DOES MOSCOW BACK ARMENIA’S EMBATTLED LEADERS?
By Emil Danielyan
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Feb 12 2008
DC
As the outcome of Armenia’s upcoming presidential election looks
increasingly unpredictable, Russia is exercising unusual caution in
backing a transfer of power from outgoing President Robert Kocharian
to his chief lieutenant, Prime Minister Serge Sarkisian. Moscow has
only indirectly and timidly endorsed Sarkisian’s presidential bid,
avoiding the kind of aggressive pre-election interference to which
it has resorted in other former Soviet republics, notably Ukraine.
Kocharian and Sarkisian have moved Armenia even closer to Russia during
their decade-long joint rule and have reason to expect a payback
from the Kremlin in the run-up to the February 19 vote. It came in
the form of a February 6 visit to Yerevan by Russian Prime Minister
Viktor Zubkov, which officially focused on bilateral commercial
relations. The two sides signed a number of agreements that will
further reinforce Russia’s economic presence in the South Caucasus
state. In particular, Russia’s state railway formally assumed long-term
management of Armenia’s rail network.
The two governments also agreed to set up a joint venture that will
explore and develop Armenia’s uranium reserves. More importantly, the
Russians reaffirmed their strong interest in the planned construction
of a new Armenian nuclear plant, which is expected to replace the
existing Soviet-era facility at Metsamor by 2016. Sergei Kiriyenko,
head of the state nuclear energy agency, Rosatom, said Russian
companies are well placed to win a relevant tender by the authorities
in Yerevan (Kommersant, February 7).
Speaking at a joint news conference after the talks, Zubkov and
Sarkisian welcomed a 65% surge in Russian Armenian trade which totaled
about $700 million in 2007 and may well pass the $1 billion mark
this year. Zubkov said Moscow will help expand a rail-ferry service
between the Georgian Black Sea port of Poti and Russia’s Port-Kavkaz,
which was launched last year and mainly caters for cargos shipped to
and from landlocked Armenia (Armenian Public Television, February 6).
Few observers doubt that the main purpose of Zubkov’s visit, the
second in less than six months, was to boost Sarkisian’s electoral
chances in a country where pro-Russian sentiment has traditionally run
high. As an unnamed Armenian government official quoted by Moskovskii
Komsomolets on February 7 explained, "The authorities are alarmed by
street protests staged by the [Armenian] opposition every day. They
are attended by more and more people. The visit by your prime minister
will demonstrate to the electorate on whose side Russia is."
Moscow has clearly not been interested in regime change in Yerevan
until now. After all, Sarkisian, who also co-chairs a Russian-Armenian
inter-governmental commission on economic cooperation, has played a
key role in the signing of controversial agreements that have left
virtually the whole of Armenia’s energy sector and other industries
under Russian control in the last several years. Several Russian
dailies quoted an unnamed official accompanying Zubkov as saying
that a "continuity of power" is essential for the development of
Russian-Armenian relations.
Vyacheslav Nikonov, a prominent pro-Kremlin pundit, agreed.
"Strategically, Sarkisian’s nomination [for the Armenian presidency]
suits Moscow, which has given him support at the top level," Nikonov
wrote in a February 7 commentary for RIA-Novosti agency. "It would
be appropriate to take steps that would demonstrate our readiness to
render Armenia substantial economic assistance," he said.
Yet Moscow is treading more carefully that one would expect. Neither
President Vladimir Putin, nor his handpicked successor, Dmitry
Medvedev, have made any public statements in support of Sarkisian’s
election victory so far. Even Zubkov stopped short of explicitly
doing that in Yerevan. "This was a very successful visit," he told
reporters before flying back Moscow. "Whatever the course of the
elections, everything should work out for Sarkisian. He is doing his
job sincerely and wholeheartedly."
"It remained unclear to journalists whether he was referring to the
work of the intergovernmental commission headed by Sarkisian or the
upcoming presidential elections in Armenia," Nezavisimaya gazeta
commented the next day. Nor is it clear why another top Russian
official, State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov, did not even talk to
journalists during a separate trip to Yerevan a week earlier.
Sarkisian is in even greater need of Russian backing now that his
election victory no longer seems a forgone conclusion. His most
formidable challenger, former president Levon Ter-Petrosian, has
pulled massive crowds during the ongoing election campaign and has
even won over some government loyalists. Ever since his dramatic
political comeback in September 2007, Ter-Petrosian has been at pains
to differentiate himself from the staunchly pro-Western leaders of
democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and to express his
commitment to maintaining close ties with Russia. Speaking at a news
conference on January 11, he emphasized the fact that Armenia had
agreed to a long-term presence of Russian in troops on its soil and
signed a comprehensive friendship treaty with Russia during his rule.
At the same time, Ter-Petrosian made it clear that he believes that the
Russian-Armenian relationship has ceased to be one of two equal allies
since his resignation in 1998, implying that his country will be less
subservient to its former Soviet master if he returns to power. The
Russians will also hardly like the former president’s enduring belief
that the best guarantee of Armenia’s national security is "normal"
relations with all neighboring states, rather than a military alliance
with Russia or any other foreign power.
Furthermore, Ter-Petrosian reportedly (and unexpectedly) left for
Moscow on February 11 and was rumored to have met Medvedev. Such a
meeting, if it really took place, could have far-reaching consequences
for the Armenian election results.
But as things stand now, the Kremlin is not lending the Armenian prime
minister the kind of vocal support which Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych
enjoyed before and during the 2004 Orange Revolution. In the end,
Yanukovych’s aggressive promotion by Putin proved fruitless and
further complicated Russian-Ukrainian ties.
Writing in Polit.ru ahead of Zubkov’s arrival in Yerevan, Russian
analyst Sergei Markedonov warned that a similar "crude interference"
in the Armenian presidential race could only antagonize many
Armenians angry at their rulers. "Moscow had better not succumb to the
‘Ukrainian temptation’ and support only the ‘correct’ candidate against
‘incorrect,’ ‘orange’ and other ‘colored’ ones," he said.