Armenia Successor

What the Papers Say (Russia)
January 14, 2008 Monday

ARMENIAN SUCCESSOR

by Yana Serova (Yerevan – Moscow)

HIGHLIGHT: OPERATION SUCCESSOR IN ARMENIA; Political landscape in
Armenia on the eve of the presidential election.

Russia is not the only post-Soviet state where Operation Successor is
in progress. A similar operation is under way in Armenia. As a matter
of fact, Armenia even beats Russia some because the parliamentary
election in this country took place in May 2007 and the presidential
is scheduled for February 19. Even the successor was handpicked long
ago – Prime Minister Serj Sarkisjan. Everything in Armenia was fine
and dandy and would have undoubtedly remained so even now were it nor
for ex-president Levon Ter-Petrosjan. Mass rallies of the opposition
he began organizing in Yerevan one after another became immediately
associated with the so called Orange Danger.

Armenia is known as Russia’s bulwark in the southern part of the
Caucasus. It is a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty
Organization – quite an important nuance since its neighbors Georgia
and Azerbaijan would like nothing better than membership in NATO. It
was to the Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia, that military
hardware from the bases in Georgia was shipped in November.

In return for faithfulness, Yerevan enjoys some not particularly
impressive economic benefits. The Armenian political establishment
remembers how five years ago Moscow demanded instant payment of a
relatively small state debt ($98 million or so) and, when the money
was refused, confiscated five major Armenian enterprises. They belong
to Russia now, but the promised investments and jobs for the locals
somehow never materialized. Besides, gas price for the Armenians was
upped in 2007.

Armenia in the meantime does not even have a common border with
Russia. In fact, it lives in what amounts to nearly a complete
blockade: borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed and the only
railroad connecting it to the world beyond runs through Georgia. Just
a short border with Iran is open.

Yerevan has learned to count on several million dollars of annual aid
from the United States within the framework of various programs. All
the same, any anti-Russian rhetorics in Armenia is tantamount to
political suicide.

Political configuration in Armenia bears a strong resemblance to the
one in Russia. President Robert Kocharjan is completing his second
term of office and cannot run for president again. Armenia has its
own ruling party – the Republican Party. It even has its number two
ruling party – Affluent Armenia. Like in Russia, the official
successor makes an emphasis on stability, economic growth, and
continuation of the reforms already under way. The difference is,
Armenia launched the constitutional reforms well in advance (in 2005)
and had the balance of power shifted in favor of the premier. Once
that was done, rumors started circulating in Yerevan that Kocharjan
was completing his second presidency to embark on premiership.

In any event, nine politicians vie for presidency nowadays. It seems,
however, that the authorities take only one of them seriously –
Ter-Petrosjan who has assembled nearly twenty political parties
around him. Ter-Petrosjan promises to resign three years from now (if
elected in the first place, that is), as soon as he has defeated
bureaucracy, corruption, and the very men he himself elevated to the
positions of power once.

Opposition in Armenia denies all "Orange" designs and whatever else
it is accused of. It promises to win the election "before the
election takes place" by making sure that nobody will so much as try
to rig the election.

The new military doctrine adopted in Yerevan in December stands for
military cooperation with both Russia and the United States. (Armenia
has a token contingent in Iraq, these days.) Asked exactly how
cooperation with the United States and NATO would be advanced,
Sarkisjan was quite diplomatic. "We do not think we should remain in
isolation from the world," he said. "Advancement of cooperation with
NATO means learning whatever there is to be learned from them.
Armenia does participate in joint programs with the Alliance. Which
does not mean NATO membership of course."

Ter-Petrosjan’s political enemies condemn his "pro-Western" views.
His followers call him "thoroughly pro-Armenian". "You are treating
Armenia as a vassal these days, and vassals are always dangerous to
have around," one of them said. "That the regime in Armenia these
days is pro-Russian… is a myth," ex-foreign minister Alexander
Arzumanjan announced.

All Armenian politicians make references and appeals to the
international community. Ter-Petrosjan for one urged the West to send
its observers to the election and suggested various forms of control
(from having bulletins printed abroad to marking a finger of whoever
has already voted with special ink). Sarkisjan asked for observers
from the European Parliament.

Along with that, the opposition earnestly hopes that Russia will
"hold its horses" this time and refrain from meddling in the election
too actively. One of the Russian TV networks has already announced
that only one candidate in Armenia really stands a chance…

THE HIGHEST RATING

Author: Mikhail Tulsky

Source: Argumenty Nedeli, NN 1 – 2 (87 – 88), January 10 – 16, 2008,
p. 4

[Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential rating beat Vladimir Putin’s in late
December.

<> MOST RUSSIANS ARE ALREADY PREPARED TO VOTE DMITRY MEDVEDEV

The opinion poll Levada-Center sociologists conducted in late
December resulted in something wholly unexpected by way of results.
Respondents were asked to name the politician they would have liked
to vote for in election of the president. Sociologists were stunned
to hear that 30% would have voted Dmitry Medvedev and only 13%
Vladimir Putin. Sure, everybody knows that Putin is not going to run
for president again but the Russians’ readiness to shift their
allegiance in the space of scant two weeks is something of a surprise
all the same.

Medvedev was named the successor on December 10. Opinion polls
conducted on December 22-23 showed Medvedev’s presidential rating
practically on a par with Putin’s. Moreover, these results were
provided by three major sociological centers (All-Russian Public
Opinion Research Center, Public Opinion Foundation, Levada-Center).

It seems that Medvedev has the sympathies of between 46% and 52% of
all Russians and of between 77% and 85% of whoever will definitely
vote come March. Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the LDPR can only count on
5-7% and Gennadi Zyuganov of the CPRF on 4-6%. (Sociologists warn,
however, that Zyuganov will probably beat Zhirinovsky all the same if
it comes to that.)

According to Levada-Center sociologists, Medvedev will poll 63% in
the second round (if it proves necessary) and Zyuganov only 9%.

Even if his rating stops going up right now, Medvedev is all but
guaranteed 75% in the very first round. It shows that the successor
is already more popular than Putin. Putin polled 52.9% in 2000 and
71.3% in 2004. A month ago, United Russia headed by Putin finished
the parliamentary campaign with 64.3%.

The population in the meantime is not going to accept two "tsars".
There may be only one, and the highest rating will be his. No wonder
common Russians are already eager to vote Medvedev and not Putin come
March.

Analysts point out that the head of state is just human enough to
experience a stab of political jealousy. Particularly should
Medvedev’s opponents and enemies decide to play on it. It is already
rumored that some powerful men in the presidential inner circle
contemplate amendment of the Constitution so as to make the future
prime minister (Putin) less dependent on the next president
(Medvedev).

They are unlikely to succeed. The Constitution of the Russian
Federation is so pro-president, so imbued with the spirit of
presidential omnipotence, that amendment of its "skeleton" will
require a complete revision. In other words, adoption of a wholly new
Constitution will be less time- and effort-consuming. In fact, there
is more than the Constitution that will have to be amended. For
example, appointment of governors by the president is regulated by a
special law and not by the Constitution at all… In short,
rearrangement of the structure will turn out to be too troublesome.

Source: Novaya Gazeta, No 1, January 10, 2008, p. 10

Translated by A. Ignatkin