DISCUSSION ON THE FORMATION OF KURDISH NATIONALISM
By Azad Aslan
Kurdish Globe
sp?id=6409F3AA7C2AD51378AA2A7882B099E6
April 16 2008
Iraq
The concepts of nation and nationalism are approached in two main
categories
In the following commentary, Globe writer Azad Aslan succeeds in his
attempts to "ignite theoretical discussion within Kurdish political
discourse."
With the exception of some scholarly studies on the origin of Kurdish
nationalism by Abbas Vali, Hamid Bozarslan, Amir Hasanpour, and Martin
van Bruinessen, there is lack of a serious and informed discussion
within the Kurdish historiography on the formation and development of
Kurdish nationalism. The lack of theoretical discourse on nation and
nationalism both within Kurdish intelligentsia and political movement
points out a chronicle theoretical infirmity of the Kurdish national
movement. This frailty is more apparent presently than ever before as
the Kurdish national question has acquired an international character,
particularly since the first Gulf War in 1991 and flourishing
Kurdish national awareness throughout Kurdistan has fast become a
phenomenon. Processes of formation of Kurdish national identity in
southern Kurdistan are not elaborated with a theoretical insight
toward the concepts of nation and nationalism. The whole purpose of
this article is to ignite such theoretical discussion within Kurdish
political discourse.
Primordialism and modernism
There is not a single comprehensive definition on the concepts
of nation and nationalism. However, for the sake of simplicity,
the myriad conflicting approaches to these concepts can broadly be
divided into two main categories: primordialism and modernism. For
the priomordialist, nation is a historical entity that has existed
since time immemorial. Nation, thus, is not a product of modernity,
but a historic entity that has developed over the centuries and has
its origin in the mists of time. Thus, nationalism is its vehicle
for the realization of its historical rights to a national state. The
modernist, on the other hand, holds that nation and nationalism are
intrinsic to the nature of the modern world and to the revolution of
modernity. In the modernist paradigm, nation is a constructed identity
invented and imagined by nationalism.
This article defines nation as a combination of objective
and subjective conditions, with more emphasis on the latter. By
objective conditions it means a community that shares common cultural
characteristics such as a commonly used language, identification with
a particular territory, shared history and myths. In other words, it
sees the existence of a cultural community with a territory assumed
as their natural possession. By subjective conditions it refers to
the political activities of conscious human agency with a purpose
to transform such a cultural community into a political community
that is based on shared rights and duties. Nation is a politicized
community, and hence nationalism is the sum of political activities
oriented toward the state.
It is this aspect of nation and nationalism that lacks a clear
political discussion amongst the Kurdish intelligentsia and Kurdish
political movement. Kurdish political actors today pay insignificant
attention to the undeniable relations between nation and the state.
Agency vs. determinism
Subjective and objective conditions mentioned above mainly refer to
internal factors. There are also external factors that are crucial
in the formation and development of nationalist movements. External
factors include two decisive aspects: world-wide, social-economic
transformation, and the global and regional political crisis.
Economic development and social transformation that have occurred
all over the world in the last two centuries or longer in relation
or in response to European capitalism have taken different forms and
consequences under different structural and conjunctural conditions.
The breakdown or transformation of primary communities, urbanization,
individualization of labor, intensification of the social division
of labor, the emergence of new forms of government and institutions,
widening of education and literacy, technologies and networks of
communications and transport, were some of the common features of
global social and economic transformation. Such economic development,
and particularly the advent of capitalism, gradually but greatly
changed the world’s social and political landscape. Thus, nationalism
as modern phenomenon became a worldwide political movement, albeit
in different forms and colors. However, treating the development
of nationalism as sole consequences of such social and economic
transformation, dominant political beliefs among the Kurdish
intelligentsia, would run the risk of lapsing into historical
determinism. The social and political crises have had a great affect
on the formation and development of nationalism throughout the world.
The impact of World War I on world politics, and particularly on the
development and the surge of nationalist movements throughout the
world, was unprecedented.
It is imperative to add the subject of structure/agency to discussion
of nation and nationalism. Nation, as a constructed political
entity, and nationalism, as a political movement oriented toward
such construction, are attributed to the role of agency. The role
of agency is limited within the primordialist perception of nation
as it conceives nation as a natural entity that exists since time
immemorial. In that sense, there is no need for conscious human
activities to create such an entity. I suggest that construction of
nation and formation and evolution of nationalism are primarily the
outcome of agency. There is, therefore, an undeniable bond between
modernist theory of nationalism and the role of agency in making
history. This, however, should not be understood to contend that there
is no place for structure in the construction and formation of nation
and nationalism. Social formations (e.g., tribalism), cultural features
(customs, traditions, language), and existing political arrangements
of a community that shares common territory are necessary backgrounds
upon which the nationalists, as agents, transform such a community
into the politicized entity that is a nation. The bulk of Kurdish
historiography approached the concept of nation and nationalism
within the paradigm of primordialism combined with an evolutionary
and determinist historical understanding. This explains the reason
behind the lack of well-established discussion within the Kurdish
historiography and politics about the role of agency in history.
Antiquity and Kurdish historiography
The early Kurdish nationalists were anxious to prove the historical
antiquity of the Kurds and their heroic past. The majority of studies
and works on the Kurds and Kurdistan, particularly since the 1970s
amongst the Kurdish intelligentsia, academics, and historians,
underline the continuity of the primordialist nature of Kurdish
historiography. Emphasizing the early emergence and existence of a/the
Kurdish nation was/is one of the main themes in the re-emergence of
Kurdish national movements, particularly for those in Turkey. Since
the late 1980s, a number of studies carried out by Kurdish writers
have emphasized the ancient history, culture, and roots of a Kurdish
nation going back to 3000 B.C. Dr. Cemsid Bender, who passed away
recently, stated that the Kurds were the oldest people of Anatolia,
adding that their age is so old that it cannot be known. The writer
further goes on to assert that it was the Kurds who, as the oldest
people of the Mesopotamia along with the Sumerians, contributed most
to world civilization in its infancy.
However, the development of Kurdish historical writings since 1970s
in Turkey is both a reaction to and imitation of 20th-century Turkish
historiography. Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic,
Turkish historical writings began to engage two mainstream ideas.
First, they tried to establish the superiority of the Turkish
nation over all other nations and ethnic groups and the great
Turkish contribution to world civilization. They claimed that global
civilization began with the Turkish race and that the Turkish language
is the oldest and most profound language in the world.
Second, Turkish historiography attempted to disprove the existence
of the Kurdish ethnicity and language by claiming that the Kurds
were in fact a part of the great Turkish race. Such extreme writings
were not mere scholastic exercises in Turkish historiography, but,
as strategic discourses, they legitimized Turkish state policy with
regards to the Kurds. Thus, it is not surprising to note that the
Kurdish historiography is a direct response to the Turkish history
writings and to a great extent an imitation of it.
Though most Kurdish nationalists and historians share the primordial
paradigm of nationalism, there are growing numbers of scholars and
historians of Kurdish history who analyze Kurdish nationalism within
the perimeters of the modernist theory of nationalism.
Formation of early Kurdish nationalism
Some scholars and historians of Kurdish history have labeled the
pre-war period as the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. Some others go
even further by assuming the 19th-century uprisings in Kurdistan to be
the beginning of Kurdish nationalism. A. Hasanpour, for example, refers
to the literary works of Ahmed-e Khani as the manifestation of "feudal"
Kurdish nationalism. This article, however, suggests that formation
of early Kurdish nationalism began with the establishment of Kurdistan
Teali Jamiyeti soon after the end of World War I. It suggests that the
classification of political, cultural, and organizational activities
of the Kurdish intelligentsia of the pre-war period, especially
from the time of publication of first Kurdish newspaper, Kurdistan,
in 1898 in Cairo, as nationalism would be inappropriate. This period
should rather be termed as the Kurdish "enlightenment." Indeed, as
an analysis of the primary Kurdish sources of the time indicates, the
Kurdish intelligentsia’s prime concern during the pre-war period was
to enlighten, inform, and educate the Kurdish masses who, as Kurdish
intelligentsia believed, had been deliberately neglected by the Ottoman
state. The intelligentsia were aware that there was a Kurdish question,
but this question was understood as an internal part of the Ottoman
whole and its solution was sought within the political boundaries
of Ottomanism. The question had not yet been perceived as having
a political character. The Kurdish intelligentsia were in search
of a means of accommodating their ethnicity and identity within
the Ottoman social and political structure. As indicated earlier,
nationalism is primarily a political movement that seeks to obtain
a nation state or self-determination. A close examination of the
associations and publications of the Kurdish intelligentsia does not
reveal any such objective. They were mainly interested and involved
in the cultural aspects of the Kurdish people, particularly in the
area of education and literature. Their thoughts were far away from
mobilizing the Kurdish masses in pursuit of a nation-state of their
own. They mainly identified themselves with Ottomanism. One must
note though, as Hutchinson would argue, that the demarcation between
a cultural movement and a nationalist movement is not clear cut and
it only needs political crisis and external factors, such as war or
disruption of social and political life, for a cultural movement to
transform itself into a political nationalist movement. It is also
imperative to differentiate between the cultural activities and
intentions of the Kurdish intelligentsia predominantly in Istanbul
and the engagement of local notables, in effect tribal leaders,
influential families, and religious leaders in Kurdistan. The former
were trying to accommodate the cultural distinctiveness of Kurdish
people within the Ottoman polity by advocating both reformation and
modernization of the Ottoman state structure, as well as improving the
social conditions of Kurdistan mainly through education and structural
reforms. The latter, however, were concerned with the advancement
of their regional influence and local interests, in effect tribal,
inter-tribal, as well as tribe-state issues in their environment.
For the first time in Kurdish modern political history a Kurdish
political organization, Kurdistan Teali Jemiyeti (KTJ, est. in 1918)),
demanded a Kurdish nation-state. The main political objective of the
KTJ was to secure general rights for the Kurdish people. An important
article published by Jin (published by KTJ in 1918-19) provides more
information with regard to KTJ’s aims and activities.
Narrating the events of a conference held by the KTJ in Istanbul
in 1918, the writer quotes from the conference: "The Association is
intended to protect the general and national interests of the Kurds.
In order to guarantee the national rights provided by the Wilson
Principles, naturally the association put the Wilson Principles
into its program. The Wilson Principles, which were approved by the
whole world and recognized by the Ottoman government, provide for and
secure national rights. For, if national rights [of the Kurds] were
not secured, the Kurds would remain oppressed and without rights, and
perhaps for centuries to come the Kurds would remain imprisoned." The
same writer asserted: "So, as the Kurdish people has preserved its
existence up to this century, and in this century, before our eyes,
and clearly with its language, characteristic features, traditions,
needs and environments distinct from others, thus it is imperative
to admit ‘there is a Kurdish nation,’ then it is their [the Kurds]
right to obtain the same [national] rights as the neighboring and
other communities of the same level." These rights, for the writer,
include: "They [the Kurds] too want to be listened to by those who
speak the same language, to be healed by those who understand them,
to be ruled by a law of its own, to be able to create their own
conditions that make them happy and to live in their own country as
they like." Here there is certainly a strong nationalist argument:
to live on their own land with their own people and by their own rule.
The head of the Kurdish delegation at the Paris Peace Conference,
Gen. Sherif Pasha, who was a member of KTJ, presented a memorandum to
the Conference in which he stated that the Kurds constitute a nation
therefore right to self-determination of the Kurdish nation must be
recognized by Great Powers.
Continuity and change
Here it is imperative to comment on continuity and change in history
with respect to the sharp transformation of the Kurdish "enlightenment"
(1898-1914) to the formation of Kurdish nationalism (1918- ). The
political actors that played a significant role during the pre-war and
post-war Kurdish activities more or less constituted the same group of
people. An explanation is required to answer the sudden transformation
of the Kurdish intelligentsia’s political thought from Ottomanism
to Kurdish nationalism in a period of four years. Remaining strictly
within the framework of modernist paradigm of nationalism examination
of the available Kurdish primary sources presents a convincing argument
with regard to the classification of the Kurdish elite’s Ottomanism and
its evolution into nationalism in a very short period of time. However,
this sudden alteration in the political thought of the Kurdish elite
poses a problem in the discipline of history.
The outbreak of World War I, the evident collapse of the Ottoman
Empire, the rise of ethnonationalism amongst the various subjects
of the Empire, including the Turks, Arabs, and Armenia, and the
nationalistic discourse of the Allied Powers, such as the Wilson
Principles and the Anglo-French declaration, were the main factors
behind the radical shift in Kurdish political thought.
The rise of Armenian nationalism and the growing Great Power and
Russian interests in Armenia from the late 19th century always caused
great anxiety amongst the Kurds. Armenian-Kurdish relations in the
immediate post-war era deteriorated further as both groups contested
for the same territory. This contention was an important factor
in contributing to the rise of Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds felt
strongly that it was either "them" or "us." What differentiated the
immediate post-war conflict from that of the pre-war period was that
the Kurds realized the inability of the Ottoman central government
to deal with the issue and the growing physical presence of the new
actors in the arena, that of Britain and France. This was compounded
by the explicit support of the U.S. toward the Armenians. The Kurds
had seen the Caliphate as the supreme protector of Muslim citizens
against the infidel and spiritually identified themselves with it.
They no longer had the hope, in the post-war period, of expecting
the Ottomans to solve the issue on behalf of and according to the
interests of the Muslim Kurds.
If the formation of early Kurdish nationalism had taken shape partly
as a reaction against Armenian nationalism, the effect of the Great
Powers’ discourse on self-determination of the oppressed people
was another factor that contributed to the development of Kurdish
nationalism. Indeed the rhetoric of the Great Powers was promising.
On November 1918, a British-French joint declaration on Middle Eastern
policy stated its aim to be "the complete and final liberation of
the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and
the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall
derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and
choice of the indigenous populations." However, it was the Wilson
Principles that caused the greatest hope amongst the Kurdish elite
because of its explicit advocacy of the right of self-determination
for the non-Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The 12th
point of the principles states: "The Turkish part of the present
Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but other
nationalities that are now under Turkish rule should be assured an
undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity of
autonomous development." It was because of the hope and excitement
that had arisen from the principles that the first Kurdish national
organization had the Wilson Principles in its program. They demanded
the application of the Wilson Principles to the Kurds due to the
fact that, as they argued, the Kurds constituted a distinct nation,
and thus had rights to their own self-determination. An article in Jin
indicates the complex relationships between the Wilson Principles and
the Armenian issue: "Yes, up to the present time, we Kurds did not feel
like separating from the Turkish government or the Ottoman community
(Menzuma-i Osmaniyan). Whereas now, we see that Wilson says "we will
not give non-Turks to the Ottomans." So this is the case: our land is
called Kurdistan and there are, apart from two to three civil servants,
no Turks. If there are no Turks, what about Armenians or others? The
Armenians only constitute 5% and the others not more than 2%.
Therefore, in Kurdistan there is no other nation than the Kurds
and thus, Kurdistan is the right of the Kurds not others. Wilson’s
Principles provide us with the right to have Kurdistan." (Jin, issue
no. 6, 25 December 1919, pp.5-14)
Reading Jin reveals that Wilson represented, for the Kurdish
nationalists, the voice of a new age in which justice, reason,
and the laws of science were to dominate international relations:
‘The old ideologies, the erstwhile political and social ideologies
are collapsing," asserted a writer. "Other principles, other leaders
are appearing; reason dominates hatred, darkness is being imprisoned
by enlightenment." (Jin, issue no. 1, 7 November 1918, p.5)
It is noteworthy to remember that World War I itself was an
unprecedented event in world history. As Roshwald acutely observed:
"The war created unusual opportunities and tremendous pressure that
served to catapult the idea of national self-determination toward
sudden realization across a wide range of societies. To be sure, the
cultural, economic, and political conditions in these various lands
were extremely divisive; what these cases all have in common is that
their transition to political systems based on the idea of national
self-determination was very sudden rather than the result of a steady,
evenly paced process, and that it took place within the framework of
a common, external contingency-a war that transformed the shape of
global politics." Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War
I played a significant role in transformation of the Kurdish elite’s
political thought on the question of nationality and identity.
There had not been any radical social and economic changes in Kurdistan
from the pre-war to the post-war period apart from the devastating
impact of the war on its economy. In that sense, explaining the
formation and development of nationalist ideas in Kurdistan from a
strict modernist perspective that nationalism developed as a result
of industrialization and of the impact on state and society of that
process would be futile. The critical and turbulent period of World War
I, on the other hand, presents an explanation for the equally critical
transformation of Kurdish political thought. As Halliday argued:
"The modernist claim need not rest on a narrow, industrial-society
model. Rather, starting from the rise of modern industrial society in
Europe and the U.S., it seeks to show how the impact of this society
was felt throughout the world, in economic change and industrialization
certainly, but also in the political, social, and ideological changes
that accompanied the subjugation to this model of the world, in the two
centuries 1800-2000 that are also the lifespan of modern nationalism."