ON THE STRATEGY OF RECOGNIZING THE REPUBLIC OF NAGORNO KARABAKH IN THE CONTEXT OF PRINCIPLES AND NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
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08.04.08
After recognition of Kosovo’s independence and adoption of the UN
Resolution on the Karabakh settlement proposals were made on the
possibility of recognizing the Nagorno Karabakh Republic by the
Republic of Armenia.
Today the Press Center of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of
Armenia (RA), took an interview on the subject from the Head of the
Institute of National Strategic Studies of MoD, RA, Major General,
Doctor of Political Sciences Hayk S. Kotanjian.
How does the UN Resolution on the Karabakh problem correlate with the
imperatives of the United Nations Charter and the threat of resumption
of war?
As is known, Russia, the USA and France, as Co-chairs of the Minsk
Group, voted against the UN General Assembly’s Resolution on Nagorno
Karabakh.
The three countries were backed by 4 other UN members and there
were 100 abstentions. This fact confirms that, while adopting
UN resolutions, the prevailing majority of the UN members do not
endorse transgressions against systemic implementation of fundamental
principles and norms of International law.
Azerbaijan and other 38 states that supported the resolution were
taught a lesson on inadmissibility in pushing through documents in
the UN contradicting the latter’s fundamental goals and principles
which, as a whole, define the international legal-contractual entity
of the United Nations. By this voting, the United Nations confirmed
that the unilateral approach in the Azerbaijani resolution on the
Karabakh conflict, which reflected Azerbaijan’s interpretation of the
principle of territorial integrity and thereof ignored the principle
of equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination,
was inadmissible. The General Assembly brought forward to the authors
of the resolution the fact that Azerbaijan violated her commitments
vis-a-vis the UN Charter.
Azerbaijan had been virtually pinpointed to her commitments in relation
to the definition of "equal rights of peoples and their right to
self-determination", which is registered in the UN Charter as one of
its fundamental goals.
What are the key messages of voting results in the UN?
The voting results, in a larger sense, include an important political
message about the harmfulness of such resolutions for the UN, which
violate the very Charter of the United Nations Organization because
they ignore its main goal – to maintain global peace and international
security. The voting showed that most UN members recognize the legal
shortcomings of Azerbaijan’s stance on the Karabakh settlement. By
imposing a counter-productive model of the Karabakh conflict resolution
exclusively within the framework of "territorial integrity" – as
coined by Azerbaijan – put the UN itself in an awkward situation. Such
influential actors in the world community as Russia, the USA, France,
and India (the first three are the UN Security Council’s permanent
members) which voted against the resolution, as well as those 100 UN
member states which abstained, confirmed the major and imperative
mission of the UN for all the states: maintenance of international
peace.
By exceeding ceilings for armaments established by the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and by pushing war
propaganda, Azerbaijan shows its disregard of the UN Charter’s key
principle of promoting peace. This position of official Baku is a
real threat to the stability in such a geostrategically important
area as the Black Sea Region is. In this respect, by voting against
the resolution, Russia, the USA and France, as UN Security Council
members, officially declared to the international community their
concern about Baku’s preparations for unleashing a new war in the
South Caucasus. The denial of the belligerent behavior of Azerbaijan
is the other key message of the United Nations.
How would you evaluate the chances of reaching a compromise between
the Armenian side and Azerbaijan?
In defiance of the norms of International law, Baku doesn’t recognize
the Nagorno Karabagh Republic (NKR) as subject of International
law. At present the Azerbaijani side declares that its compromise is
limited merely to its consent of continuing consultations with Armenia
on the Karabakh problem. Disturbingly, the Republic of Azerbaijan
rejects the possibility of a direct dialogue with the authorities of
the NKR. In its public policy not only does Azerbaijan undermine the
intermediary mission of the Minsk Group but it also doesn’t respond to
the recommendations of the Council of Europe to establish a dialogue
with Nagorno Karabakh, in spite of the NKR’s declared preparedness to
negotiate with the AzR (see the PACE resolution # 1416, of January 25,
2005). Azerbaijan’s recent activities directed to undermine the status
of Russia, the USA and France within the Minsk Group and its attempt
to impose on the United Nations a resolution that contradicted the
UN Charter, testified about the counter-productivity of the Baku’s
position in the Karabakh peace process.
Azerbaijan’s "compromise", as only Baku understands it, is a world away
from compromises the Armenian side is prepared to make. In essence,
this position is pointless and empty. If Baku doesn’t change its
blatantly revanchist position, the chances of reaching a compromise
among the parties of the Karabakh conflict are not great.
What would you say about the offer to sign an agreement between the
Republic of Armenia and the NKR as subjects of International law in
response to the UN resolution on Karabakh?
The UN member states in their majority couldn’t ignore the fact that
in the United Nations’ system peoples struggling for independence
are recognized as primary subjects of International law. This
viewpoint is based on principles of International law which consider
a people struggling for liberation as a legal party. For instance,
the People’s League of the Eastern Pakistan, which represented the
part of Bengali people residing in Pakistan and unilaterally declared
the Republic of Bangladesh, was such a body taken under the protection
of International law.
The international legal-entity of the part of the Armenian people
residing in Karabakh is consolidated by the political and legal fact
of uninterrupted and efficient functioning of the legitimate and
democratically elected NKR authorities in a period of more than 16
years. These authorities were formed as a result of a referendum held
in the period when the Law on the USSR from 1990 to December 21, 1991
was still in force before the proclamation of the Alma-Ata Declaration
on the disintegration of the USSR. Thereby, an international-legal
basis for concluding international agreements between the RA and the
NKR undoubtedly exists.
In case Azerbaijan continues rejecting counter-compromises commensurate
with the compromises of the Armenian side, the NKR will have the right,
taking into consideration the lessons of the history, principles
and norms of International law, the OSCE recommendations, to conduct
negotiations with the RA on choosing more effective means to maintain
regional peace and a model of stable and secure development. To my
mind, in this stage, while maintaining the practical interaction in
the sphere of defense, it is reasonable not to limit the full-scale
cooperation between the NKR and the RA within the frames of any
separate sphere.
What is your take on a possibility of recognition of the NKR by
Armenia?
Because of the lack of counter-compromises from Azerbaijan, relatively
commensurate with the Armenian proposals, the fact of recognition of
the NKR’s independence by the Republic of Armenia seems a logical and
a justified component in the process of international recognition of
the NKR.
In my opinion, at this stage it will be more pragmatic if the process
of recognition comes after the development of a cooperation strategy
between the NKR and the RA on the questions of maintaining peace,
stability and security in the South Caucasus. The main priority of the
mentioned Strategy and the policy of its implementation should be a
guaranteed exclusion of recurrence of genocide against the Armenians,
as well as, secure and democratic development of both sovereign
Armenian states in the context of their progressive international
integration. If Armenia, Artsakh (Nagorno Karabagh) and the Diaspora
in allied cooperation possess an agreed strategy on issues of national
priorities, a possibility will arise to develop a mid- and long-term
policy, as well as design its effective provision.
How do you picture the process of recognition of the NKR?
Adhering to the universally-recognized principles and norms
of International law the Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia could
institutionalize their interstate cooperation. I mean founding a joint
Interstate Commission on elaboration and implementation of strategy on
cooperation between the NKR and Armenia on questions of maintaining
peace and their sustainable and secured development. The Secretariat
of the mentioned Interstate Commission on strategic partnership,
headed by the presidents of the two countries, could be composed of
plenipotentiary representatives of presidents, legislatures, as well
as governments of the NKR and the RA.
Particular political-legal products of the Interstate Commission’s
pursuit, as well as projects of agreements could be presented for
reviewing not only to the state institutions of the parties, but
also, if necessary, to the respected organizations of the Diaspora
and international community.
The interests of strengthening and progressive development of the
tandem of the Armenian statehood personalized by the RA and the NKR
should be placed in the center of the Strategy and systems of planning,
accumulation, coordination and targeted implementation of political,
economic, defensive and informational resources. I don’t exclude that
with time the Interstate Commission will transform the strategic
partnership between the RA and the NKR into a loose confederative
cooperation between the two fraternal sovereign states.
What do you think of the perspectives of the Minsk Group?
I think the Minsk Group has accumulated a huge experience in mediating
between the parties of the Karabakh conflict and surely has not
exhausted its constructive potential.