Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908
( preparation-for-a-revolution-the-young-turks-1902- 1908/)

2/23/2008 (Balkanalysis.com)
_Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908_
( lution-1902-1908-Studies-Eastern/dp/019513463X/bal kanalys
isc-20)
By M. Å=9Eükrü HanioÄ=9Flu
Oxford University Press (2001), 560 pp.
Reviewed by Christopher Deliso

In this new study of the intrigue and organization behind the Young Turk
revolution of 1908, author and Princeton professor M. Å=9EükrüHanioÄ=9Fl u makes a
compelling case that the real motivation of these plotters and political
agitators was, contrary to what some have maintained, not exactly an egalitarian,
liberal reform movement having the simple goal of restoring the constitution
of 1876. Nor was it at bottom an inclusive movement supported by a majority of
the feuding Ottoman factions under a mantle of =80=98pan-Ottoman=80=99 reform.
Rather, it was a conservative, militaristic movement, and the first sustained
iteration of a xenophobic, anti-European Turkish nationalism, the repercussions of
which are still being felt today.
Indeed, the Turkish police’s _January 2008 arrests_
( 2332) of ultra-nationalist plotters alarmed at the apparent
loss of their country to an untrustworthy government is just one recent events
that a shows remarkable continuity between the present and the relatively
recent past, one in which a small though determined group of agitators developed
a wide network of collaborators and finally won over large portions of the
military to put muscle behind their demands. The major difference between the
activities of then and now was that, unlike the Turkish =80=98Deep State’ of the
post-WWII period, the Young Turks did not rely on illicit commerce or
organized crime for propelling their revolution. But it was unquestionablyin the
pre-WWI period that the seeds of a future militaristic and nationalistic
conservatism were sown in Turkey, one which be institutionalized and energized
after the mid-1960’s.
The Young Turks: A New Picture
Since he restricts himself to the period of 1902-1908, of course, the author
does not draw out these connections. What he does do in _Preparation for a
Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908_
( lution-1902-1908-Studies-Eastern/dp/019513463X/bal kanalysisc-20) is
nevertheless more than enough. Although very dense and undoubtedly somewhat slow
going for the more general reader, this work will prove indispensable to serious
students of the Balkans and, after a somewhat sluggish start, does become
somewhat more exciting as the narrative unfolds, chronicling the final frenzied
months leading up to the daring revolution in July 1908.
In documenting the evolution of the Young Turk movement, the major political
organization of which was known as the CPU or CUP (Committee of Progress and
Union), the author reappraises the organization, tactics and goals of the
group as it struggled to attain relevance, something which it did substantially
between the two Congresses of Ottoman Opposition Parties in 1902 and 1907.
With a small leadership body based in Paris, and with secret branches
throughout Europe and the Ottoman Empire, the CPU evolved in a few short years from
an insignificant group of idealists and theorists into a pragmatic and
effective network employing propagandists, assassins and plotters who were
also
taken seriously by European diplomats. Using previously neglected primary source
material from dozens of archives across Europe, and the voluminous private
correspondence of the CPU leaders themselves, HanioÄ=9Flu very objectively
analyzes the evolution of Young Turk thought, and how the evolution of this thought
led fatefully towards a scenario in which it could act, and in so doing
change the course of history.
The new picture of the CPU that emerges from the pages of _Preparation for
a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908_
( lution-1902-1908-Studies-Eastern/dp/019513463X/bal kanalysisc-20) is, from
the idealistic perspective, a rather unflattering one: far from being liberal
reformers, the Young Turks in Paris were authoritarian, conservative
nationalists motivated specifically by the perception that the sultan was on the
verge of losing the empire’s Balkan and Arabian provinces through crude
incompetence and mismanagement. To do this was disaster for the CPU, as itwould,
they feared, destroy Turkey’s prominence on the world stage and reduce its
contact with European scientific and other forms of `progress.=80=9D
It was the overriding desire to keep the empire that led the CPU to grasp
onto concepts such as =80=98Ottomanism’ – the building of a single Ottoman identity
capable of including the disparate ethnic and religious groups of the vast
empire. However, the very divergent rhetoric that the CPU used in appealing to
different groups indicate that this abstraction was, like the others
employed, just another manifestation of the Young Turks’ cunning opportunism.
Rhetoric and Its Ends
Indeed, while the CPU used Ottomanism in attempts to win over Christians
such as Armenians and Greeks, they used the pan-Turkic ideal and pan-Islamist
ideal when approaching the Turks of Azerbaijan and Central Asia (they even
attempted, less successfully, to appeal to the Bulgarians by citing the shared
Turkic roots of the Ottoman Turks and early medieval Bulgars). And the Young
Turks’ appeal for support to the Kosovo Albanians was also based on the stated
desire to preserve Islam and implement Sharia law, both of which
fundamentalist leaders among the Albanians desired. Ironically, however, while the CPU
regularly railed on Sultan Abdul Hamid in its appeals to peoples being
massacred under his watch such as the Armenians, Bulgarians and Macedonians, it
praised him to the Kosovo Albanians, who apparently regarded the sultan fondly as
a sort of `father figure.’
On at least one occasion, the author recounts, a contemporary Greek journal
pointed out the contradictions in this wildly divergent rhetoric, which would
have been clear to anyone capable of reading the CPU’s printed materiel.
Indeed, while the CPU was able to bring together a wide enough coalition to act
with its confusing and opportunistic rhetoric, the latent contradictions in
it would cripple its efforts to rule afterward, and provide direct impetusfor
the already rebelling ethnic groups to continue their quest- the exact
opposite of what the Young Turks had hoped to avoid by their revolution.
Nevertheless, by 1913, with the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, the unthinkable had
happened, and the Ottoman Empire had been driven almost entirely out of Europe.
Of course, those non-Turks who signed on with the CPU were not necessarily
taken in by the Young Turk rhetoric; they were merely attempting to secure
their own interests. In any case, it would have been clear to them that Ottoman `
equality’ in the eyes of the CPU meant an understood dominant rolefor the
Turks, who resented what they felt was special treatment for the non-Muslim
populations of the empire.
Realpolitik, nevertheless, played a considerable role. The Armenian rebels in
the east were in dire straits by 1907, as was Jane Sandanski’s Macedonian
band of rebels, following a schism caused by this faction’s assassination of
two leaders of the Bulgarian IMRO in November of that year. The Albanian Tosks
in Albania proper saw alliance with the Young Turks as a precursor to
independence, whereas the Ghegs of Kosovo saw it as a way to promote Islamand stave
off foreign intervention, in order to keep the European _Murzsteg reforms_
( nternational-intervention-in-macedonia
-1903-1909- the-murzsteg-reforms/) , set up to protect persecuted Christians
in Macedonia, out of their lands. In the months preceding the revolution, the
CPU made appeals to both the right-wing of the IMRO in Bulgaria and the Greek
government, which controlled surreptitiously the Greek bands fighting in
Macedonia. Both were mistrustful of the `reformist’ intentions and refused to
participate.
Developing a Network
This did not mean, however, that the Young Turks were not active through
their secret networks in these lands. It took them several years to createthis
network, and even to grasp the concept of how vital it would be in any effort
to make the government bend to its will. At the same time, the CPU was not
prepared to dilute its message or give up any of its power to groups formed
inside the bounds of the empire – what became known as the =80=98internal’
committees – and the =80=98external’ one in Paris.
Lawless Macedonia, then under weak European supervision with the advent of
the Murzsteg reform program, proved exceptionally fertile ground for CPU local
branches to operate and to infiltrate the Ottoman army. It was also able to
set up branches among Turkish populations in Bulgarian towns such as
Kazanlak, Plovdiv, Vidin, Shumen, Balchik and Dobrich. The Greek island of Crete,
then in an uneasy state of autonomy, also contained CPU sympathizers amongthe
threatened Muslim population.
The CPU, aware that any reinforcement troops to be sent to Macedonia in case
of a rebellion would be sent from Aydin province (near Izmir in Anatolia),
made special efforts to propagandize the Aydin troops against the Sultan well
in advance (they would be spectacularly successful in the end in so doing).
Nevertheless, on an operational level, the Macedonian port city of
Thessaloniki and Bitola to the north played the major role in the Young Turk’s =80=98internal
‘ committee structure in the Balkans.
Constantinople, the ultimate prize, proved however exceptionally hard to
penetrate, as the Sultan’s `extensive spy networks=80=9D were naturally very active
there (one would like to have heard more about the activities and
organization of these networks). From the correspondence and records of the CPU leaders,
a marvelous picture emerges of turn-of-the-century intrigue: members
crossing international borders in disguise, secret notebooks meant to be stored in
safes, special code numbers ofr committee members, oaths of silence and
penalties of death- all these and more tell the story of the CPU as an operational
force. Although to modern ears they can sound amusingly archaic at times,
these were the attributes of espionage a century ago, and were taken very
seriously.
Another element that is oddly touching, in light of our modern sense of
cynicism, is the very real influence of written propaganda (in the form ofthe
CPU journal, Turk and other publications) on readers. In an age when
periodicals relied to some extent on payment of subscriptions rather than advertising,
readership was significant to the life of any journal and the pages of
_Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908_
( lution-1902-1908-Studies-Eastern/dp/019513463X/bal kanalysisc-20)
are full of examples of activist journals that failed. Turk, however,
resonated with common people from North Africa to the Middle East and Europe, and
the (to us, strangely) heartfelt letters it elicited evidence this. In fact,
the CPU seems to have gotten a fair number of branch members from those who
read, and agreed with, its party magazine.
Unanswered Questions and Interesting Details
The arrangement of these branches was done cleverly. CPU’s leadership in
Paris was a paranoid and authoritarian lot, and to lessen the chances thatfield
operations would not be compromised, they established each branch via
written correspondence and authorized direct communication only between each branch
and the center- not, at first, from branch to branch. Yet given the rapid
success of the CPU in establishing and managing these branches from afar, the
author could have attempted to delve somewhat into the personalities of the
leaders. True, _Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908_
( lution-1902-1908-Studies-Eastern/dp/019513463
X/ba lkanalysisc-20) is neither a psychological study nor a novel: still,
the reader would like to comprehend how a small group of activists only
differentiated by the nuances of their ideological stance was able to accomplish so
much, so fast.
Clearly, the CPU was led by some capable figures, yet we do not hear much
about their individual personal qualities- just who was popular with who, and
who wielded more authority than the others at various points. Nevertheless,
considering the rapid expansion of CPU activity between 1906-1908, it remains a
mystery to us as how a handful of men were able to deal with what must have
been an ever-mounting avalanche of correspondence, and increasingly complex
issues requiring immediate and careful decision-making.
There are other unanswered questions that emerge from _Preparation for a
Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908_
( lution-1902-1908-Studies-Eastern/dp/019513463X/bal kanalysisc-20) . Considering
the highly controversial activities of the CPU, and its ambivalent
relationship with the European powers (whom it accused of bloodthirsty imperialism in
the Ottoman Empire, as well as Islamophobia, morale hypocrisy and disingenuous
pontification) it is unfortunate that the author does not mention how they
were allowed to operate undisturbed from the very middle of Paris. Very
interesting questions are not raised, such as why the French government tolerated
the group (at one point it is revealed that the French were keeping police
dossiers on the CPU, apparently still in the Paris archives today), and why the
Sultan never sent assassins to eliminate them.
Nevertheless, one mark of a good study is that it raised more questions the
further the investigation goes, and in this Dr. HanioÄ=9Flu’s work is a fine
example. Another distinction is the number of interesting details that popup
here and there, regarding which readers and scholars might be intrigued enough
to delve into further on their own.
Such is the case with the tales of a Turkish professor at Cambridge
University whom the CPU recruited to monitor the British media for anti-Turkish
articles, or the Turkish science students in Paris who were asked for bomb-making
advice. And we learn that in their early days, in fact, the Young Turks
contemplated assassinating hated Ottoman political leaders with the help of
Italian anarchists. We read of the uproarious case of an angry Albanian mob that
gathered when it was learned that the children of Austrian railworkers in
Skopje had been allowed to have a picnic in Kosovo. The surprising number of
Young Turks that became Freemasons, the personal descriptions of Turkish death
squads pillaging Macedonian villages, and the decisive role of Albanian
irregulars in fleshing out the actual revolutionary brigades of 1908 are just a few
of the great many interesting details presented in the book.
Most fundamentally, however, _Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks,
1902-1908_
( on-Revolution-1902-1908-Studies-Eastern/dp/0195134 63X/balkanalysisc-20) is vital for what it proves, and how
it does so. From the fervent scrawlings of the Young Turks themselves, the
reader of today is exposed for the first time to the intimate thoughts of these
turn-of-the-century revolutionaries who, despite their own success, would
hasten the downfall of an empire they had sought to save.
In the pages of this seminal work, it becomes eminently clear that all of
the rich complexities and contradictions of modern Turkey – ranging from
fiercely argued attitudes to Europe and the idea of `Western progress,’
nationalism and the question of other ethnicities in Turkish and former Turkish lands,
and of course Islam – have been not only existing, but have been actively
debated, for well over 100 years. While the immediate value of the work isits
historical specifics, it is the insights into an uncanny and remarkable
continuity of existence that is perhaps the reader’s greatest reward.