SURRENDER, GENOCIDE OR WHAT?
El Inglés

Global Politician, NY
April 24 2008

A few months ago, I wrote "The Danish Civil War", a fictional
scenario which served to structure a consideration of various issues
relating to the rise of Islam in Europe and the likely consequences
thereof. The essay finished with the conclusion that Islam constituted
an existential threat to the survival of European civilization, and
that Islam’s influence on Europe therefore needed to be eliminated. It
further concluded that, logically speaking, the various ways of
achieving this goal could be broadly subdivided into three categories:

1) inducing Muslims to leave of their own free will, 2) mass
deportations, and 3) genocide.

(Hereinafter referred to as options one, two and three, respectively)

This final conclusion was delivered as dispassionately as possible
due to a desire to present the situation objectively, as if an alien
super-intelligence were viewing the conflicts of various warring tribes
of hairless apes. If I am correct in arguing that the number of Muslims
in Europe must be reduced to no more than a fraction of its current
value, then the three options I discussed are the only three options
for achieving this goal. We may consider all three to be morally
abhorrent and decide to submit to Islam rather than avail ourselves
of any of them, but that does not alter the brute analysis of what
could, in principle, be done in response to the Islamization of Europe.

Having now had several months in which to further consider this issue,
it seems to me that my conclusions in this regard can be considerably
refined. For reasons that I hope to make clear in this essay, I no
longer believe that it is possible to solve the problem that Islam
has become by means of option one, and I have little confidence that
even option two could constitute an effective tool in this regard. I
therefore predict that Europe is being swept into a position where
it will be forced to choose between relying overwhelmingly on option
three and surrendering.

To the type of people most likely to read this essay, this suggestion
will not necessarily come as much of a surprise. However, I feel
that an issue of such gravity should be analyzed with as much rigour
as possible, and this essay will constitute my attempt to conduct
this analysis. I have much confidence in parts of it, but less in
others, and would appreciate comments from those who feel they have
greater or additional insight into key topics. There is certainly
a huge amount of variety among European countries in key respects,
which I have largely ignored here. Ideally the key claims of the
essay would be explored on a country-by-country basis, but such an
analysis is quite beyond me. There is also great variety in terms of
the current degree of Islamization of these countries, and the amount
of braking room that they therefore have available. To the extent that
the analysis herein captures the imagination of any of its readers,
I would welcome opinions on the likelihood or likely timelines of
the different discontinuities discussed below.

– – – – – – – – – These caveats out of the way, I will briefly describe
the structure of the essay. It is divided into three parts. The first,
"Decay", will consist of an overview of certain aspects of the current
situation in an attempt to establish the momentum already established
by the forces of Islamization. The second, "Consequences", will analyze
the extent to which our options in dealing with Islam have been and
will continue to be narrowed for some time yet by this momentum. The
final part, "Violence", will take this analysis further whilst also
considering the likely nature of the large-scale societal breakdowns we
will see as Islam in Europe continues to be what it cannot help but be.

Decay

Information pertaining to the decay of European societies in the
face of the onslaught from Islam comes so thick and fast these days
from such a variety of sources that there is no particular need
to try and summarize it here. Instead, I would like to examine
one particular aspect of the decay of one particular country in
an attempt to establish the sheer momentum already inherent in the
process of Islamization, which will have ramifications later on in
the essay. Sadly, the country in question is my own, the UK, and the
institution already in an advanced degree of cultural and political
putrefaction is that of the British police. I will briefly summarize
three examples of their egregiousness.

The first relates to that most sweet-natured of Muslim terrorists,
Abu Hamza (Captain Hook to the tabloids). In 2005, under the Freedom
of Information Act, the Metropolitan Police were forced to reveal
that they had spent nearly £900,000 over a 22-month period from
January 2003, stewarding (i.e. protecting and enabling) illegal
street sermons given by Hamza after he was evicted from the Finsbury
Park Mosque. Patrick Mercer, the Conservative frontbench spokesman
on homeland security at the time this information came to light, had
the following to say in response: "The effect of the police action
was to make it easier for poison and subversion to be preached openly
on our streets."

However, according to an article in The Times, the paper
which made the original request for the information, Sir John
Stevens, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, expressed
himself to the effect that his force had been presented with
"a challenging policing operation" that had been handled with
"appropriate sensitivity." Contrary, it seems, to the lowbrow
prejudices of xenophobes like the current author, spending vast
sums of money on protecting criminals openly engaged in criminal
activities in public is an appropriate response to the challenges of
multiculturalism. Whether similar consideration would have been shown
to large, illegal gatherings of white supremacists advocating, say,
the ethnic cleansing of London, remains an open question.

Moving on, we have the inspiring response of the police to the online
publishing of one of the Mohammed cartoons by the British magazine,
The Liberal. In an online editorial explaining the decision to put
the image on the magazine’s website, the editor, Ben Ramm, wrote the
following: "[The Liberal] will not be coerced into self-censorship by
the threat of violence from those who use a platform of free speech to
call for the destruction of the very system that enfranchises them." In
other words, despite the very real possibility of being the target
of violence, Mr. Ramm refused to allow himself to be intimidated
by Muslim fanatics. Unfortunately, he was subsequently intimidated
somewhat more effectively by "senior officers" at Scotland Yard, who
conveyed to him that the resources of the police were "not infinite."

Given that this is, in fact, a statement of the crashingly obvious
and therefore conveys no information if interpreted literally, we
would surely be justified in assuming that the police meant something
else by it, something they could not say explicitly. I will hereby
hazard a guess that the police had decided that by withdrawing the
protection of the state from law-abiding citizens exercising their
historic rights in the face of murderous religious savages, they
could successfully conclude another "challenging policing operation"
with the "appropriate sensitivity." Presumably the fact that they were
acting as highly effective force multipliers for the enforcers of a
totalitarian political creed, which would destroy British society if
it could, did not occur to them.

Finally, we have the controversy over the British documentary
"Undercover Mosque," which showed undercover footage from a variety
of British mosques and Islamic centres of Muslims being Muslims. The
response, predictably, was split down the middle, with Muslim groups
taking the presentation of the filth spouted by Muslims as being
evidence of Islamophobia (yes, really) and everyone else calling
for a police investigation. The investigation, far from resulting in
the charging of anyone caught on tape, resulted in the West Midlands
Police complaining to Ofcom, the media watchdog, that the film had
been selectively edited in a manner "sufficient to undermine community
cohesion" and "likely to undermine feelings of public reassurance
and safety of those communities in the West Midlands for which the
Chief Constable has a responsibility."

This development allowed the usual apologists for Islam, Muslim
and non-Muslim, to crawl out of the woodwork, claiming that the
revelations in the film were meaningless, the intent Islamophobic,
and the featured imams victims. This significantly blunted any effect
the film might otherwise have had in alerting the British public to
the danger of the growing Muslim presence in their country. It also
had the effect of libeling the creators of the film, as Ofcom itself
concluded that "Undercover Mosque was a legitimate investigation,
uncovering matters of important public interest… On the evidence
(including untransmitted footage and scripts), Ofcom found that the
broadcaster had accurately represented the material it had gathered
and dealt with the subject matter responsibly and in context."

I cannot comment on the soundness of the decision not to prosecute
any imams featured in the film. But the way the police and the Crown
Prosecution Service effectively accused the filmmakers of inciting
hatred against Muslims in response to having been presented with
incontrovertible evidence of Muslims inciting hatred against others
strikes one as being a less than satisfactory response on the part
of those entrusted with the maintenance of law and order.

As I hope I have demonstrated, we have concrete examples here of the
following activities on the part of the British police:

1) Publicly and unashamedly protecting criminals engaged in criminal
activities in broad daylight 2) Greatly amplifying the efficacy
of shari’a-based intimidation directed at law-abiding citizens by
criminals and would-be murderers 3) Subverting serious journalistic
efforts to investigate the degree of Islamic rot in the UK by hurling
libelous claims at said journalists, thereby helping to perpetuate the
smoke and mirrors of the Islamic apologism that afflicts our societies

There are many people far better positioned than I to try and explain
how it came to pass that the police could have become so thoroughly
and hopelessly compromised. But the sheer scale of the disaster that
this represents is something that needs to be appreciated, as is the
light it casts on proposals to reverse Islamization.

It is striking to note that there does not seem to be any discernible
philosophy or strategy guiding the response of the British police
or establishment to the encroachment of Islam into our lives and
societies. The terrible, mind-numbing boilerplate about inclusion,
and integration, and assimilation, and reaching out, and Muslims
being just the same as everyone else, and inter-community respect,
and Islam being one of the great religions, and on, and on, and on,
simply highlights their complete and utter cluelessness. Islam is
a problem the solution to which exists so far outside their mental
universes as to exist, in effect, not at all. This can perhaps be
forgiven to some extent on the part of the police, who are presented
with a demographic reality that they are then required to deal with. It
is hardly forgivable on the part of their political masters.

Having accused the British police of not having a strategy to deal
with the increasingly corrosive effects of large and growing numbers
of Muslims in British society, I will now suggest that there is one
strategy consistent with their behaviour, whether they have ever
consciously formulated it or not. Simply put, it is the strategy of
managing decline. The police have recognized that brute demographic
realities render it impossible to ensure that the rule of British
law continues to obtain in Muslim-dominated areas or with respect
to Muslims in general, and that there is nothing they can do about
it. They therefore take action against the most egregious examples of
Muslim criminality, whilst simultaneously recommending that clergymen
in London not wear their collars in public for fear of being assaulted
by adherents of the Religion of Peace. They are, in essence, fighting
a rearguard action against an inexorable demographic process, which
can be slowed, but no longer stopped through mainstream political
processes.

Consequences

Anyone masochistic to enough re-read my earlier 10,000-word essay
will find ample explanation of why I believe that accommodation of,
indeed coexistence with, Islam is impossible, and I do not propose
to revisit those arguments here. Instead, I will claim that the
pathetic and dispiriting abandonment of pride and principle in the
face of Islam described so far has attained a momentum that renders
it impossible to reverse by any gradual process.

Let me first make clear what I mean by a gradual process. I use the
term to refer to sets of policies and actions: a) implemented by
existing mainstream political parties that b) do not consist of or
result in major, long-term disruptions to the stability, security, or
viability of the countries in question. It does not imply that sudden,
far-reaching changes in legislation (on immigration, for example) could
not be part of the process, only that such changes, if they occur at
all, must come from outside the political mainstream that allowed the
Islamic cancer to metastasize in our midst in the first place. This
would prevent them from constituting gradual change as defined here.

My reasoning in concluding that gradual change is impossible is very
straightforward. Consider a hypothetical, yet representative European
country with a 5% Muslim population and the attendant problems that
we are painfully familiar with and need not elaborate here. We can
be sure that this country has a certain type of political and media
elite, with certain ‘progressive’ attitudes towards national identity,
immigration, religion and race, as only the existence of such an elite
could allow a 5% Muslim population in the first place. This elite has
at least three decades of intellectual and emotional investment in
an entire moral-cultural-political worldview which is embodied in the
corrupted state the country now exists in. So terrified at the prospect
of having to confront the consequences of its macro-historical errors,
which even it has now dimly started to perceive, it chooses a course
of appeasement, making soothing noises to Muslims, and cracking down
on anything that might displease them in whatever manner it can.

Let us now advance our country a discrete portion of time, say one
year, during which the Muslim population has increased to 5.5% and
become ever more accustomed to demanding and receiving concessions,
while the ruling elite has made an even greater investment in its
position and conditioned itself even more thoroughly to genuflect to
the adherents of Islam. Is it now better positioned to confront the
reality of the situation, or less well positioned? Clearly, all the
factors that made a realistic appraisal of the situation impossible
before are all reinforced now, which will only increase the extent to
which the situation worsens when we advance our country by a further
increment of time. I conclude that no extant political elite will
take any serious steps to reverse the tide of Islamization. I do not
claim that they cannot slow this tide down at all, and the tightening
of family reunification and marriage laws in some European countries
is evidence that the blinkers are slowly coming off. But this is too
little, too late.

This argument about the inability of mainstream politicians to solve
the Muslim problem will seem absurdly simplistic to some, ignoring
as it does worlds of complexity, along with national differences
and idiosyncrasies. But I would argue nonetheless that it is the
fundamental dynamic at work here. Those who think I underestimate
the chances of gentler political change led by mainstream political
parties should consider the brilliant innovation of Gordon Brown’s
government in the UK, in response to the terrorist attacks that
occurred shortly after he entered office: Muslim terrorist plots
directed at non-Muslims would now be referred to as ‘anti-Islamic
activity.’ What to make of the people who dreamed up this ‘policy’?

Now the notion that the mainstream political parties who have put
our head in the Islamic noose will not come riding back to take it
out again may not seem particularly insightful. But that is not the
key point to be made here. The key point is twofold:

1) Stopping and then reducing the Islamization of our countries will
require a discontinuity, a completely new dynamic that overpowers
these existing trends and that must therefore come from outside of
the existing power structure, which is not capable of generating it.

2) Although, in principle, one can conceive of two distinct types of
discontinuity, the electoral and the non-electoral, there is a very
high probability that the first, if it could be achieved in time at
all, would rapidly collapse into the second, resulting in a grand
total of one type of discontinuity that could reverse Islamization.

To try and establish both halves of the proposition, let us first
consider what these two theoretical discontinuities would look
like. The electoral discontinuity consists, naturally, of the election
of political parties from outside the political mainstream who would
introduce new legislation to deal with the Muslim problem. This
legislation would act as the basis for the implementation of some
combination of options one, two and three as detailed above, all
three of which still exist as options at this point in time. The
non-electoral discontinuity refers to a discontinuity that bears no
relation to politics in the normal sense of the word, but consists
instead of a partial or complete breakdown in the authority of the
state and a concomitant descent into chaos, subsequent to which
options one and two are no longer available to any significant degree.

It must first be observed that the possibility of electoral
discontinuity, clearly the most desirable of the two types of
discontinuity, seems remote at present in most European countries,
despite the remarkable efforts of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands
and the positive developments in Denmark. Given the private sector
opposition to his efforts, the fact that his party currently has
only 9 seats out of a total of 150 in the Dutch Parliament, and the
likelihood of existing elites resorting to every dirty trick in the
book to foil him as his influence grows, it is hard to believe that
a Netherlands with him or a similar figure in the driving seat is
likely to exist any time within the next five years, during which
time the window of opportunity for successful electoral discontinuity
will continue to close. In France, another country neck-deep in the
green stuff, Sarkozy was, some hoped, to represent the long-awaited
electoral discontinuity. To be as gentle as possible, this does not
seem to have been the case. As for Sweden, if what I read about its
political and media culture on concerned websites is accurate, there
is no hope whatsoever of electoral discontinuity occurring before
it is preempted by something far more grisly. I note, for the sake
of completeness, the existence of countries such as Denmark, Italy,
and Switzerland, which hold more promise than most of refuting my
position in whole or in part.

Let us focus on a single example and consider the most optimistic
possible scenario for the Netherlands. I do not know the country
or its politics well, but will attempt to use it to examine some
general principles. If Geert Wilders’s Freedom Party were to attain
an outright majority in the Dutch parliament tomorrow and attempt to
implement option one, we would have achieved as neat and clean an
electoral discontinuity as could be imagined. Would it be possible
to solve the Muslim problem then without recourse to either options
two or three? I do not think the possibility can be ruled out, but
I think there are many factors that make it improbable.

Collectively, the Dutch have, until recently, offered, as far as the
interested layman can discern, not a single iota of real opposition
to the influx of massive numbers of adherents of a religion which
considers everything they hold dear to be absolutely anathema (I
intend no disrespect by this, and observe that in terms of sheer
preemptive cultural surrender, the UK competes with the very best).

Despite Muslims’ well-rehearsed claims of how brutal and oppressive
their host societies in Europe are, I feel that Dutch Muslims
are confident that they, in fact, have the initiative in the
Netherlands. The readiness with which they riot and burn, the
shockingly disproportionate fraction of crimes they commit, and the
demands for inconveniences such as freedom of speech to be removed
to appease them are not suggestive of a people who shy away from
conflict or have much regard for the will of the people on the other
side of that conflict. Put differently, Muslims in the Netherlands
seem to be desensitized to conflict to a very significant degree, be
it verbal conflict or actual street violence. In contrast, significant
numbers of ethnic Dutch seem to still be operating within a paradigm
which sees civil breakdown along tribal lines as being literally
unimaginable, something which can be avoided through concessions,
and must be avoided at all costs.

This disparity in the relative appetites for and desensitization
towards conflict is scarcely the type of thing that the Muslim
population of the Netherlands could be unaware of. Much weepy-eyed
talk to one side, it does not exactly seem to be a community living
in fear. Of course, we have stipulated that the Freedom Party has
already won an outright majority, which would only be possible
with a significant hardening of opinion on the part of ethnic Dutch
towards Muslims. But I do not believe the desensitization gap can
be closed so quickly or so easily in either direction, and it is a
key contention of this essay that this gap will be the key factor
in turning electoral discontinuities (should they even occur) into
non-electoral discontinuities.

Would a young, violent, disproportionately criminal community,
possessed of (and by) a supremacist and totalitarian politico-religious
ideology preaching world domination, significantly desensitized to
the tribal violence most Europeans fear above all else, and already
approaching being a majority in the biggest cities in the Netherlands,
be likely to conclude that the jig was up for Islam, that it would
simply have to pack its bags and leave? To even ask the question,
I think, is to realize that the answer is no. They simply would not
believe that massive amounts of rioting, killing, and burning tearing
through the urban centres of the Netherlands would not be able to
force the Dutch to back down and revert to their earlier path to
dhimmitude. Thus does the chaos of the non-electoral discontinuity
strip away from the hands of those Dutch who would still apply
them options one and two, which both require an intact and dominant
apparatus of state.

Weakness has two disadvantages, the weakness itself being but the first
of them. The second is the inability to have a reversion to strength
taken seriously without violence. The Dutch will inevitably overcome
the first of these disadvantages sooner or later. But they cannot
overcome the second without locking horns with their Muslim population
in such a manner as to almost certainly collapse their hard-earned
electoral discontinuity, should they even be capable of generating
it in the first place. Even if I am wrong about the country already
having reached this point of no return, where options one and two
disappear and only option three remains, I feel that it will reach it
very soon. And there are other European countries which are in similar,
if not worse, positions, such as France, Sweden, and Belgium. Others,
such as the UK, Germany, Norway, Austria, and Denmark do not seem to be
that far behind. And the violence will prove to be contagious in direct
proportion to its severity, destroying the ability of neighbouring
countries to achieve or build upon electoral discontinuity.

Violence

I have argued that, in those European countries with significant
Muslim populations, a situation is rapidly being reached, if, indeed,
it has not already been, in which option three is the only option left
for dealing with the Muslim problem. I have also argued in the Danish
Civil War, that though this violence may well involve the organs of
state, most obviously the police and the army, it will be of a scope
and scale which will ensure that it spills outside any cordon the
state may try to erect around it. This may well result in not only a
collapse in the authority of the state itself, but a collapse in the
coherence and command-and-control of such organs of state as remain
intact, thereby accelerating the downward slide into anarchy.

The first and perhaps most important point to make in this context
concerns the reduction of a continuum of violent options into a brute
choice between a small handful of broad-brush approaches. Considering
violence to consist of all types of physical coercion and all actions
backed by the obvious and immediate possibility of bringing violence
to bear, it is clear that the state, alone among all potential actors
in the early, non-critical phases of a conflict, has the ability
to calibrate without restrictions the violence it can apply to a
situation. It can combine, in arbitrary proportions, incarceration,
the prohibition of proscribed activities (wearing hijab, etc),
large-scale non-lethal violence (using riot police, etc.), curfews,
targeted executions, deportations, internment, mass expulsions,
and large-scale killings. Moreover, the knowledge that it has access
to these varied options will reinforce the likely effectiveness of
the less draconian and therefore reduce the likelihood of the more
draconian being used.

Following the types of discontinuity that I envisage occurring in
the near future, we must observe that the likelihood of government
being capable of maintaining an effective monopoly on the use of
violence is exceptionally low, and that, in direct proportion to its
failure to do so, the continuum represented by various combinations
of the above options will be collapsed into a much smaller number
of discrete, widely separated and virtually impossible-to-combine
options. Incarceration after a fair trial will simply not exist as an
option in the event of societal breakdown. Prohibitions of proscribed
activities will be enforceable only through immediate violence, which
essentially collapses this option into a new option not available
to the state itself, mob violence and vigilante ‘justice’ centered
on tribal markers such as dress, appearance, or language. Large-scale
non-lethal violence takes large numbers of well-trained, well-equipped,
well-organized and amply-supported personnel and is therefore
the province of organs of the state, guided by intact political
structures. It cannot exist in the circumstances imagined here.

Curfews require a patrolling presence by a heavily-armed controlling
authority in areas of potential unrest and therefore suffer from the
same problems as large-scale non-lethal violence. Deportations are a
key point to which I will return briefly, but I suggest here that they
will be impossible to organize on a large scale once the situation has
degenerated to the point foreseen in this analysis. Internment that
does not result in everyone being dead 48 hours later is obviously the
province of government, with the massive infrastructural demands it
makes of those who would implement it. Mass expulsion, the poor man’s
deportation, though possible in principle on an impromptu basis, would
present insuperable problems in practice that are presumably obvious
but that I will discuss below nonetheless. As for large-scale killing,
it is not only always an option, it is the option that constitutes
the backdrop to all human conflict, whether we perceive it or not.

As this brief categorization makes clear, the tactical options left to
actors on either side of the conflict in the result of non-electoral
discontinuity become very similar very quickly, even if the means
available to implement those options differ significantly. Surrender,
flight, mob-style violence resulting in almost immediate segregation
in major cities, and more determined efforts to actually start
systematically killing entire groups of the opposition: these are the
tracks along which the course of events will inevitably run once the
grip of government on the situation fails.

And this is the tragedy of the situation and the scale of the
betrayal. Government, the one entity capable of preventing the problem
in the first place, and capable also of solving it with a minimum of
bloodshed once it was indeed recognized to be an existential problem,
has, in effect, simply washed its hands of it. In doing so, it has
guaranteed the deaths of countless people and the utter destruction
of the society it was responsible for protecting, at least in the
form in which it has hitherto existed.

The joker in the pack here is the joint category of deportation/mass
expulsion. I take the former to mean the removal of people by
government in a relatively orderly manner, the latter to mean the
expulsion of entire groups by violence and the threat of violence
in a disorderly and impromptu fashion. The most obvious point to
make here is the that the latter can only take place if there is some
adjacent territory to which the group being driven out can easily gain
access. Despite the dark mutterings of some that people like myself
are advocating some sort of mass ethnic cleansing, it is not clear
that this would even be physically possible. How would the French
ethnically cleanse their Algerian population? By driving them from one
side of Paris to the other? That, to put it politely, would not solve
the problem. Perhaps they could drive them, by fire and pitchfork,
into Spain. But one suspects that even the Spanish would not put
up with this, and would simply drive their own burgeoning Moroccan
and Pakistani populations back into France, bringing new meaning to
the term population exchange. Mass expulsions as I have defined them
here are actually not possible in a brute physical sense. Compare this
with what, in principle, America could do to its Mexican (or Canadian,
if you prefer) population, and the point is clear.

This leaves only the question of deportations. I am aware of no
examples of large-scale deportations being carried out by aircraft,
which they would have to be in this case. Apart from the faintly
surreal notion of hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis being flown
out of the UK and being served hundreds of thousands of halal meal
options while fiddling around with hundreds of thousands of aggravating
airline headsets on the way back to the homeland, it must be observed
that air travel is the most infrastructurally fragile of all modes of
transportation, and completely reliant on the goodwill and cooperation
of people at the destination. A functioning government might be able
to organize and carry out mass deportations via airline, but would
surely be forced to preemptively intern the target population, and
the notion that such populations in Europe would allow themselves
to be peacefully interned strains credulity to breaking point and
beyond. If this is true now, how much truer would it be in five or
ten years time? Even the merest suggestion of implementing such a plan
would surely collapse an electoral discontinuity into a non-electoral
discontinuity for reasons already discussed. It is on the basis of
this reasoning that I argue that deportations and mass expulsions,
though the most difficult types of violence to read in this context,
will not play a key role in post-discontinuity violence apart from
perhaps being used to repatriate the survivors once the conflict has
been won.

It is worth noting that the notion that some sort of Nazi-style
genocide is in the cards for Europe’s Muslims would seem to be missing
the point for related reasons. The Holocaust, like the Armenian
Genocide that provided the inspiration for it, was conducted with
as much deception and misdirection as was possible given the vast
numbers of people involved. Both genocides were heavily reliant on
the relocation of vast numbers of victims to sparsely-inhabited areas
to be dispatched, whether in recently conquered territories as in the
case of Germany, or the wilder reaches of empire, as in the case of the
Ottoman Empire. There is no conceivable way that this would be viable
in any European case, especially given the massive qualitative gulf
between communication and surveillance technologies of the early/middle
20th-century and the first decades of the 21st. Whatever type of
violence we end up seeing between Muslims and their host societies (and
I do believe it will be appropriately described by the word genocidal),
the Holocaust will not be much of a reference point. I suspect that
the recent conflicts in the Balkans are much more likely to overlap
structurally with what we will see in Europe in the near future.

The disparity between the levels of desensitization of Muslims and
non-Muslims has already been mentioned. However, there is an additional
consequence that should be mentioned here in closing. I am happy to
be corrected on this point, but I have gained the impression from
various sources over the years that it is precisely those who are
plunged into violence without having been conditioned to deal with it
psychologically, in whatever manner, that are most likely to commit
atrocities (excluding those who are already ideologically committed to
them). If violence does erupt in European countries between natives
and Muslims, I consider it highly likely that people who had never
done anything more violent than beat eggs will prove incapable of
managing the psychological transition to controlled violence and
start killing anything that looks remotely Muslim. Our unspoken
conviction that we, in 21st-century Europe, have moved beyond such
savagery will be shown to be an arrogance founded on a few decades
of fragile peace and prosperity, taken for granted and allowed to
slip through our fingers for no reason at all.

In Closing

Given my obvious and adamant opposition to European countries allowing
themselves to have their political, cultural, or legal destinies
influenced by their rapidly-growing Islamic populations, and my belief
that, in all likelihood, violence edging towards the genocidal would be
an inevitable part of removing this threat, readers would be perfectly
justified in wondering if I am advocating genocide. The answer is
no. Let me make clear what I do in fact advocate in the context of
my own country, that is to say, the policies I would immediately
implement if I were the sole, unchallenged ruler of the UK. I will
not concern myself with any legal issues that would be involved in
actually implementing such policies; ignoring such technicalities is
one of the great pleasures of being dictator-for-a-day.

As newly installed ruler, I would introduce an immediate ban on Muslim
immigration. If I were in an exceptionally good mood, I would consider
allowing up to 100 Muslims annually to gain temporary residency in the
UK if, and only if, they were married to non-Muslim UK citizens. Other
than this, no Muslim would be granted permission to live in the UK
unless essential (diplomatic staff, etc.). Visas, whether for tourism,
study, or business, would be exceptionally hard to come by for Muslims,
especially for Saudis wishing to go shopping at Harrods. As a result
of this policy, exogenous growth of the Muslim population of the UK
would be reduced to zero. The question of determining who was a Muslim
and who was not would not be difficult for a committed immigration
service to answer, and in the case of any doubt, permission to enter
the country would simply be denied.

It would be announced that immigrant Muslims, of whatever generation,
(i.e. the overwhelming majority) would all be investigated to
discover whether they had any record whatsoever of supporting the
erosion of British freedoms to further the dictates of Islam, and
could demonstrate proactive efforts to engage with British society
on its terms. Anyone failing to satisfy any of these criteria would
be deported immediately, without the possibility of appeal. Ideally,
the announcement in advance would serve to inform many Muslims that
their days in the country were numbered, and provide them with a
period of time in which to put their affairs in order and hopefully
make a dignified exit from the country of their own accord. Muslims
claiming to have converted to another religion would have to provide
evidence of attendance at a house of worship of said religion for
at least the last year. Questionable cases would be deported. Anyone
having been judged to be in accordance with these criteria would be
informed that they could be deported at any time in the future if
they were judged to have ceased to comply in any respect.

Having banned Muslim immigration and deported some hundreds of
thousands of people, thereby addressing the most pressing demographic
issues, attention would be turned to undermining Islam itself
at the institutional level. Mosque construction would be banned,
and locations serving as mosques without official permission would
be closed down by the police. Attending an illegal mosque would be
considered grounds for deportation. Advocating or defending the use of
violence in support of any Muslim cause would be considered grounds
for deportation. Advocating the adoption of any aspect of shari’a
law would be considered grounds for deportation, especially if you
happened to be the head of the Church of England. A thousand and one
various other gradual restrictions could be conceived of to squeeze
Muslims so hard that they concluded that there was simply no point in
remaining in the UK at all, up to and including the classification
of Islam itself as a pernicious political ideology, the practice of
which would be considered grounds for deportation for immigrants or
their children, imprisonment in the case of native Britons.

Observant readers will note that this set of policies is actually
a combination of the previously discussed options one and two,
coupled with the obvious necessity of curtailing any further Muslim
immigration. It also has the advantage of allowing ‘borderline’ or
‘cultural’ Muslims the option of staying in the UK if they understood
that Islam had no future there and would simply be bleached out of
British life over the course of a generation or two. But there are two
other observations that need to be made here. The first is that there
is not the slightest chance of any European country enacting policies
of this sort any time soon, if ever. Secondly, there is absolutely
no guarantee that they would not, if actually enacted, simply fall
prey to the structural problems outlined in the discussion above,
and result in us slipping all the way down to the bottom of the slide,
where option three awaits us.

–Boundary_(ID_PUsS+oJqJK0eRoRHDyK1tg)–

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress