COUNTRY – IN NEED OF A NEW OPPOSITION
Armen Tsatouryan
Hayots Ashkhar Daily
Published on April 18, 2008
Armenia
The sharp and unyielding struggle of the pre-election period ended
in the formation of a quadrilateral political coalition around the
new authorities, whereas the political camp opposing the authorities
keeps preserving the mentality and status it had before February 19.
This actually is the repetition of the uncertain situation following
the 1998 and 2003 presidential elections, when the forces that united
around a particular pro-opposition figure prior to the electoral
campaign found themselves in painful and long-lasting processes.
In 1998, the role of such individual was reserved for Karen
Demirtchyan, and in 2003, it was reserved for Stepan Demirtchyan. At
present, Ter-Petrosyan has found himself in their status.
To what extent is it beneficial to the country and the political
arena to maintain the model of bi-polar confrontations resulting from
post-electoral developments?
It’s obvious that:
First: the possible dialogue within the frameworks of the continuing
confrontation may certainly alleviate the internal political tension
to a certain extent, but it can never serve as a basis for civilized
relations between the authorities and the opposition, as such relations
develop only in case the debate goes around the ways of the country’s
further development and not around some unfinished political processes.
Second: In view of the new developments taking place in the region,
prolonging the confrontations may become a mechanism of imposing
serious concessions on the new authorities of Armenia on the external
front, because the pro-opposition camp is supervised by forces favoring
a much more moderate foreign policy course.
Third: the perilous situation existing in the opposition camp will all
the time force the new authorities to think about neutralizing the
imminent danger instead of finding ways for reforming the political
arena.
Therefore, the model of a bi-polar confrontation formed in the
pre-election period has become an obstacle towards the country’s
further development.
Such obstacle restricts the country’s opportunities for further
democratization, serious economic reforms and the fair solution to
the Karabakh issue, because such tasks continue to be viewed through
the prism of disputing the elections.
That’s to say, the opposition, which suffered a defeat during the
elections, is trying to block and "conserve" the post-electoral
situation, anticipating the failure of the authorities’ policy. Whereas
being an inseparable part of the political system of the given
country, any normal opposition should shift its political steps to
the plane of criticizing the initiatives and programs directed at
the country’s future.
As a result of the presidential elections, the playing cards of
most of the political forces, which created a certain climate in our
reality during the past ten years, were mainly hit at. The field was
trampled down and suffered a great shock, creating conditions for
the formation of new political forces. The people have also divided
into two camps, one of them supporting the authorities and the others
favoring L. Ter-Petrosyan.
Therefore, the delusion of a "pro-Levon" alternative will grow weaker
in case there’s an increase in the quality and quantity of the "new
alternative" opposing the policy of the new authorities. In this
respect, the post-electoral period is the time for the formation
of a third force or forces whose existence was simply ruled out in
the pre-election period. Such forces may be formed as a result of
the consolidation of the existing small parties or the creation of
new ones.
The first tendency was observed before the elections when several
national-liberal forces united with Ramkavar-liberal party. The
temporary unification of some of the former NDU members around the
"mother party" and its leader was also an evidence of the same process.
As to the inevitability of the second tendency, it is dictated by the
following obvious reality: ex-president Ter-Petrosyan’s preferences
in the spheres of both foreign and domestic policy are alien to the
opposition-oriented citizens. More unacceptable are the key figures
of the political team with whom L. Ter-Petrosyan wanted to come to
power during the elections. That pro-opposition electorate has already
complied with the ex-President’s proposal saying "make me your tool",
and now they are experiencing a political apathy since the "potential
tool" did not serve its purpose.
We believe that there currently exist all the political preconditions
required for the formation of a new opposition next to the authorities;
an opposition which will be more radical on the external front and
which will make demands for speeding up the paces of the reforms and
increasing their social trend.