What the Papers Say (Russia)
February 22, 2008 Friday

NO RIGHT TO LOSE?

by Boris Navasardjan

HIGHLIGHT: SERJ SARKISJAN IS ABOUT TO BECOME PRESIDENT, LEVON
TER-PETROSJAN PROMISES "SURPRISES"; Whatever Ter-Petrosjan is
planning, his time has nearly run out.

Everybody in Armenia wondered before the election on January 19 to
what extent the correlation of forces and interests that had taken
shape under Robert Kocharjan would be spared changes.

These doubts and apprehensions played their part, and the outcome of
the election was never a foregone conclusion. Levon Ter-Petrosjan’s
participation in the election became a wild card in the deck. A
substantial part of the establishment views Ter-Petrosjan, the first
president of sovereign Armenia, as a man they know and a man who
could be trusted to do right (or at least not to do wrong). These
people made fortunes and gained political weight in Ter-Petrosjan’s
days. He posed a threat only to a narrow circle of players directly
involved in his confrontation with Kocharjan-Sarkisjan duo on the
side of the latter. As far as practically all of the elite was
concerned, Ter-Petrosjan was all right.

As a matter of fact, Ter-Petrosjan knew that he should rely on the
resources the authorities themselves would be relying on –
bureaucracy, oligarchs, and security structures. His whole
presidential campaign was arranged in such a manner as to convince
these people that he posed no threats to them. It seems that
Ter-Petrosjan succeeded. Cracks began developing in the previously
monolithic support of the regime. These cracks would have been made
even deeper and more serious by the second round. That was why
whether or not Sarkisjan would win in the very first round was the
central intrigue of the election. Establishment abhors surprises by
definition. Being thoroughly conservative, it was supposed to vote
Sarkisjan just because of that.

(Attempts were made to present Sarkisjan and Ter-Petrosjan as
pro-Russian and pro-Western politicians. They failed. It was analysts
in nearby Azerbaijan and Georgia that succumbed to the temptation to
present the situation as crucial for Moscow’s clout with the South
Caucasus. It became clear to everyone in practically no time at all
that both candidates, pragmatics as they were, would keep up
Kocharjan’s foreign policy.

Ter-Petrosjan meant business (i.e. was determined to beat Sarkisjan).
He tapped every available resource, pulled every string, and called
in all debts. Ter-Petrosjan’s campaign had more than enough sponsors
– wealthy people prepared to back the erstwhile president. Even some
political parties backed Ter-Petrosjan. Last but not the least, he
rallied the so called protest electorate.

What Ter-Petrosjan is going to do now is anybody’s guess. He has
already said he wanted the outcome invalidated as rigged and another
election organized. In any event, Ter-Petrosjan is running out of
time. He must spring whatever surprises he has prepared soon or it
will be too late. Protest rallies have a tendency to wind down when
protesters do not see any specific steps taken. Some observers
therefore anticipate attempts to seize government buildings or even
foment a civil war. On the other hand, situation in CIS countries is
not what it used to be 3-4 years ago. The authorities are less
tentative and mobs less reckless, as proved by the recent
developments in Georgia. Ter-Petrosjan is surely aware of it. Does it
mean that he has something altogether different in mind?

Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, No 35, February 22, 2008, p. 3