TREMORS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Lee Hudson Teslik

Council on Foreign Relations, NY
April 25 2008

Georgian troops on the internal border between Georgia and South
Ossetia in 2004. (AP Photo/George Abdaladze)

When Kosovo seceded from Serbia earlier this year, Russia opposed UN
recognition of an independent Kosovar state on the grounds that it
violated the sovereignty and wishes of Moscow’s ally, Serbia. Moscow
also warned the move opened the door for Georgia’s separatist provinces
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which rely heavily on Russia, to seek
independence. Now, just weeks after NATO leaders irked Russia by
signaling a willingness to expand ties with Georgia and Ukraine (AP),
Moscow seems to have made its response. Much to the consternation of
Georgian authorities, the Kremlin announced it might increase trade
relations (WSJ) with the breakaway Abkhazis and Ossetians.

It remains unclear what will come of Moscow’s overtures. The Kremlin
says it wants to avoid conflict with Georgia, which has characterized
Russia’s intentions as "creeping annexation." Russia’s parliament
stands ready for more debate on how Russia should characterize
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, though the Russian news agency RIA
Novosti says the Russian parliament is unlikely to recognize
the territories. Regardless, a top Council of Europe official
has criticized Russia for entertaining the debate in the first
place, adding that Russian bilateral relations with South Ossetia
and Abkhazia threaten to undermine stability in the region. The
potential for broader tensions was underscored following an incident
in which an unmanned Georgian reconnaissance plane was shot down
over Abkhazia. Georgia blames the incident on Russia (RFE/RL), though
Moscow denies involvement.

The dispute spells concern for the South Caucasus, a region plagued
by unresolved secessionist battles and messy politics. South Ossetia,
for instance, is culturally conjoined with the North Ossetia region,
across the border in geographic Russia. The region has its own
language, Ossetian, though since the breakup of the Soviet Union the
Georgian government has pressed for Georgian to be used and taught
nationwide. Abkhazia, where most people speak Abkhaz but Russian is
an official language, has its own linguistic tension. North Ossetia
borders two other Russian provinces, Ingushetia and Chechnya, each
of which also has its own language and has experienced violent
secessionist efforts in the recent past. In nearby Azerbaijan,
the province of Nagorno-Karabakh–conquered militarily by ethnic
Armenians–continues to press for independence. A map published in the
Economist shows the region’s complex and volatile geography. Outside of
the Caucasus, but still in the former Soviet sphere, a similar dynamic
is at play in Trans-Dniester, a Slav-dominated region of Moldova.

Trans-Dniester and Nagorno-Karabakh are hardly household names, even
among foreign policy wonks. But tensions in the region are attracting
attention, as they spotlight broader challenges facing Russia as
it seeks to create a cohesive foreign policy toward its post-Soviet
brethren. Liz Fuller, a Caucasus expert with Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, notes that the issue carries political ramifications
domestically in Georgia, where President Mikheil Saakashvili won
reelection last year "by the skin of his teeth." Fuller says Russia is
floating a new proposal for solving frozen conflicts in its strategic
sphere by suggesting joint state entities rather than applying words
like "autonomous" to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In a region frayed
with border disputes, experts say, any decision that verges on setting
a firm precedent will be closely watched and potentially inflammatory.