Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
Feb. 25, 2008
Turkey’s offensive comes at a price
By M K Bhadrakumar
The high Qandil mountains and deep gorges on the northern Iraqi
border region with Iran must be one of the world’s most ideal
terrains for guerrilla war. That is where the fighters of the
separatist Turkish Kurdish movement the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) have set up its headquarters. The PKK is close enough to the
Turkish border to stage its guerrilla attacks and can easily
frustrate "hot pursuits" by the Turkish army.
There is a popular saying that Kurds have no friends but the
mountains. The region offers one of the world’s spectacular natural
fortresses, virtually impossible to penetrate. Especially so in the
winter with heavy snowfall, frequent treacherous avalanches and
howling icy winds mercilessly ransacking anything out in the
open.
Without doubt, the seasoned military commanders in Ankara know that
the Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq, which began last
Thursday just after sunset, can settle nothing. The Pashas are highly
professional men and are hard realists who act with deliberation.
They would know that it will not be easy to find the Kurdish
guerrillas who know every inch of their mountain strongholds and
evaded for decades even a skilful predator like Saddam Hussein.
More so, since the current Turkish operation lacks the all-important
element of surprise. It has been in the making for months – visibly
and meticulously. It has been on the drawing board at the military,
political and diplomatic level. Besides, the world knows it is not in
the Turkish character to back off, looking weak, when provoked. The
first stage of the Turkish incursion into northern Iraq began last
December when the Turkish air force started attacking PKK camps and
insisted this was a prelude to a ground offensive to follow.
Turkey’s General Staff said that 33 PKK rebels, including a leader,
and eight soldiers died in heavy fighting in poor weather conditions
on Sunday. It said at least 112 rebels and 15 soldiers had died since
the operations began.
Turkish domestic reaction
The Kurdish guerrillas knew they had provoked Turkey too far this
past year and retribution wouldn’t be long in coming. They could have
gone into hiding. Therefore, the Turkish incursion on Thursday is to
be evaluated not for its military results but for its political and
strategic implications. A few hundred Turkish troops on
search-and-destroy missions in the Iraqi mountains cannot solve the
Kurdish problem. They may render a blow to PKK morale, but when the
snow melts and the passes open, it is a wide open question whether
the PKK cadres will resume their bloody business.
Meanwhile, the switch to the military track may scotch prospects of
any serious national reconciliation with Turkey’s Kurdish population
that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been seeking. Indeed, Erdogan
realizes that Turkey has a Kurdish problem which needs to be
politically addressed. Enlightened sections of Turkish opinion share
his view.
They realize, as one of Turkey’s senior editors, Ilnur Cevik, wrote,
"There are millions of Kurds living in Turkey and a sizeable majority
has integrated into our society. But there are also those who do not
feel a part of us and demand to be treated as first class citizens of
the Turkish republic. They feel discriminated, persecuted and
underprivileged. They believe the reason for this is their ethnic
background." The cross-border operations into northern Iraq might end
up hardening grievances. But then that is looking ahead.
In immediate terms, the Turkish nation has rallied in patriotic
fervor as powerful images come flooding home of brave lads in smart
military fatigues heading for the battlefront, of tanks and heavy
armor menacingly advancing towards the border and of F-16 aircraft
pounding the staggering Kurdish mountains. Even grumpy sections of
Turkey’s corporate media have fallen in line, including some whom
Erdogan lately antagonized by not accommodating their business
interests. "Ten thousands heroes in northern Iraq," hailed the mass
circulation Hurriyet newspaper belonging to the Dogan group.
The secular "Kemalists", who were appalled by Erdogan’s latest
constitutional reform lifting the ban on Turkish women wearing
headscarves at universities, have shifted their attention to national
security. The dark rumors of a military coup against the Islamist
government have scattered. The staunchly secular-minded Turkish
judiciary may now hesitate to uphold appeals against Erdogan’s reform
over headscarves.
All in all, the acute political polarization in Turkey in recent
weeks between the Islamist and secular camps takes a back seat. True,
the mounting economic difficulties arising out of slowing economic
growth, falling investment rates, mounting unemployment, inflation
and widening income disparities will not easily go away. But
historically, the working class too becomes susceptible to
nationalism.
Shifting alignments in Iraq
However, the timing of the incursion has a far wider significance. It
is obvious that the timing has much to do with political alignments
within Iraq. For the first time since 2003, Iraqi Kurds are
politically isolated. The Kurdish parties have come under pressure
>From Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s government, as it pushes through
a US$45 billion budget that substantially reduces the share of income
of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) from 17% to 14.5%. Baghdad
also refuses to pay the salary of the 80,000-strong Kurdish militia
(Peshmerga) or to allow the provincial legislature to remove
federally appointed provincial governors. Equally, Baghdad is firm on
the federal government’s prerogative to be the sole authority to
award contracts to foreign oil companies.
Sunni parties, the Shi’ite Sadrist movement, the Turkomen party
(supported by Ankara) and possibly the Iraqi List headed by former
prime minister Iyad Allawi (who has links with the West) are arrayed
as a majority grouping within the Iraqi Parliament, which seeks
strengthening of Baghdad’s central authority over the Kurdish
provinces. The US remains supportive of Maliki.
Iraqi Kurdish ambitions no longer match US interests. A devastating
recent essay by Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute
titled "Is Iraqi Kurdistan a Good Ally?" analyzed the shifting
alignments. Rubin thoroughly questioned the assumptions regarding the
Iraqi Kurds’ "pro-Americanism". He underscored that Iraqi Kurdish
leader Massoud Barzani would turn out to be like former Palestinian
leader Yasser Arafat as a thorn in Washington’s side. Rubin alleged
double-dealings by the Iraqi Kurds with Iran. He suggested the
rampantly corrupt and decadent leadership in Kurdistan could only
lead to a strengthening of the forces of religious conservatism and
the growth of Islamist parties.
Rubin concluded, "As Turkish warplanes bomb terrorist bases in Iraqi
Kurdistan, it is time for both Washington and Irbil [capital of the
KRG] to reassess their policies. Washington has many cards to play.
Sympathy to Kurdistan is understandable, but is increasingly based on
myth. US goodwill should never be an entitlement. Barzani may remain
an ally, but he has disqualified himself from any substantive
partnership. It is time to take a tough-love approach to Iraqi
Kurdistan. There should be no aid and no diplomatic legitimacy so
long as Iraqi Kurdistan remains a PKK safe haven, sells US security
to the highest bidder, and leaves democratic reform stagnant."
Nothing like this has ever been said by a leading American analyst
about the Iraqi Kurds, who were the darling of US policymakers
through the past 17-year period since Saddam’s catastrophic Gulf War
in 1991. Rubin sent out a deadly message – Washington has no more
critical need of Iraqi Kurds.
He was spot on. The US military in Iraq has concluded that the best
means of countering the Sunni insurgency is by bribing the militants.
The success of the policy has sharply reduced US dependence on the
Kurdish Peshmerga. As the US military works on a similar deal with
the Shi’ite Sadrist militias as well, the use of Peshmerga as foot
soldiers of counterinsurgency operations further diminishes.
The US’s Iraq strategy
The shift in US thinking is already manifesting. The referendum on
the status of the Kirkuk area, which was due last December, stands
postponed until June – perhaps, indefinitely. Washington may listen
to Ankara’s plea that Kirkuk must be given a special status under a
United Nations mandate, as the Turks do not want to see it
incorporated into Iraqi Kurdistan.
Washington has abandoned any plans of setting up a permanent military
base in northern Iraq. William Arkin, a prominent US security
analyst, wrote in his Washington Post blog last week that President
George W Bush is pressing ahead with a period of "consolidation and
reorganization" and "the likelihood of any significant change in Iraq
is slim".
Arkin substantiates that Bush is "quietly putting in place the pieces
that will indeed tie the next president’s hands". The emphasis is on
contracting US combat forces in Iraq to a fewer number of combat
forces and special operations forces and to fight the war in Iraq
>From other locations.
Thus, in Kuwait, the US is completing finishing touches on a
permanent ground forces command for Iraq and the region, which is
capable of being a platform for "full spectrum operations" in 27
countries around southwest Asia and the Middle East. In Bahrain, the
United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, the US Air Force and navy have
set up additional permanent bases.
According to Arkin, "tens of billions have been ploughed into the
American infrastructure", and "permanently deployed with the new
regional headquarters in Kuwait will be a theater-level logistical
command, a communications command, a military intelligence brigade, a
‘civil affairs’ group and a medical command".
But, interestingly, the Bush strategy virtually leaves Iraq’s
northern side without any significant American military presence.
Such a security vacuum is unsustainable. Clearly, Washington expects
Turkey to play a major role as the guardian of the stability of
northern Iraq. This is logical thinking. Turkey is perfectly capable
of keeping at bay the two other prowling powers in northern Iraq’s
neighborhood – Iran and Syria. It suits American – and Israeli –
interests if Ankara doesn’t advance its entente cordiale any further
with Tehran and Damascus.
Ankara also welcomes the role of being a pivotal power in US regional
policies. To quote Gungor Uras of the liberal Milliyet newspaper,
"The US is now reshaping the Middle East. While this is happening,
Turkey has the choice of either sitting on one side and watching
developments, or taking an active role. US support has great
importance for ending terrorism in Turkey, resolving the Kurdish and
Armenian issues, our relations with our neighbors, and keeping the
military strong … Do not forget that the US carried us to the
waiting room of the European Union … Foreign capital and loans come
through New York. Washington’s green light is important to prevent
jams on the road to New York."
Moreover, the transportation routes of the oil and gas resources of
northern Iraq pass through Turkey. Ankara has a genuine interest in
keeping the area stable. Several inter-linkages have already appeared
around energy security. The growing regional energy interdependence
places Turkey at an advantage. Turkey has always prided itself as
Europe’s energy hub. Washington will encourage a key role for Turkey
in proposed trans-Caspian energy pipeline projects, which will also
put the brakes on swiftly expanding Russia-Turkey cooperation. The
Arab Gas Pipeline connects Turkey with Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon
and Egypt. Turkey is working on an energy linkup with Israel.
Again, it is the oil and gas supplies from Iraq that will help
realize the viability of the 3,300-kilometer Nabucco pipeline
(running from the Caspian Sea via Turkey and the Balkan states to
Austria), without which Russia’s tightening grip over the European
energy market cannot be loosened, which, in turn, holds profound
implications for Russia’s relations with Europe and for the US’s
trans-Atlantic leadership.
US policy review on Turkey
Thus, all in all, Washington has estimated the urgent need to
accommodate Turkey’s aspirations as a regional power. The Bush
administration seems to have undertaken a major policy review toward
Turkey in the October-November period last year around the same time
it considered the follow-up on the troop "surge" in Iraq. It
concluded that for a variety of reasons, abandoning Iraqi Kurds to
their fate is a small price to pay for reviving Turkey’s friendship.
The turning point came during the visit of Erdogan to the US in
November. Almost overnight, the body language of US-Turkey relations
began to change. The chilly rhetoric abruptly changed to warm
backslapping. The emphasis was on the commonality of interests in the
struggle against terrorism. There was an unmistakable impatience in
the US calls on the Iraqi Kurdish leadership to restrain the PKK
through concrete steps.
Immediately after Erdogan’s visit, deputy chief of the Turkish
General Staff, General Ergin Saygun, received his American
counterpart, General James Cartwright, and the US’s top commander in
Iraq, General David Petraeus, in Ankara for follow-up discussions.
They established a mechanism for intelligence-sharing. And the US
began supplying Turkey with real-time intelligence regarding PKK
activities in northern Iraq.
By the time US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Ankara
a week later in early December, she could already acknowledge that
Turkey had a "comprehensive plan" to fight the PKK. The tacit
understanding with the US enabled Turkey to launch the air strikes
inside northern Iraq from December 16 onward. Washington – and
European countries – openly accepted
the legitimacy of Turkey’s attacks on the PKK bases. It was a major
diplomatic and military victory for Ankara.
Turkish columnist Cuneyt Ulsever wrote in Hurriyet, "My greatest
pleasure in this operation is that Turkey was able to show the entire
world that it is the greatest power in the Middle East. This should
be a warning not only to the PKK, but to all nations about Turkey’s
superiority in terms of both technology and the human capital
employing it."
The US-Turkish bonding rapidly thickened as it happens when old
friends get together. At a speech at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars during his visit to the US in January, Turkish
President Abdullah Gul said, "Turkey and United States are partners
in Iraq. Needless to say, we both have [a] great stake in Iraq’s
security and stability and welfare."
Even the left-wing Kemalist Cumhuriyet newspaper acknowledged, "A new
era is upon us [in US-Turkey relations]." With a sense of deja vu,
Iraqi Kurd leaders began realizing that Bush has done a Kissingerian
trick on them and the ground has shifted beneath their feet. Since
November, they have been resigned to the inevitability of Turkish
military operations inside northern Iraq. More important, they have
assessed that with the u-turn in US policy, the odds are heavily
stacked against them. The Kurds know from long experience it is
futile to be defiant of a superpower, especially when it bonds with a
strong regional power – at least for the time being.
Both Barzani and Kurdish leader and President Jalal Talabani have
accepted that as long as the Turkish operations are in the nature of
"limited military incursions to remote, isolated, uninhabited
regions" of northern Iraq – to quote Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar
Zebary, who is also Barzani’s nephew – they won’t make a fuss about
the Turkish violation of Iraqi sovereignty. When the Turkish jets and
helicopter gunships first appeared over the northern Iraqi skies in
mid-December, it was apparent that Barzani had abandoned the PKK and
henceforth the latter would be on its own. Barzani expects Ankara to
appreciate his attitude as a serious concession and an act of
goodwill.
The three-way equation throws light on an obscure aspect of Ankara’s
ties with Barzani. Turkey and Barzani are equally interested to see
that the transportation of oil from northern Iraq proceeds without
disruption. In the future, as increased volumes of oil (and gas)
begin to flow, this convergence of interests will only get
reinforced.
Muted international reaction
Ankara can derive satisfaction that there has been no outright
condemnation of its military incursion by the international
community. Turkish diplomats claim that the Iraqi authorities had
"close knowledge" of the incursion in advance.
Zebary told the BBC that "all this has been done unilaterally", but
he would only point out that the Turkish action had the "potential to
escalate" and, therefore, should end "as soon as possible", and he
couldn’t "contemplate" any protracted stay by the Turkish army on
Iraqi soil.
Indeed, Europe, which is grappling with the Kosovo issue, is hardly
in a position to prescribe the cannons of international law to
Turkey. Predictably, United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon
sounded defensive. The Arab League essentially called for restraint
by Turkey.
Ankara has little to worry about. US Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates sees no reason to postpone his scheduled visit to Turkey on
Tuesday. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited Ankara on
February 13. His main agenda was to canvass for Israel’s highly
lucrative arms sales to Turkey, but in his meeting with the Turkish
chief of general staff, General Yasar Buyukanit, Barak said Israel
supported Turkey’s fight against the PKK. (This was despite Gul’s
criticism of Israeli attacks on Gaza when Barak called on him.)
General James Cartwright, deputy head of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff, also arrived in Ankara on February 13 for discussions with his
Turkish counterpart, General Ergin Saygun, on the operations against
the PKK. The two generals are the point persons designated by
Washington and Ankara as responsible for coordinating US-Turkey
military cooperation in countering the PKK.
Evidently, Turkey is acting in concert with the US and Israel. The US
and Israel endorse Turkey’s pre-eminent role in northern Iraq. With
the Balkans in focus and with defeat staring in the face of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)in Afghanistan, Turkey’s
importance as a key US ally is rising. Turkey commands the KFOR
(Kosovo Force) in southern Kosovo. Turkey has historical influence in
the Balkans.
The fact is, the Kosovo model is both good and bad for Turkey. As
Russian President Vladimir Putin caustically suggested last week, the
West should also now recognize Northern Cyprus as Turkish. On the
other hand, Kosovo sets a bad example for separatist elements in
Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iraq. Ankara’s prompt decision to
recognize the "independent" Kosovo was indeed a diplomatic signal to
Washington that it is willing to harmonize its foreign policy
decisions with US geostrategy.
Turkish role in Afghanistan
However, for Washington, it is not Ottoman Turkey’s legacy in the
Balkans, which is all very well as misty history, but what Ankara can
tangibly do for it in Afghanistan that becomes the number one
priority. Frank Hyland, a former US intelligence official (who served
in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counter-Terrorist Center, the
National Security Agency and the National Counter-Terrorism Center)
wrote recently that Washington has requested Turkey to step up its
troop deployment in Afghanistan and, more importantly, to deploy the
troops in active combat missions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
(The 1,000-strong Turkish contingent is presently deployed in
non-combat duties in and around Kabul.)
Turkish media criticized that the US was seeking a quid pro quo from
Turkey for its cooperation in the fight against the PKK. This is a
correct reading of Bush’s intentions. During his two-day mission to
Turkey on Tuesday, Gates will reiterate the US expectations. Hyland
says, "Washington is well aware of the strong hand it brings to
negotiations with Turkey, considering the latter’s need to locate and
track PKK guerrillas in support of Turkish military operations."
Certainly, when someone takes its help, Washington usually expects
the friend to return the favor. Ankara can’t be an exception. But,
will the AKP reciprocate? It will be a tough call. The Islamist AKP
government will seriously ponder over the irony of ordering troops to
get cracking on militant Islamists as part of a NATO force, which a
growing number of alienated Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan view
as an occupation army. Turkey would consult its close friend,
Pakistan.
But Bush is running out of time. He will expect Erdogan and Gul to
stand up and be counted as true friends by the time NATO gathers for
its summit in Romania in early April. Hyland sums up, "Given the
stakes for the United States, the tough negotiations over the
NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan have just begun with other NATO
allies as well as with Turkey. After making a general appeal for
additional troops across the entire NATO community, the United States
appears to have chosen Turkey as the ‘best-chance’ ally to focus on
for immediate results.
"Turkey’s success against the PKK since real-time intelligence made
it possible to hit targets in Iraq with pinpoint precision, is a
considerable inducement in the ongoing discussions, especially as
spring approaches – the traditional season for the commencement of
another PKK campaign."
The buck of course stops with the Turkish Pashas. They are wise men,
who are not given to hyperbole. They will coolly evaluate the
challenge of fulfilling Bush’s great expectations of Turkey as a
regional power – not only in the snow-clad, windy Qandil mountains,
but also in the inhospitable Hindu Kush notorious for its unwelcome
ways.
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for over 29 years, with postings including India’s ambassador
to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
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