proselytize, i.e., solicit believers on the territories that have
never been object of his affairs. This is the background of the
present conflict.’
`Obviously, the unyielding negative reaction of Voronin is, firstly,
motivated by his own situation: he does not lose the country of which
he is a president. Secondly, his reaction objectively coincides with
the standpoint of the Moscow Patriarchate who also is not intending
to give in and allow breaching Church canons. The third aspect of the
conflict is the Transdniester Tiraspol and Dubossary diocese of the
Russian Orthodox Church that has not so far said its word. It is
clearly interested that no Romanian Church exists on its territory.
But the diocese has traditionally thorny relations with the
Transdniester leadership,’ Zatulin said.
`I believe that the events will not end at this point. It is quite
hard to believe that the Romanian Orthodox Church will back up
without struggle. It is more likely that the it will persist, finding
support not only among the Romanian political elite but also the
nationalists within Moldova who consider themselves Romanians and who
want to be integrated into Romania as soon as possible,’ the expert
believes.
`Clearly, the issue of the dioceses for the Romanian Orthodox Church
is a touchstone in its activities. It is raised now in order to test
how decisive are not only Voronin but also Moldovan political elite
in defending their independence. Moldova in the former times so much
strived to display its independence from the old Soviet times that it
failed to notice another danger, the danger of being completely taken
in by Romania.’
`Such absorption, that is projected by many today, has become one of
the reasons of the Moldovan-Transdniester conflict. Language
controversy, the desire to enforce not even Moldovan but the Romanian
language in Moldova, including Transdniester – all this ultimately
led to the events of 20 years ago. Today they are trying it another
way, under the slogan of restoration of territorial integrity of
Moldova, only in the form of expanding the Romanian Orthodoxy on the
territories belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate,’ Zatulin stressed.
`The economic situation in the region is such that living standards
in Romania who has become an object of EU investments are higher than
in Moldova. This creates a certain attraction, which, along with the
clerical proselytism and nationalist propaganda, pushes Voronin to
Moscow in an attempt to unite with the Transdniester, in order to try
to preserve Moldova’s independence based on the Transdniestrian votes
and insure that the country is not absorbed by Romania,’ Mr. Zatulin
maintains.
`On the other hand, if he fails to achieve that, and Moldova becomes
a Romanian province, the polarization along the Dniester River will
persist. Transdniester will become an enclave state. At the same
time, it is hardly possible to predict that it would be able to
survive on its own. It could only survive with the help of two
factors: sufficient help from Moscow and at least consent of Ukraine,
Ukraine under Yushchenko’s presidency demonstrates uninterestedness
in Transdniester. However, not everybody in Ukraine, including
nationalists, is ready to give up a land that they consider their
own.’
`Therefore, we should not rule out that, if Moldova will continue to
further the merge with Romania, then, sooner or later, Ukraine will
lay claims to Transdniester, which, in its turn, will create such an
interesting phenomenon as emerging in the South Black Sea region of
territories with a pretty large proportion of Russian ethnic
population.’
Commenting to REGNUM on the issue of qualification of the events of
1990 in Gagauzia as genocide of the Gagauz people that is now being
discussed in Moldova, Zatulin stated: `I would not misapply the term
`genocide.’ I believe that genocide is what happened in the Ottoman
Turkey against Armenians and in Germany against Jews. I believe that
the conduct of Hitlerites on the occupied Slavic territories can also
be regarded as genocide. What about the narrow-minded Romanian
nationalism that became the reason of the Transdniester conflict and
aggravation between Romania/Moldova and Gagauzia, I think that,
however harsh we condemn the phenomenon, we cannot attribute to it
the scale of genocide. For, after all, we have international legal
acts that classify genocide, and from this point of view, events of
the turbulent times related to the collapse of the Soviet Union fail
to match the level of genocide. Of course, there is a reverse side of
nationalism, and it was so repulsive that caused the Transdniester
conflict and aggravation of relations in Gagauzia.’