Haykakan Zhamanak, Armenia
Feb 14 2008
A geopolitical issue: Handing over Meghri was beneficial for Turkey
Harutyunyan’s interview with Lusine Barseghyan
[Barseghyan] Mr Harutyunyan, the document that envisaged transfer of
Meghri to Azerbaijan was made public recently [in Haykakan Zhamanak
on 9 February]. However, Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan tried to
deny yesterday that such a document existed. Was such a document
discussed in 1999, when you were the defence minister of Armenia?
[Harutyunyan] I carefully listened to Oskanyan. He in fact confirmed
it and confirmed in the following wording that such an issue was
discussed for a very short time and was rejected. That is Oskanyan
confirmed what was announced [by former President] Levon
Ter-Petrosyan in regard to this document. As defence minister, I took
part in the discussion of this document. Vazgen Sargsyan [former
Armenian prime minister, assassinated in 1999 terrorist attack in
Armenian parliament] was the first to tell me about the option of
transferring Meghri. Afterwards the Azerbaijani defence minister
spoke about it during a meeting between [then Azerbaijani President
Heydar] Aliyev, [Armenian President Robert] Kocharyan, [Azerbaijani
Defence Minister Safar] Abiyev and I in Sadarak [a partly
Armenian-controlled district in Azerbaijan’s Naxcivan; the meeting
took place on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border]. Afterwards Robert
Kocharyan presented this option to me and said that it was a good
solution.
Then I met the [OSCE] Minsk Group chairpersons, who discussed the
approaches presented in this document and described in your
newspaper. The document about transferring Meghri was in circulation
before Aram Sargsyan [brother of Vazgen Sargsyan, who was appointed
prime minister after Vazgen Sargsyan’s death] and I were dismissed.
Aram Sargsyan also had a meeting with the [OSCE Minsk Group]
co-chairpersons concerning this document. Now on the air of Shant TV
Oskanyan has said clearly that such a meeting took place. However,
Kocharyan’s spokesperson said earlier that such a thing did not
happen. I do not know. This issue is being discussed in the whole
world. Everyone knows that it took place. But the [Armenian] foreign
minister and other officials do not know that it happened? Moreover,
former [Azerbaijani] chief of presidential secretariat [Eldar]
Namazov, [former Azerbaijani] Foreign Minister Tofiq Zulfuqarov and
[former Azerbaijani] presidential foreign policy adviser Vafa
Quluzada resigned in 1999 over the Meghri option. And the press wrote
about this. That is, it is a fact that transferring Meghri was an
option.
[Barseghyan] Mr Harutyunyan, in your opinion, what would be the
consequences for Armenia of transferring Meghri?
[Harutyunyan] Transferring Meghri is not an issue of territory. This
is a geopolitical issue, which solves a military-political issue for
Turkey. Turkey does not have border with Azerbaijan. In 1921, Turkey
exchanged territories with Iran. In order to have an 11-kilometre
border with Naxcivan [a region in Azerbaijan], it gave Iran a piece
of territory 10-times bigger. This is the whole meaning. It is a
geopolitical issue, which solves a military-political issue for
Turkey. In this way, Turkey also gains access to Central Asia.
Armenia’s weight in this case is Meghri. Meghri is your power. You
are in control. Turkey was the stakeholder most interested in
implementation of this project. Those who have geopolitical knowledge
understand the value of Meghri. If this document had been signed,
Armenia would have been cut off from Iran, and blockaded by Turkey
and Azerbaijan. Only Georgia would have remained, and there would be
no alternative route. I, naturally, announced that I was against this
option, because it does not ensure Armenia’s security. Afterwards the
co-chairmen came again and suggested another option, according to
which Armenia would be left with one half of Meghri and the other –
[would be given] to Azerbaijan. In order that Armenia would have a
border with Iran, a zero point would be left, which would be
controlled by Azerbaijan. Understanding that these options were not
accepted, that there was opposition, this was continued in Key West
[talks between Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan in the USA] in
2001. An air bridge was suggested.
[Barseghyan] Which Armenian forces, in your opinion, would benefit
from this option? And why did Kocharyan go for this step?
[Harutyunyan] To tell the truth, I have no explanation. In general,
this option should not have been discussed, and I said this at once.
If you speak about transferring Meghri, it means you accept that it
is possible to solve the Karabakh issue at the expense of Armenia.
Secondly, the interests of different superpowers clash here. Russian
border-guards are located in Meghri. This option is not beneficial
for Iran, not to speak of Armenia, which loses a border with a
friendly state – Iran.
[Barseghyan] So how was this option prevented? Why wasn’t this
agreement signed?
[Harutyunyan] There was opposition to it. The opposition came from
Aram Sargsyan and me. Aram Sargsyan also said a categorical no during
the meeting with the co-chairmen. It had also become obvious that
this option would not be accepted in Armenia either by political
forces or by society.
[translated from Armenian]