Diplomatic Traffic, DC
March 16 2008
Dim Prospects for Sarkissian after Armenia’s Post-election Violence
by Blanka Hancilova
The violent suppression of the opposition rally on 1-2 March has
opened up a gaping schism in the Armenian body politic. Following the
deaths of at least several dozen protesters, the Kocharyan-Sarkissian
duo is bound to lose some supporters, while some neutral voters may
chose to join the opposition. The battle for power may be drawn out,
and its conclusion is far from certain but, so far, it is evident
that the foundations of the ruling regime have been profoundly
shaken.
BACKGROUND: The 19 February 2008 presidential election in Armenia was
expected to see a smooth transfer of power from the current
president, Robert Kocharyan, to his long-time ally and current prime
minister, Serzh Sarkissian. But Armenia’s first president turned
opposition leader after a long absence from the political scene,
Levon Ter-Petrossian, turned it into a bitter contest, drawing his
supporters to the streets in record numbers, a sight unseen in
Yerevan since the 1990s. According to official results, Serzh
Sarkissian won the election in the first round, securing 52.8 per
cent of the cast, while Ter-Petrossian trailed behind with 21.5 per
cent.
The opposition alleges that mass fraud had taken place. Although
independent information is hard to come by, Human Rights Watch
documented the bullying and intimidation of opposition observers. On
election day, numerous violent incidents and irregularities were
reported such as vote buying, `carousel’ voting (where the same
people vote repeatedly), irregularities in the military’s voting and,
crucially, in vote counting.
Nevertheless, according to the preliminary findings of the OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights election
observation mission, the election `was administered mostly in line
with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards.’ Despite
this finding, opposition parties heavily criticized the conduct of
the elections.
The opposition contested the results and hit the streets for 11 days
of non-stop protests. Many other opposition leaders rallied behind
Ter-Petrossian. At the same time, a number of opposition politicians
were detained and some senior foreign ministry officials and
prosecutors, who publicly backed the opposition, were dismissed.
As the government felt increasingly insecure, it offered to set up a
coalition government and managed to co-opt one of the most
influential figures – former National Assembly Speaker and Chair of
the `Orinats Yerkir’ party, 40 year-old Arthur Baghdasarian.
Following this success, in the early hours of 1 March, the police
dispersed a rally at Yerevan’s Liberty Square and Ter-Petrossian was
placed under de facto house arrest.
Yerevan Violence
Notwithstanding the events earlier in the morning, later in the day
protesters gathered in Miasniakian square, in the vicinity of the City
Administration Hall and the embassies of France, Italy and Russia.
During the day, there were possibly several hundred thousand people
waiting for Ter-Petrossian, but also a strong police, interior forces
and army presence.
By the evening, the atmosphere had become extremely tense and a
violent standoff was widely expected. At the same time, the
opposition leaders that had organized the rally disavowed and
condemned incidents of violence, blaming them on government
provocateurs. Small-scale violent incidents started to take place,
and the looting of shops in downtown Yerevan also began. In the
evening, about 10,000 protesters were still present at the square,
burning cars and engaged in running battles with the security forces.
Late on 1 March, outgoing President Kocharyan introduced a state of
emergency for 20 days, which was upheld by the parliament. Media
freedoms, freedom of assembly and political activity remain
suspended.
Shortly after emergency rule was declared, security forces advanced
towards the protesters and, according to official information, a
violent standoff occurred which left at least eight people dead and
about two hundred injured. Unofficial sources speak of at least 20
dead, and possibly up to 50.
Subsequent international reactions criticized the government for use
of excessive force and violence to disperse demonstrators.
IMPLICATIONS: Ter-Petrossian’s success in running a popular campaign
has shaken the governing Kocharyan-Sarkissian duo which, after ten
years in power, seems to have grossly underestimated the extent of
public dissatisfaction with the regime. The authorities clearly did
not expect Ter-Petrossian to be capable of mustering a wave of
popular protests, particularly given that he remains unpopular
amongst many Armenians who remember the economic hardships that
plagued his presidency in 1990s, while many disapprove of his
position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, not only did he
manage to attract people to the streets, but he has also managed to
coalesce the fractious opposition political forces around him and,
moreover, against the ruling regime. All of this occurred without
Ter-Petrossian offering any specific program of change apart from a
change of regime from the Kocharyan-Sarkissian `kleptocracy’.
Especially worrying for Kocharyan and Sarkissian, who both come from
Nagorno-Karabakh, were the signs of defections from the Yerevan elite
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the prosecutor’s office.
The electoral success, even if contested by the opposition, could
have given Sarkissian a chance to re-assert control by playing on the
opposition’s lack of internal coherence and a united program.
Co-opting Arthur Baghdasarian was an important step in this regard.
On the other hand, it is not clear how much power Baghdasarian now
commands. Ter-Petrossian has been claiming for some time now that
Baghdasarian’s supporters are joining him and Baghdasarian’s u-turn
is unlikely to fare well with his voters.
On the other hand, the external situation played in the regime’s
hands. The lack of foreign media attention to Armenia, the largely
benevolent and superficial reports of international observers, and
the keen interest of all neighbors and major powers to prevent any
new hotspot from emerging made it easier for the government to quell
the opposition tide. However, the death of protesters is a watershed
which has made Armenia’s political future all too uncertain.
CONCLUSIONS: It is too early to tell how the political situation in
Armenia will develop. However, several observations can be offered.
To begin with, the options of the incumbent regime seem to be very
limited. It is likely to try to run things `as usual’, put the blame
for post-electoral violence on the opposition led by Ter-Petrossian
and, step-by-step, isolate him. Co-opting Baghdasarian was one of the
first steps in this direction. It remains to be seen whether
Baghdasarian will be able to recover his credibility with his
electorate and whether he will emerge as a serious contender for
high-level political posts in the future.
But even if Sarkissian succeeds in calming the situation down, and
keeps himself in power, his credibility has been severely undermined.
Even many of his current supporters are likely to blame him for the
events of 1-2 March for years to come. It is possible that the whole
institution of the presidency could be weakened as a result, and that
power will increasingly gravitate to the National Assembly.
The outgoing president, Robert Kocharyan, has not announced his
future plans, but it is widely believed that he will implement the
`Russian scenario’ and replace Sarkissian as prime minister. By doing
so, he will be able to contribute to the consolidation of his and
Sarkissian’s power.
As for Ter-Petrossian, it remains to be seen whether his supporters
will be able to sustain a protracted public protest when the state of
emergency lifts. Should he be unsuccessful, he may have lost possibly
his last chance to re-enter Armenian politics. So far, many of his
supporters have been imprisoned, and some charged with attempting a
coup d’état. Many went into hiding, fearing reprisals from the
authorities.
In the short term, Armenia is likely to remain volatile, and the
possibility of renewed violence is present. In the mid-term, two
scenarios can be envisaged: stabilization with a broad coalition
government with simmering discontent and pressures to `re-open’ the
political and media space; or increasingly hard authoritarianism,
essentially military rule, keeping the opposition in jail.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Blanka Hancilova is analyst of international
relations with a focus on the CIS and the co-founder of Apreco
Consulting Group.
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