The China-India-Russia alliance
Strategy and Politics

As U.S. unilateralism has asserted its role as the sole global
superpower, the rest of the world is exploring a variety of ways of
pushing back. One is the creation of several new regional security
consortiums which are independent of the U.S.

darticle=13396
Sunday, January 06, 2008

By Tarique Niazi

As U.S. unilateralism has asserted the role of the United States as the
sole global superpower, the rest of the world is exploring a variety of
ways of pushing back. One is the creation of several new regional
security consortiums which are independent of the U.S. One of the most
important is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security
alliance led by Russia and China, with several non-voting members
including India. Its rising economic, political and military profile
this year can serve as a useful lens through which to view this
geopolitical pushback. It is based on promoting a multipolar world,
distributing power along multiple poles in the international system,
such as the United States, Europe, Asia-Eurasia and the Middle East,1
while also promoting the multilateralism of international cooperation.2
In recent years, Russia and China have stepped up their advocacy for a
multipolar-multilateral alternative.

Multipolarity

Russia is promoting its vision of a multipolar world hinging on the
consensus-based decision making that it wants steered through global
institutions such as the United Nations. Chinese President Hu Jintao
has outlined a similar vision. At a caucus of the leaders of Brazil,
India, Mexico and South Africa in Berlin, Germany in June of 2007 he
said: "Developing countries should strengthen cooperation and
consolidate solidarity to promote the establishment of a multipolar
world and a democratic international relationship.3

India, however, treads cautiously between the competing visions of a
world with multiple poles of power. As such, it makes a refined
distinction between multipolarity and multilateralism, and strongly
advocates for the latter. India rejects multipolarity that seeks to
challenge U.S. military power[why? India’s independent line is
mentioned here and then sort of drops out of the piece], while
espousing the need for cooperation in governing international
relations. In 2003, India’s External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha
outlined the contours of multilateralism: "If globalization is the
trend, then multilateralism is its life-sustaining mechanism, for no
process will survive without a genuine spirit of multilateralism
underlined by the belief that global problems require global solutions
globally arrived at. Otherwise, the world faces the risk of repeating
the mistakes of the past."4 He emphatically rejected unilateralism, and
pointed out that "Iraq attests to the limits of unilateralism."5 In
October this year, Sonia Gandhi, leader of the ruling Congress Party in
India, while on a landmark visit to Beijing, offered her formulation of
a world order on which her country agrees with China: "Both China and
India seek an open and inclusive world order based on the principles of
‘Panchsheel’ that were founded together by (then Chinese Prime
Minister) Zhou Enlai and (India’s founding father) Jawaharlal Nehru in
1954."6 Later, Panchsheel became the founding charter of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that had claimed to be the third pole of
power in the bipolar world.

A substantial outcome of this advocacy came about in February this year
when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao
signed the Declaration on the World Order in the 21st Century.7 The
Declaration called for peaceful coexistence, a just and rational world
order, abandonment of unilateralism, and embrace of multilateralism. In
its own words, the Declaration stated: "It is necessary to solve
differences and disputes in a peaceful way, avoid unilateral action
(and) not to resort to the policy of diktat, the threat or use of
force…Every country has the right to manage its affairs in a
sovereign way and international issues should be resolved through
dialogue and consultations on the basis of multilateral collective
approaches."8 Similarly India, in its bilateral relations with China
and Russia, boldly spells out its vision of a world of shared
governance.

Trilateral Dialogue: China, India and Russia

The growing convergence in the worldview of China, India and Russia
brought them into a trilateral dialogue, which in Chinese President
Jintao’s words would see "the three nations work together for further
communication and coordination in major international and regional
issues and promote the solution of disputes and differences through
dialogue."9 Russian President Putin, while speaking at the first
trilateral summit between China, India and Russia in St. Petersburg,
Russia, in July 2006 echoed Hu: "…that discussions held in the
trilateral meeting would promote mutual trust not only between India,
Russia and China individually, but also at regional and global
levels."10 Beijing and New Delhi accepted Russia’s proposal to hold
trilateral summit because "it was beneficial to boosting the
cooperation among the three countries as well as maintaining
multipolarity … in the world."11 Former Russian Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov was the first leader to propose the trilateral
relationship between China, India, and Russia during his visit to New
Delhi in 1998. The first trilateral summit was followed by a meeting of
the foreign ministers of three countries in New Delhi on February 14,
2007. In a joint communiqué, the foreign ministers "expressed their
conviction that democratization of international relations is the key
to building an increasingly multipolar world order."12

During his recent visit to New Delhi on January 25-26, 2007, as the
guest of honor on India’s Republic Day, President Putin further
discussed trilateral cooperation with Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan
Singh. Later, standing shoulder to shoulder with Singh, he told a news
conference in New Delhi: "We want to resolve regional problems in a way
acceptable to all sides. We therefore think that there are good
prospects for working together in a trilateral format."13 Indians who
have long been beholden to Russia seems to embrace Putin’s trilateral
initiative, while remaining skeptical of the Indo-U.S. alliance that is
currently in the works. K. Subrahmanyam, India’s foremost observer of
strategic affairs, gratefully speaks of Indian pull towards Moscow:
"Russia has seen India as a key to Asian stability for the past 50
years, some four decades before George W. Bush’s team reached that
conclusion."14 The formation of trilateral dialogue has already been
institutionalized. As part of this dialogue, Chinese, Indian and
Russian foreign ministers held their first meeting in June 2005 in
Vladivostok, Russia. As noted above, they met again in New Delhi in
February 2007. Similarly, the leaders of three countries have been
holding trilateral summits on the sidelines of G-8 meetings, of which
Russia is a member and at which China and India have been regular
invitees since 2006.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Parallel to the trilateral dialogue, China and Russia took the lead to
institutionalize their strategic relations into the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which India, together with Iran,
Mongolia and Pakistan, is a non-voting member. The six-member SCO is
widely seen as a collective security organization for nations in South,
Central and West Asia. Some observers view the SCO as a counterbalance
to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and its advance into
the region. Others believe that "Beijing and Moscow…shared the common
aims of…frustrating Washington’s agenda to dominate the (Central
Asian) region which had been an integral part of the Soviet Union for
three generations."15 The recent SCO summit on August 16, 2007 in
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, however, emphasized in a joint communiqué that
"modern challenges and security threat can only be effectively
countered through united efforts of the international community."16
There is a range of events that signify the SCO’s rising economic,
political and military profile, but five events stand out in this
regard:

(a) post-Taliban Afghanistan;
(b) U.S. military presence in central Asia;
(c) SCO’s rapid expansion;
(d) the Caspian Sea Nations Summit; and,
(e) "Peace Mission 2007."

SCO and post-Taliban Afghanistan

As the SCO asserts for a role in post-Taliban Afghanistan, it wants to
see the U.S.-led forces leave Kabul. At its annual summit in July 2005
in Astana, Kazakhstan, the SCO called on the U.S. to give a timetable
for a pullout of its troops from Afghanistan. "As the active military
phase in the antiterror operation in Afghanistan is nearing completion,
the SCO would like the coalition’s members to decide on the deadline
for the use of the temporary infrastructure and for their military
contingents’ presence in those countries."17 The SCO’s demands were
based on the assumption that the Taliban has been defeated; hence,
there is no need for the continued presence of U.S. and NATO troops in
the region. The U.S., however, has since built several military bases
across Afghanistan, to fight Taliban’s insurgency and al Qaeda’s
terrorism. The U.S.’ expanded military presence further fueld
suspicions among SCO member states–especially China and Russia–that
the U.S. and NATO are in the region for the long haul.

The SCO has since begun developing its own Afghan policy with the
founding of the Afghanistan Contact Group (ACG) to strengthen
relationship between the SCO and Kabul. The Afghan President Hamid
Karzai, who regularly attends the SCO’s annual summits, has positively
responded to the SCO’s initiative. It is important to note that
Karzai’s political support base in the ruling Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan continues to be beholden to Russia for the latter’s
critical support against the Taliban long before the 9/11 attacks. To
this day, the Northern Alliance government kept up its warm relations
with the Kremlin. Similarly, the Alliance’s ethnic links with the
Central Asian Republics (CARs), especially with Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan, two member-states of the SCO, also play out in making
Afghanistan receptive to the SCO. In return, Afghanistan is showered
with economic and military support by China and Russia. In the economic
sector, China has become Afghanistan’s anchor. In late November 2007,
Kabul gave Beijing the largest-ever mining contract in Afghanistan’s
history. Under this 30-year deal, China would invest $3b in the
development of copper mines, which are likely to go in production in
the next five years, in Afghanistan’s Logar province. This
single-stroke Chinese investment of $3b comes close to the entire
foreign investment in Afghanistan of just $4b since 2001.18 Militarily,
Moscow has continued to be Kabul’s main supplier of weapons and
military hardware since 2001. Thus, Kabul’s growing economic and
military dependence on China and Russia is further binding it to these
nations. That’s why Afghanistan is now poised to become a member of the
SCO.

SCO and U.S. Military Presence

While gathering Afghanistan into its embrace, the SCO publicly
expresses its unease at the U.S.’s military presence in the region. At
its Astana summit, the SCO also called for the closing of U.S. bases in
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Months later, Uzbekistan evicted the U.S.
from its air base at Karshi-Khanabad, also known as K-2. At this summit
Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov "essentially called on his SCO
partners to make a choice between siding with the United States or
‘with our neighbors in Russia and China.’"19

The United States, however, continues to keep another air base at Manas
in Kyrgyzstan, which it has been using for humanitarian and combat
operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. has 1,200 troops stationed there.
Unsurprisingly, Kyrgyzstan balanced the U.S. military presence on its
soil with the hosting of a Russian airbase nearby. As the Russian and
U.S. air bases sit only a few miles apart, Russians use this proximity
as a strategic vantage point to keep tabs on what goes on at Manas
base. There are reports that China also is in talks with Bishkek to
open up an airbase of its own in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, Bishkek,
which hosted the SCO summit in 2007, has already stopped the U.S. from
using Manas base for combat operations. It is now placing additional
restrictions on Washington for using the base even for humanitarian
relief supplies. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev, who was elected
with U.S. support, "called for the United States to start reducing its
military presence in the country" as "situation in Afghanistan had
stabilized."20 Bishkek also is under mounting persuasion by Iran to not
let its base be used for any hostile action against Tehran.

The Expanding SCO

As the U.S. presence in the region tends to contract, the SCO goes on
expanding into an unparalleled Asian-Eurasian Security organization.
Its current members include China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Among its members with observer status are
included India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan. As noted before,
Afghanistan also is now lining up to become a full-fledged member. So
are Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan–two staunch U.S. allies and
energy-rich nations. In recognition of the SCO’s growing significance,
even the U.S. applied for its membership.21 The application was,
however, denied. Yet the SCO won global recognition with a United
Nations Assistant Secretary General in attendance at the Bishkek summit
this year. The SCO is now linking arms with the Russian-dominated
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is seen in the
west as a Eurasian military pact, to further help advance mutual
interests. Both organizations have signed a cooperation agreement this
year. By virtue of this agreement, China has become an unofficial
member of the CSTO, which is made up of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Interestingly, all SCO
members, except China, are also members of the CSTO. More importantly,
Iran, which has applied for SCO membership, has also been invited to
join the CSTO. The CSTO also wants a piece of action in Afghanistan,
and insists to model the NATO in undertaking global peacekeeping,
especially in its "region of responsibility." In parallel, China and
Russia are ready to accept India as a voting member, which will be an
upgrade on its current status as an observer. It is interesting to note
that China, India and Russia all have made a massive investment in
Iran’s energy production sector, which further binds them together.
Chinese and Indian oil and gas interests in Iran are respectively
valued at $100b and $40b. Russia, for its part, is helping Tehran to
build its flagship $1b nuclear reactor in Busher.

The Caspian Sea Summit

In so many ways, Tehran has become a catalyst for the competitive
tensions between unipolarists and multipolarists. It can be gauged from
the just-concluded second Caspian Sea Summit, which met in Tehran on
October 16, 2007. Along the lines of the SCO, Russia is developing an
alliance of the Caspian Sea’s littoral states that include Azerbaijan,
Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia. The alliance is seemingly
meant to share the natural wealth of the Caspian Sea, which some
observers bill as the new Middle East. The 700 mile-long Caspian, which
is the world’s largest inland sea, contains six separate hydrocarbon
basins. Its proven and potential oil reserves boast 270 billion barrels
of oil. In 1994, the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium sealed an
$8b deal with Baku to develop three Caspian Sea oil fields with
reserves of about 3-5 billion barrels of oil. The deal was to extend
over 30 years. There have since been occasional skirmishes between
Azerbaijan and Iran over the demarcation of their respective
coastlines. The five littoral states now seek a framework to replace
the 1921 treaty that first divided the Sea between Iran and the former
U.S.S.R. to have an agreed-upon share in its natural bounties.

The Tehran summit was meant to achieve this end. The summit was,
however, clouded by the worsening standoff between Iran, Europe and the
U.S. over Iran’s nuclear program. In this tense atmosphere, Tehran
wasted no time in claiming the presence of President Putin, who was the
first Russian leader to travel to Iran since the Islamic Revolution in
1979, at the summit as a vindication of its position that its nuclear
program had all along been for peaceful purposes. On December 3 2007,
the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate said: "We judge with high
confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its weapons program," and
that "Tehran had not restarted its nuclear-weapons program as of
mid-2007."22 The weapons program is defined as relating to weapons
design, weaponization work and covert uranium work. Two weeks after the
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released, Russia delivered 80
tons of enriched uranium for Tehran’s Busher nuclear reactor.23 Putin’s
visit was, however, widely interpreted as a counterweight to
Washington’s persistent opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.24
Putin, too, publicly defended Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear
technology. At the summit, he further cheered his Iranian hosts with a
call on the summiteers to stand united against outside interference:
"We have to build confidence to settle the relevant issues and not even
think of resorting to force against each other in the Caspian Sea, or
of allowing other countries to avail themselves of our (Caspian)
territories."25

Iranians believe that the U.S. is setting up Azerbaijan to
counterbalance Iran. They are also perturbed by U.S. involvement in
helping Kazakhstan to build its navy. So are Russians. As a result,
there is growing convergence of views between Iran and Russia on
keeping the Caspian Sea demilitarized. To further their cooperation
beyond the appropriation of the Caspian Sea’s natural wealth, the
summit’s member states have formed the Caspian Sea Economic Commission,
which is scheduled to meet next year in Moscow with Putin in chair. Not
only is the revolving door between the SCO, CSTO and Caspian Sea
nations strengthening the Russian and Chinese influence in the region,
it is deepening their military and security alliance as well.

Peace Mission 2007

The major manifestation of this deepening alliance was the SCO-wide
military maneuvers, dubbed as "Peace Mission 2007." These maneuvers
were conducted on August 9-17, 2007 in Chelyabinsk in Russia’s Urals
region, followed by its final phase carried out in Urumuqi, Xinjiang,
China. The exercises involved 6,500 troops, 80 aircraft and 500 combat
vehicles from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. China and Russia supplied all of the combat vehicles, as
well as 3,700 troops. "For the SCO…the war games mark its most
ambitious attempt yet to build an integrated military-security
apparatus to complement expanding political and commercial
collaboration."26 Some observers suspect that Peace Mission 2007
"resembles less of an anti-terrorism drill than a full-scale,
state-on-state conventional fight."27 The SCO has never held a
full-scale military exercise involving all member states, although
China and Russia have held several joint exercises under the auspices
of the SCO. In 2005, they held large-scale amphibious landings on
China’s Yellow Sea Coast, which many observers believed were intended
for Chinese separatists in Taiwan.28 These maneuvers, however, were
massive in their scope as they were conducted on land, in air, and at
sea in southeast of the Shandong Peninsula in China. The stated goal of
each drill–held in 2007 and 2005–was to fight separatism and
terrorism. China faces problems of separatism in Tibet and Taiwan, and
terrorism in Xinjiang, while Russia is confronted with the twin menace
in the wide swath of its northern territories. Similarly, India is
battling enduring separatist movements in its west and northeast.
Although India, which is an observer at the SCO, sat out of the 2007
drills, it is scheduled to hold joint army exercises with China later
this month in its southwestern province of Yunnan.29 The planned
exercises are being billed as "historic" since the two giants have come
a long way from active hostilities to strategic partnership. In their
luncheon meeting in Singapore on November 21, 2007, Chinese Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh further
signified the import of these exercises by reiterating their commitment
"to take their strategic cooperative partnership to a next level."30
Prime Minister Singh, in his statement, added that "India and China
ties are beyond and above bilateral matters. They are related to peace,
stability and prosperity in the region and the world beyond…India and
China are…friends and partners."31 The Indian Prime Minister, who has
just returned from his state visit to Moscow, is now scheduled to visit
China early next year.

Conclusion

The SCO’s geopolitical pushback to the unipolar-unilateral makeover of
the world is, however, defensive. Both China and Russia are being
protective of their turf. Their internal divisions caused by
"extremism, splitism, and terrorism" further unnerve them at even a
slight hint of U.S. or NATO proximity to their "near-abroad." They have
created the SCO and CSTO, and formed the Caspian Sea Alliance to put
distance between their respective "spheres of influence" and NATO-US
presence. Many argue that this alliance-building is a reaction to U.S.
unilateralism. These alliances, however, cannot threaten U.S. security
interests in the region. The allied nations have been consistently
reassuring the U.S. that their alliances are not directed at "third
party." In fact, SCO member states have helped the U.S. to protect its
security interests in the region. In the run-up to U.S. military action
in Afghanistan in 2001, the Russian President Putin, according to Bob
Woodward, stunned the top U.S. policy makers with his unsolicited offer
to let U.S. combat jets use the Russian airspace to strike the Taliban
government in Kabul.32 The Bush White House was not even sure if
Russians would agree to U.S. airbases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for
which it sought Putin’s consent. More importantly, China, which shares
a long border with Kyrgyzstan and is next door neighbor to Uzbekistan,
went along with the U.S. bases in both countries. Besides, and it is
noteworthy for American policy makers, the three nations that broke out
in spontaneous outpouring of sympathy for 9/11 victims were not Egypt,
Jordan or Saudi Arabia, but Russia, Iran and China–in that
order–where hundreds of thousands of marchers held candle-lit vigils
and mourned the tragic deaths of 3,000 Americans in terrorist attacks.
In strictly strategic sense, the U.S. by itself and together with its
allies, especially Australia, Britain and Japan, continues to be the
dominant force in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Strait of
Malacca and the Indian Ocean, which are the key sources and supply
routes of energy shipments for China and trade goods for Central Asia.
This makes China and the region vulnerable to U.S. retaliation in the
event of any perceived or real threat to U.S. security interests.

Yet the Asian-Eurasian regional powers, which are coalescing into the
SCO, CSTO and Caspian Alliance, have the potential to entangle U.S.
economic interests, especially energy interests. On this score too, the
U.S. has been able to circumvent such potential challenges by
establishing bilateral relations with the region’s energy-rich nations,
particularly Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Of these,
Kazakhstan is the richest nation, with three-fourths of the region’s
oil and about half of its gas reserves; Azerbaijan owns one-sixth of
the region’s oil and10 percent of gas reserves; and Turkmenistan
possesses close to half of the region’s gas and 5 percent of oil
reserves. In 1993, Chevron concluded a $20b deal with Kazakhstan to
develop its Tengiz oil field, which is estimated to contain recoverable
oil reserves of 6-9 billion barrels of oil. An $8b Azerbaijan
International Consortium, led by BP-Amoco-Statoil, is already
developing oil fields off the shores of Azerbaijan. Similarly, the U.S.
has successfully pushed for a multi-billion dollar
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline as an alternative
to the $10b Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline.

Above all, the U.S. enjoys worldwide economic and military superiority
that allows it to force its way through closed doors, if needed. As the
world’s strongest nation, multilateralists argue, the United States
serves its interests best when it works in a multilateral framework on
which China, India and Russia all agree. A starting point for
multilateralism can be war-torn Afghanistan where the SCO and CSTO both
want a piece of action. The U.S. should welcome both to share in
counter-insurgency operations for which both China and Russia have a
long-standing career. This will free up 25,000 U.S. troops in
Afghanistan, which can be exclusively deployed for counter-terrorism;
while NATO forces can undertake reconstruction work that has long
remained frozen. If it happens, it will turn Afghanistan into the North
Star of multilateralism. To the U.S.’ further advantage, India’s
alliance with China and Russia would privilege multilateralism over
multipolarism. The latter, as Indian Foreign Minister Sinha in his 2003
address cautioned, has the potential to reprise the cold war rivalries
that could set the world on a dangerous course. Multilateralism, on the
other hand, would further strengthen the continuing economic
integration worldwide, and thus lay the foundation for political
integration as well.

Endnotes
1. John Van Oudenaren, "Unipolar versus Unilateral: Confusing Power
with Purpose," Policy Review, April-May, 2004.
2. John Van Oudenaren, "What is Multilateral?" Policy Review,
February-March, 2003.
3. President Hu Jintao Had a Collective Meeting With the Leaders of
India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico." Available online at:
tm
4. "Push for Multipolar World Need Not Be Confrontationist." The Hindu,
October 19, 2003. Available online at:
1903231000.htm
5. ibid
6. "India and China–a Harmony of Civilizations." Available online at:

7. "China-Russia Joint Statement on 21st Century World Order."
Political Affairs Magazine. Available online at:
/1/108
8. ibid
9. "China Russia India Trilateral Summit," People’s Daily, July 18,
2006.
10. ibid
11. ibid
12. "India China Russia call for Fairer World Order." Reuters, February
14, 2007.
13. Rachel Douglas, "Nuclear Power Tops Putin’s Agenda in India."
Executive Intelligence Review, February 9, 2007.
14. K. Subrahmanyam, "The Lessons From Putin’s Visit." Rediff.com, Jan.
29, 2007.
15. Dilip Hiro, "Reordering the World Order." Guardian, August 20,
2007.
16. "Iran Leader Denounces U.S. Missile Shield Plan," International
Herald Tribune, August 16, 2007.
17. "Timetable Urged for U.S. to Pull Out of Central Asia." The Boston
Globe, July 6, 2005.
18. "China Wins Mega Afghan Project." BBC News, November 25, 2007
19. Ramtanu Mitra, "Central Asia Battle Lines Being Drawn," Executive
Intelligence Review, July 22, 2005.
20. ibid
21. Dilip Hiro, op.cit.
22. "Less Scary Than We Thought?" The Economist, December 4, 2007.
Available online at:
ndly.cfm?story_id=10238608

23. "Russia Ships Nuclear Fuel to Iran." BBC News, December 17, 2007.
24. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, "Caspian Summit a Triumph for Iran and a
Victory for Russia." Japan Focus. Available online at:

25. "Caspian Sea Summit in Tehran Ends with Final Declaration,"
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 16, 2007.
26. "Putin’s Politics Put Partners on Edge," Guardian, August 10, 2007.
27. "Russian Military: Peace Mission 2007," March 29, 2007. Available
online at: ;id =44272
28. John Daly, "SCO to Host Peace Mission 2007 Anti-terrorist Drill in
August," July 27, 2007. Available online at:
id=2372326
29. "China, India Plan Joint Military Exercise." China Daily, November
22, 2007.
30. ibid
31. ibid
32. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).

Tarique Niazi is an Environmental Sociologist at the University of
Wisconsin at Eau Claire and is a contributor to Foreign Policy In
Focus. Published by Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a project of the
Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at ). Copyright
© 2007, Institute for Policy Studies.