Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Feb 15 2008
POLICY AND PERSONALITY: A RIFT OPENS IN TURCO-GERMAN TIES
By Gareth Jenkins
Friday, February 15, 2008
The recent angry exchanges between the Turkish and German governments
over the integration of Turks living in Germany have highlighted the
increasing vulnerability of Turkish policy to the personality of
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
On February 10, Erdogan told an audience of around 18,000 Turks in
the German city of Cologne that they should resist attempts to
assimilate them into German society but should remain faithful to
their Turkish traditions (Hurriyet, Milliyet, Yeni Safak, Zaman,
Sabah, February 11).
Erdogan had already clashed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel over
the education of the Turks living in Germany. Approximately 2.5
million people of Turkish origin currently live in Germany, around
one-third of whom have German citizenship. Erdogan insists that the
priority of children of Turkish origin should be to learn Turkish,
with German as a second language. He has called for an increase in
the number of Turkish schools in Germany and even promised to send
teachers from Turkey. In contrast, Merkel has called on all those
living in Germany to prioritize learning German in order to
facilitate their integration into German society and ensure their
full access to public services and employment. She condemned
Erdogan’s speech in Cologne and pointedly remarked: `We shall have to
continue debating our understanding of integration issues with the
Turkish prime minister’ (Anatolian Agency, February 11).
Merkel’s statement triggered an angry response from Erdogan. On
February 12, he told a meeting of his Justice and Development Party
(AKP), `Assimilation is a crime against humanity. I may think
differently from Merkel on this matter but I explicitly declare that
nobody can dictate to the Turkish community to assimilate’ (Hurriyet,
February 13).
On February 13, Erdogan went one step further. `We may not agree with
Mrs. Merkel on the subject of assimilation and integration. This is
true. In any case, if I act according to what she thinks then I am
not myself. Nor are we ourselves. We have no desire to be like them’
(Milliyet, February 14).
There is no question that, since they first began arriving as guest
workers in what was then West Germany in the 1960s, Turks have
frequently suffered from racial discrimination. There have also been
numerous occasions when Turks have been attacked by extremist German
nationalists, sometimes with fatal consequences. Shortly before
Erdogan arrived in Germany, nine Turks died in a fire in the western
German city of Ludwigshafen. The cause of the blaze is still unclear.
However, both the Turkish media and Erdogan himself immediately
jumped to the conclusion that it was the result of a racist arson
attack. Erdogan insisted on sending a team of investigators to
Ludwigshafen from Turkey.
Erdogan’s blunt, often brusque, personal manner is probably an
electoral asset, particularly among the rural and urban poor who form
the bulk of the AKP’s grassroots support and who are often alienated
by the honeyed words of the Turkish elite. However, diplomatically,
it increasingly appears to be a liability.
Erdogan currently enjoys more political power than any other Turkish
politician in at least the last 20 years (see EDM, February 1). When
Erdogan was first appointed prime minister in March 2003, a team of
bureaucrats attempted to smooth his rough edges and persuade him to
adopt a more measured, less hectoring tone, in his speeches and
meetings. In terms of Turkey’s foreign relations, Turkey undoubtedly
benefited from the calm demeanor of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul,
who was as polished as Erdogan is often raw. However, since Gul’s
elevation to the presidency in August 2007, Erdogan has not only
increased his personal control over the decision-making process in
the AKP but also adopted a higher profile in foreign affairs. Such is
his stature within the AKP that no one now dares either to disagree
with him or suggest that he should be less aggressive and more
conciliatory. Ali Babacan, Gul’s successor as foreign minister, has
been ineffective and often invisible, to the point where AKP
officials close to Erdogan are now discussing replacing Babacan as
Turkey’s main interlocutor with the EU in the hope of restarting
Turkey’s stalled accession process.
Erdogan’s latest outburst will have done little to persuade the
opponents of Turkish accession in the EU of the error of their ways.
Indeed it will have further alienated the very country that Turkey
needs most to convince. Relations with France, the other main
opponent of Turkish accession, are currently extremely tense, not
least over France’s recognition of the Armenian genocide. There
appears little prospect of an imminent improvement. But the same
could not have been said about Germany. Over the last 18 months,
Merkel had reduced the references in her public speeches to her
opposition to full Turkish membership. There was hope that the two
countries could at least engage in a productive dialogue without
being held hostage to public rhetoric. These hopes have now suffered
a severe blow. Perhaps most bewilderingly, Erdogan’s outburst came
just weeks after a number of Turkish officials, including Gul and
Babacan, responded to criticism of the AKP’s reluctance to implement
the reforms required for EU membership by promising that 2008 would
be `the year of the EU.’
But even more bewildered will be the members of Turkey’s non-Turkish
minorities, particularly by Erdogan’s declaration that `assimilation
is a crime against humanity.’ Over the years, particularly in the
predominantly Kurdish southeast and the Laz-speaking northeast of
Turkey, the Turkish authorities have changed the names of thousands
of villages and hamlets and replaced them with Turkish names.
Non-Turkish minorities still face restrictions on the use of their
languages and even the names that they can call their children.
Unlike in Germany, anyone who takes Turkish citizenship is almost
automatically required to assume a new Turkish name. While Erdogan’s
insistence on Turks in Germany being educated in their mother tongue
is in marked contrast to his refusal to allow education in minority
languages such as Kurdish inside Turkey.