Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Feb 21 2008
KOSOVA AND THE `FROZEN’ CONFLICTS OF THE FORMER USSR
By Pavel Felgenhauer
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Rally in Abkhazia The leaders of the breakaway mini-states of
Transnistria in Moldova, Karabakh in Azerbaijan, as well as Abkhazia
and South Ossetia in Georgia welcomed Kosova’s unilateral declaration
of independence this week and its subsequent recognition by the
international community. At a joint press conference this week in
Moscow, the presidents of self-proclaimed South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Eduard Kokoiti and Sergei Bagapsh, announced they will `address
Russia, other CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries, and
international organizations to defend and approve our rights to
independence.’ The Transnistria foreign ministry issued a statement
announcing, `The declaration and consecutive recognition of Kosova
are of principal importance since they create a new model of conflict
settlement based on the priority of the right for self-determination’
(Interfax, February 18; RIA-Novosti, February 19).
Transnistria , Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh proclaimed their
sovereignty in the early 1990s as the USSR collapsed, but no
international actor has recognized them. Only Abkhazia is seeking
outright independence; Transnistria and South Ossetia have expressed
a desire to join Russia, while Karabakh wants to join Armenia. The
Abkhaz people still vividly remember the terrible massacre and ethnic
cleansing committed by Russian imperial troops and authorities in the
1860s and 1870s, which left 90% of the Abkhaz population either dead
or forced into permanent exile in Turkey and the Middle East. As the
Russian Empire completed the conquest of the North Caucasus in the
1860s and 1870s, some half a million Muslim Caucasian mountain people
were forcibly expelled to the Ottoman Empire. The Caucasian Black Sea
coast from Taman in the north to Sochi in the south was entirely
depopulated and resettled by Russians. The Abkhaz became a minority
in their own land.
Russian officials have strongly denounced Kosova’s independence and
have threatened retaliation without stating what it will be. It now
seems that Moscow’s reaction will be diplomatic and verbal. The
Kremlin will not use gas or oil supplies to Europe as a weapon, nor
will it use Kosovar independence as a pretext to immediately
recognize any of the self-proclaimed states.
Russia’s decision to not back its harsh words with action is not
surprising. Moscow never truly intended to use Kosovar independence
to somehow revenge Russia’s humiliation during the 1999 NATO bombing
of Yugoslavia that evicted Serbian troops from Kosova. Speaking at a
press conference in the Kremlin last week, President Vladimir Putin
announced, `We think that to support a unilateral declaration of
independence by Kosova is immoral and against the law.’ At the same
time Putin stated that if the West makes an `incorrect decision’ to
recognize Kosova’s independence, Russia will not do the same with
Abkhazia and the others, but will `ensure that our interests are
protected’ (, February 14).
Kremlin insiders have personal reasons to keep selling oil and gas to
the West at the highest possible volume and the best possible price.
Last week Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told journalists that Russia
has no intention of imposing any sanctions whatsoever on the EU for
recognizing Kosova (Interfax, February 13).
The Kremlin unilaterally withdrew all Russian peacekeepers from
Yugoslavia in 2003 and has no intention to dispatch solders to the
Balkans to help the Serbs in any way. During a farewell press
conference in Moscow last month before going to Brussels as Russia’s
permanent representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin (see EDM, January
31) was asked by a Serbian journalist if Russia would, please, return
the several thousand solders it has the right to deploy in Kosova
under a 1999 agreement with the United States as part of a NATO-led
force to `defend the Serbs?’ Rogozin, the flamboyant anti-Western
nationalist politician turned diplomat, replied, `The withdrawal of
our troops from Kosova was a correct move, and I believe they must
not return. We are defending not Serbia, but international law. The
Serbs must defend themselves.’ It was clear that Rogozin was
expressing not just his personal opinion, but the Kremlin line as
well. Russia still has political and economic interests in the
Balkans, but military action in Kosova is a line it will not cross.
Russia’s future policy on Kosova will be to a large degree decided in
the coming months by the pace of Kosova’s international recognition.
There never was any internal unity within the Kremlin on the Kosova
issue. The Foreign Ministry swayed Putin to take a public stand to
defend `international law’ against U.S. jingoism. Russian UN
ambassador Vitaly Churkin has voiced the hope that the majority of UN
states will not support the Western position on Kosova (Itar-Tass,
February 18). If Churkin and the Foreign Ministry are proven wrong,
if Third World countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim, recognize
Kosova en masse, or if by the time Putin’s successor is inaugurated
in May there are over a hundred recognitions, Moscow’s position may
change. Standing up to the United States as a leader of the emerging
multipolar world is one thing, becoming isolated alongside Serbia is
another. It may be seen as an appropriate time for Dmitry Medvedev,
Putin’s heir apparent, to send a positive signal to the West at the
expense of Serb nationalists. Russia might, for example, decide not
to block Kosova’s admission to the UN and other international bodies.
The Kremlin would like to increase its influence within the
post-Soviet space, but that does not mean it particularly wants to
proceed by adding geographical tidbits like Transnistria or South
Ossetia to its imperial crown. Moscow wants much more, but, as with
the Kosova issue, the multiple views on how to achieve the goal
translate into frequently inconsistent policies.