COMPETENT DIPLOMACY
Russia Profile
id=International&articleid=a1208272859
April 15 2008
Russia
The Leaders of Moldova and Transdnestr Hold Their First Meeting in
Seven Years
While Russia is extensively criticized in the West for its unyielding
stance against Kosovo’s independence, being accused of fomenting
separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow is showing creative
and effective peace diplomacy in another breakaway region of the
former Soviet Union – the self-proclaimed Transdnestr republic.
Last week, the leaders of Moldova and Transdnestr gathered in the town
of Benderi, currently under Trasndestr’s control. It was their first
face-to-face meeting in the last seven years. The meeting launched the
latest round of serious diplomacy aimed at settling the 16-year-old
conflict. It would not have happened without Russia’s skillful and
pragmatic involvement.
Far from promoting instability in this troubled part of the world,
Russia is seeking to bring closure to a war that separated Moldova
and Transdnestr for so many years, and to reach a settlement, not
imposed by foreign powers, that would be accepted by both sides.
Contrary to the precedent set by Western support and encouragement
for Kosovo’s independence, Russia has worked to cajole Moldova and
Transdnestr into an arrangement that would preserve the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Moldova, while maintaining the self-government
that the people of Transdnestr have enjoyed all these years.
As things stand now, the deal is likely to be built around Moldova’s
pledge to grant Transdnestr the greatest autonomy possible, including
the right to elect its own parliament and government, and to maintain
its own security and police forces. In return, Transdnestr would not
seek formal independence, and would delegate foreign and external
defense policy to Kishinev.
The parties are to convene a meeting of working groups this week,
to thrash out the details of the settlement and then present it to a
meeting of the "five plus two" — the internationally mandated forum
involving outside powers – Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE as guarantors
of the settlement, and the United States and the EU as observers.
It is not yet a "done deal," but something tells me that this
time around it will not unravel at the last moment, the way it did
disastrously in the fall of 2003. At that time, Moscow sought to
capitalize on the election of a pro-Russian President in Moldova –
Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin, who had just won an election.
The contours of the deal called the "Kozak Plan," named after the
Kremlin’s chief negotiator at the time, Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration Dmitry Kozak, resembled the ones of today-territorial
integrity for Moldova, broad autonomy for Transdnestr. However,
some elements of the package in 2003 hinted at effectively turning
Moldova into a confederate state, like Bosnia, while Russia would
retain a substantial military presence in Transdnestr.
President Putin himself was about to fly to Kishinev to inaugurate
the breakthrough, but was forced to cancel the trip, as Moldova’s
president Voronin balked at signing at the last moment.
Moscow blamed the collapse of the Kozak plan on Washington’s
maneuvering aimed at preventing Russia from a diplomatic triumph
(and indeed, Washington and Brussels counseled Kishinev heavily in
favor of rejecting the deal), but Moscow’s own overbearing manner of
conducting diplomacy also played a role.
In fact Kozak, and his boss at the time, Presidential Chief of
Staff Alexander Voloshin, sought to impose a solution on Molodva’s
Voronin that was too hard to swallow, and made a mockery of Moldova’s
sovereignty. It is interesting that the entire negotiating process
was run from the Kremlin, bypassing the Foreign Ministry.
More importantly, it was evident to Voronin that his rule would become
symbolic, and that he and his family clan stood to lose control of
the key economic assets, were the Russian plan to become reality. The
pressure from Washington and Brussels provided timely political
cover for Voronin to wriggle out of the deal that went against his
personal interests.
This time around Moscow proved quite capable of learning the hard
lessons, and is flexible enough to allow the parties to adjust to the
new realities. It also proved itself quite capable of shaping those
realities to make the parties more eager to negotiate.
First, Voronin’s chutzpah of 2003 was not left without consequences.
Russia turned substantial heat on Voronin and his government by
banning imports of Moldovan wine and other agricultural exports
(its principal source of hard currency revenue) and blocked money
transfers from Moldovan guest workers in Russia. Moscow made little
secret of working to unseat Voronin by supporting his principal
political opponents during the parliamentary election in 2005.
That did not happen, but the effort got Voronin’s attention.
By 2007, Voronin toned down his anti-Russian rhetoric and sought to
improve relations with Moscow. He was also spooked by Romania’s open
claims on Moldova, when Romanian leaders openly talked about Moldova
joining the EU as part of Romania.
This was not part of Voronin’s plans – he had no intention of ceding
power and dissolving the Molodvan state. Romanian claims on Moldova
played a crucial role in Voronin’s decision to renounce aspirations
for NATO membership. Voronin also supported Moscow’s position opposing
the independence of Kosovo.
Russia put pressure on Transdnestr’s leadership by making it clear
that the former does not support the latter’s independence (although
Moscow was openly sympathetic to the independence referendum in
Transdnestr in 2006, it was merely part of the campaign to put
pressure on Voronin’s government in Moldova). The Kremlin pushed the
republic’s recalcitrant leader Igor Smirnov to accept wide autonomy
within Moldova under international guarantees. There were also ways
to pressure other individual members of Transdnestr’s leadership,
by squeezing their business interests in Russia.
Moscow clearly distinguished the case of Transdnestr from the frozen
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While the latter two breakaway
states are believed to be unlikely ever to agree to wide autonomy
within the Georgian state, Transdnestr was delegated more to the
category of Nagorno-Karabakh, meaning that partition was unfeasible
and indefensible. Unlike Abkhazia or South Ossetia, Transdnestr does
not share a border with Russia, and recognizing its independence or,
worse still, allowing it to join Russia, as some hot heads demanded,
was downright crazy, and the Kremlin never seriously considered it
as an option.
Moscow worked painstakingly for several years to craft a situation
in which both sides in the conflict would see it to be in their
interests to seek a compromise, and would agree to forego at least
part of their demands. And this time around Russia also worked to
keep the other intermediaries in the settlement process, like the
United States and the OSCE, informed about what it was doing to bring
Moldova and Transdnestr to the negotiating table.
Of course, we will make the final judgment when we see the deal get
signed, but it is heartening to know that Russia could be an effective
force for good in the world when it chooses to do so.