What the international community fears regarding recognition of the
unrecognized states and how NKR differs

Igor Muradyan
09-03-2008 15:58:04 – KarabakhOpen

The media report that on March 13 the Russian Duma may pass a decision
regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On that day the Russian
parliament will hold a hearing on the urge of the unrecognized states
of the post-Soviet space to recognize their independence. The speakers
of the parliaments of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnyestr will
participate in the hearing. Russia said ready to participate in the
change of status of Nagorno-Karabakh as well. The head of the Duma
Committee said although the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh is not on the
agenda of the hearing on March 13, each of the participants of the
discussion can speak about what they want, he said.

No doubt, it is not the culmination but the beginning of a new
international political process. There is no confidence that Russia
would have taken this step without the recognition of the independence
of Kosovo. Despite forecasts and innumerable arguments of the
`experienced’, `sophisticated’, `sympathetic’ Russian political
scientists, toiling for the shop window organization `Council on
External and Defense Policies’, as well as the ingloriously collapsed
group of official Moscow-based lobbyists Y. Primakov, S. Karaganov, the
Western community recognized and not only recognized but also maximally
legitimized Albanian Kosovo. In other words, despite warnings about
such an outcome of the Kosovo project stemming from the foreign
ministry of Russia and other competent structures, the political
leadership of Russia remained charmed by those booked activists, and
treated them, as one of the functionaries of the Russian president
administration would put it, `better a small fish than an empty dish’.
Russia faced a complicated and unusual situation of which it is trying
to benefit. For a lasting period, Russia has relied on the solidarity
of European states regarding the problem of unrecognized states, which
might make a front versus the United States. It turned out that it will
not take place, and Europe appeared to go along the British-American
project.

In the world there are only two states which possess operational
resource for politics of geopolitical projection towards revision of
the geo-construction in regional policy ` the United States and Russia.
However, it turned out that it is the United States which in several
regions conducts a policy of creation of new states and redrawing of
borders, since the existing geo-construction created by Great Britain
does not work and does not enable the United States to conduct
effective geopolitics.

Russia is trying to keep up and come up with initiatives regarding
unrecognized states but in compliance with the principles and format of
the ideology which the United States has already established. In other
words, for the time being, the most important principle is concerned,
that is prevention of self-proclamation but downward recognition of
sovereignty. This is highly important for Russia where there are
innumerable ethnic regions. Another important condition is that
`unification’ or integration is a principle of self-determination
rather than `secession’. In other words, self-determination means
change of master for Moscow.

For over a long time Moscow has being trying to involve NKR in a
certain system of rules and relations which Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transdnyestr have entered. However, it was under other conditions which
disappeared after the recognition of Albanian Kosovo. The thesis on the
possibility of the unification of NKR and Russia which was offered by
the Armenian folk politicians of Karabakh origin has vanished. In 1813
the province of Karabakh united with Russia, and we know what the
result was. However, in this situation unification of NKR and Russia,
as the speaker of the Russian Duma G. Seleznyov stated once, means that
only the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
will unite with Russia, and the rest of our homeland will be given to
Azerbaijan. Besides, what is unification with a country where from time
to time Armenians are killed because of their ethnic identity? But
those are the consequences of the `local’ policy.

In reality, Russia has launched a strategic offensive, and the problem
is not that Moscow has decided to get hold of Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Transdnyestr as geostrategic points, using the `commotion’ on the
international stage. What is applied had been instilled in Putin and
his team by experts who did not integrate with government agencies. The
notion and category of recognition of sovereignty is questioned.
Recognition as a political act is deemed as non-principal, it has been
stated that relation to government is not as important as relation to
the `ethnic subject’, that is people who have the right for social and
legal security. This `Russian project’ is more legitimate, humane and
lawful than the precedent of Kosovo.

If anyone suggests that Russia temporized and conducted a genial
policy, they tell a lie. The Russian political elite was not ready for
such events and did not have a reserve of time to continue to
temporize. But this is not what matters. Despite conservators in the
Russian leadership, Vladimir Putin’s position won, but his opponents
can hardly be called conservators. It is not inert thinking but rather
a well-thought concept of failure of the foreign policy of Russia, and
first of all in the strategic southern direction. At the sunset of his
presidency V. Putin used this method as a sign of development of his
own foreign political line.

Russia launches a regional `cold war’ for influence in a severe battle
with the United States and its partner Great Britain. For the time
being, this policy may be characterized as a `cold war’ but it is
probable that a new situation is emerging when the establishment of
regional security in some directions may be in the interests of both
the United States and Russia. In addition, there may be many
initiatives if conditions and solidarity in actions occur in solving
these and other similar problems. The U.S.-Russian `default plot’ is
probable. The basis of this `plot’ could be the understanding that the
process of gaining sovereignty should be taken under control as a
condition for legitimacy. It is an extremely important condition for
both powers. For the time being, this condition can be provided through
the method of `downward recognition’ but a more complicated approach is
possible when the risk is too great. In the context of these
developments, in response to Russia’s initiative regarding Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, the United States could allow for a military conflict in
the province of Karabakh only, as a lever of pressure on Russia. What
would it be? Overt likelihood to use force to convince, but whom,
Azerbaijan or Armenia?

Regarding March 13 when Duma is supposed to discuss this problem and
the steps to be taken by the unrecognized states, Armenia appears in a
rather difficult situation because it is necessary to work out a
definite reaction, only reaction, not a complete policy. In this new
situation when NKR needs to be a genuine political subject, the
republic has nothing to offer because it has wasted the last reserves
for the establishment of such a subject. The United States and Russia
need sensible partners for fulfilling those projects, and they need
recommendations and suggestions more than ever. Both powers are in an
unfavorable situation. It is absolutely clear that in Kosovo a signal
came for the Islamic community which is likely to integrate with the
Christian community both vertically and horizontally. Now it is time
for a legitimate project regarding the Christian community which sets
up successful relations with the Islamic world.
But what makes Nagorno-Karabakh different from unrecognized states?