ARMENIA’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: THE VIEW FROM BAKU
Rovshan Ismayilov

EurasiaNet
Feb 12 2008
NY

In Azerbaijan, official or public interest in Armenia’s upcoming
presidential election is minimal. Few in Baku see the impending
political transition in Yerevan as having much of an impact on efforts
to break the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations stalemate.

Despite a recent push to revive peace talks, analysts contend
that a lack of popular hope in Baku for the normalization of
Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, or for the resolution of the Karabakh
conflict, is behind the lack of interest in the Armenian election.

The Azerbaijani government’s indifferent stance reinforces this
impression. The identity of Armenia’s new president, succinctly
commented foreign ministry spokesperson Khazar Ibrahim, "will be the
choice of the Armenian voters and society."

The Armenian vote is generally viewed by Azerbaijani onlookers as a
choice between just two candidates, even though nine are officially
in the race. Most believe that the two candidates with any chance
of winning are Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian, who is seen as the
favorite, and former president Levon Ter-Petrosian, who was in
office during Armenia’s 1988-1994 war with Azerbaijan over control
of Karabakh.

>From Baku’s perspective, the other seven candidates in Yerevan simply
do not exist. There is virtually no mention of them in the Azerbaijani
media, and their movements and statements are generally not followed
by Baku political analysts or government officials.

Between Sarkisian and Ter-Petrosian, the latter is seen more as a
political leader open to compromise with Azerbaijan.

"Ter-Petrosian is an experienced politician who is ready for courageous
solutions," commented Rasim Musabekov, an opposition-friendly political
analyst in Baku. "And his speeches show he is readier to stop the
hostilities with Azerbaijan. But the issue is whether Ter-Petrosian
will be able to control the hawks in the Armenian administration."

"He said several times that it is necessary for Armenia to have better
relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey," agreed Rauf Mirkadirov, a
political columnist for the Russian-language daily Zerkalo (Mirror) who
recently returned from a trip to Armenia. "Of course, better relations
are not possible without compromises on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue."

Former presidential foreign policy aide Vafa Guluzade, who took part
in the Karabakh peace talks during the 1990s, also sees Ter-Petrosian
as capable of "real" compromises – a pullout from the seven occupied
Azerbaijani territories surrounding Karabakh, and the start of some
form of cooperation with Azerbaijan. Guluzade blames Russia’s supposed
dislike of such compromises for the former president’s resignation
in 1998.

With the pro-Russian Sarkisian in power, Guluzade forecasts, "the
[peace] process will remain stuck. "

The deputy chairman of the Azerbaijani parliament’s Security and
Defense Committee disagrees. "I do not see a big difference between
them [on the Karabakh issue]," Aydin Mirzazade said, referring to
Sarkisian and Ter-Petrosian. "It was Ter-Petrosian who appointed
Karabakh war hawks Serzh Sarkisian and Robert Kocharian [as] Armenian
defense minister and prime minister, respectively."

Speeches made by Ter-Petrosian, though, Mirzazade continued, indicate
that he grasps "Azerbaijan’s growing strength" – a phrase commonly
used to refer to the country’s energy-fueled economic boom and recent
military buildup. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

"[R]egardless who wins the elections, the new president will have
to consider the new realities of our region and Azerbaijan’s growing
military and economic potential," Mirzazade said.

Analyst Musabekov sees Sarkisian as out of sync with those "new
realities."

"This group does not really understand the situation in the region …

and does not see the risks that Azerbaijan is getting stronger.

Sarkisian is more confrontational," he said.

The Foreign Ministry’s Ibrahim noted only that the government hopes
Armenia’s next president will take a "more constructive position on
the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict."

The expected victory by Sarkisian could bring some benefits for the
Karabakh peace process, Musabekov suggested. "Sarkisian is from the
incumbent administration that conducts talks with Azerbaijan. If he
wins, there will not be need for delays in the negotiation process.

He will not need time to get a grasp of the situation."

The fact that Sarkisian is originally from Karabakh is another
advantage, Musabekov continued. "Because once he decides to accept
compromises, he will face fewer problems to persuade the elite of
Nagorno-Karabakh to agree with that."

Another independent political expert, Ilgar Mammadov, believes that
the February 19 election means Yerevan is currently under greater
outside pressure than Baku to compromise on Karabakh.

In early January, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe’s Minsk Group, which is overseeing negotiations between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, traveled to Baku, Yerevan and Karabakh. "The reason for
these renewed efforts [by both governments] lies in the understanding
that there is a high correlation between election cycles and the
negotiation process," Mammadov noted. "Previously, the presidents
of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, when up for election, have always
promised a compromise in order to ensure the West’s support amidst
election fraud, and failed to deliver such a compromise afterwards
under various pretexts."

Eventually, though, international pressure will focus on Azerbaijan,
he said. "Apparently, Yerevan is pressed harder now, but the pressure
will shift to Baku after April, heading towards the October 2008
presidential elections in Azerbaijan," he noted.

If Ter-Petrosian somehow wins the vote, Mammadov believes, Western
pressure on Azerbaijan will stay strong, even after its upcoming
presidential poll. "He already says he is ready for compromises.

Therefore, if he wins, the West will demand more compromises from
Baku as well," the expert said.

At a January press conference in Yerevan, the Minsk Group’s American
co-chair, Assistant Deputy Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs Matthew Bryza, affirmed that both Baku and Yerevan had "a
common vision" for a framework peace agreement, news agencies reported.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress