CONJECTURAL NOT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: TURKISH U-TURN POLICY
By Azad Aslan

Kurdish Globe, Iraq
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April 30 2008

Vehicles of Turkish army are moving near the border with Iraq. PRESS
PHOTO

Without radical democratic reforms and a genuine U-turn policy in
its Kurdish national question, Turkey will remain a serious threat
for the future of south Kurdistan.

While Turkish air force renewed their air attacks against PKK bases in
Iraqi Kurdistan, the top political and military body of the Turkish
establishment, the National Security Council (MGK), gave the green
light for talks with Iraqi Kurds in its last regular monthly meeting
on April 24. For several years, Turkey has refused dialogue with the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and has yet to recognize the KRG
as a legal political establishment in Iraq.

MGK released a statement, stating: "Activities in the legislative
field, which constitutes the basis of national consensus in Iraq,
and developments toward restoration of Iraq’s standing in the region
have been assessed; it has been considered that it will be beneficial
to continue consultations with all Iraqi groups and movements."

MGK’s decision is crucial to establish relations between KRG and the
Turkish government, which is run by the AKP (Justice and Development
Party). It is commonly argued that the AKP tends to make contact
with the KRG while the army has refused so far to have any official
relations between Turkey and the KRG. MGK’s decision in that sense
may be seen a U-turn in official Turkish policy toward the KRG. It
is now possible for the AKP to invite KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan
Barzani to Turkey for bilateral talks.

This U-turn in Turkish policy vis-a-vis the KRG should not be
seen a radical political shift within the Turkish establishment
toward the Kurdish national question in general and Iraqi Kurdistan
in particular. It reflects the Turkish adjustment to conjectural
developments both at home and in the region at large. In other words,
such a seemingly positive political attitude of Turkey is temporary
and prone to be altered as possible new political conditions may arise.

Political formation of the Turkish regime since 1923 has been
anti-democratic and totalitarian despite the fact that since the second
half of the 20th century Turkey moved to a multi-party system. At the
root of anti-democratic political formation of the Turkish regime lies
the construction of an artificial Turkish nation upon the ruins of a
multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire. The founders of the
Turkish Republic, Kemalists, were the continuation of the Committee
of Union and Progress (CUP). It would not be wrong to argue that
Kemalists’ post-war vision of Turkish nationalism was clearly rooted
in the ideas and practices of the CUP. The main objective of CUP,
particularly from 1913 when the Ottoman Empire lost 1/3 of its land,
was to secure the Ottoman state and make it 99% Muslim. CUP seized the
opportunity of World War I and eliminated Armenians during the 1915
genocide campaign. The Armenians were the only sizeable non-Muslim
elements remaining within the Ottoman Empire.

With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and its unavoidable
disintegration, the remaining CUP elements launched defense
movements in Anatolia, and this movement gradually evolved toward
what was called Kemalism. The Kemalist movement, upon the final and
decisive victory over the Greek army, and over Armenian and Kurdish
nationalism, during 1920-22 embarked upon a new Turkish state that
was, as A. Roshwald argued, "built on a legacy of genocide and ethnic
cleansing and propagated by a dictatorial regime with little patience
for the niceties of pluralistic policies." The main tenet of Kemalism
was and still is to make Turkey 99% Turk. Nothing clarifies the
Kemalist notion better than the slogan of one of the oldest daily
Turkish newspapers, Hurriyet, which states "Turkey belongs to the
Turks." Decades of forceful assimilation of Kurds in Turkey had this
objective to evaporate all the non-Turkish ethnic communities within
the Turkish identity.

The intention to repeat such well-known historical facts here is to
explain that formation of Turkish political, economic, and cultural
characteristics based on such anti-democratic principles, and that
it would not be an easy task to reform and democratize the whole
Turkish establishment that established, grew, and evolved throughout
the 20th century with a mentality of exclusive Turkish identity. To
put it another way, to expect Turkish political establishment to
democratize itself on the issue of Kurdish national identity would
be illusionary and misleading.

The current political chaos in Turkey, mainly between the Kemalists
and the AKP, is on the one hand resulting due to struggle of interests
between industrial, financial, and newly growing Anatolian capitalist
groups, and on the other hand resulting due to the resistance of
Kemalist elite (the military/bureaucratic class) to preserve its
political, social, and economic privileges within the Turkish political
and economic system. The Kurdish national question in Turkey is used
and exploited as an object in this struggle of interests.

Kurdish political actors must realize that the ongoing political chaos
in Turkey would not evolve toward a democratic regime. Formation
of exclusive Turkish political identity and an almost century-long
stagnant Kemalist ideology are the two main obstacles in the way
toward radical reforms to democratize Turkey.

Turkey was content with its Kemalist state policy throughout the 20th
century as established status quo in the world between so-called
Socialist and Capitalist blocks had not allowed any serious border
change in the Middle East. However, the fall of the Soviet Union
and collapse of status quo provided new political alterations in
the region. Formation of the KRG as a new political body exactly
had taken place in that period. Existence of the KRG as the only
internationally recognized legal Kurdish political entity represents
a real danger to Turkey as its mere existence destroys ideological
foundation of Kemalist ideology on the issue of the Kurds. "Mountain
Turks," as Turkey categorized the Kurds for so many decades, can no
longer be sustained, solely due to now there are Kurds who exercises
a Parliament, a government, and army of its own. Furthermore, these
Kurdish institutions are recognized by a sovereign state constitution
and by the UN. Since 1991, Turkey has been in deep trouble to
reformulate its stagnant Kurdish policy, and particularly Kemalist
elite find it almost impossible to sustain its anti-Kurdish rhetoric;
even they no longer believe in it.

Here lies the crux of the matter, to explain the ways in which Turkey
may be transformed either toward a democratic country in peace
with its multi-ethnic identities or toward a further militarist,
totalitarian, and dictatorial regime. Despite the myopic official
discourse on the Kurdish question and some constitutional reforms
imposed by the EU, there lacks a tangible indication to suggest that
Turkey is on the course toward a democratic country. There is still
strong resistance by both the Kemalist elite and the AKP and others to
recognize political-national identity of the Kurds. Nothing symbolizes
this more clearly than Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s
harsh reactions against Sezgin Tanrikulu, head of the Lawyer Union
of Diyarbakir, who demanded right to education in native Kurdish
language in those areas where the Kurds constitute a majority.

With this political background of Turkey, it is difficult to
optimistically interpret MGK’s decision to allow relations with
the KRG. In its statement, as mentioned above, MGK refrains to use
the acronym KRG, instead using "all Iraqi groups." Neither is there
any sign to observe of Turkish officials using the term "Kurdistan
Region," but rather referred to the region as "northern Iraq." This
suggests the insistence of Turkish official discourse to reject the
terms of Kurdistan.

The burning question to ask then is why Turkey indirectly moves to
establish relations with the KRG? The answer is not straightforward and
must be analyzed within the framework of interconnected issues. Turkey
realized that it would not be an accomplished short-term policy
to eliminate or diminish the KRG’s position within Iraq. Turkey,
particularly since the fall of Saddam, tried very hard to become
involved in Iraqi affairs and redirect it toward a unitary state
system rather than a federal political system. Post-Saddam Iraq’s
unitary state system was indeed one of the conditions of Turkey in
its negotiations with U.S. pre-war period to open its borders to
U.S. soldiers in order for the U.S. to have a northern front. Using
the PKK threat as pretext, Turkey militarily threatened and finally
attempted to occupy Iraqi Kurdistan but failed in its objective. This
realization forced Turkey to make adjustments in its current policy
toward Kurdistan Region.

To exploit energy sources and have its share in the petroleum and
natural gas sector in Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey realized the necessity
of having some kind of official relations with the KRG. Prime Minister
Barzani’s recent successful visit to Iraq to resolve outstanding issues
between Baghdad and Erbil convinced Turkey that the KRG position in
Baghdad is getting stronger than otherwise believed as weakening. Iraqi
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s government crackdown on al-Sadr, who
shares the Baathist mentality of a unitary Iraqi state, indicates for
the first time ever the seriousness of the Iraqi central government
to implement the Iraqi Constitution, which includes federalism.

Iraqi Kurds’ strong resistance against the latest Turkish military land
incursion into south Kurdistan convinced the Turkish establishment that
further conflict with the KRG will intensify the link between the Kurds
on both sides of the border. In other words, with its reactionary and
militarist policy, Turkey obliquely consolidates Kurdish nationalism
both in south and north Kurdistan. Despite the official discourse of
KRG and Kurdish leaders, it can easily be observed that southern Kurds
are more sympathetic toward their brethren in north Kurdistan. The
danger for Turkey is that further consolidation of solidarity and
unity between southern and northern Kurds may in mid-term open the
possibility of consolidated and unified Kurdish nationalism. By
semi-recognition of the KRG as the "northern Iraqi administration,"
Turkey hopes on the one hand to foil southern Kurds’ closeness toward
the Kurds in the north and on the other hand to have a free hand to
deal with its own Kurds.

Establishing relations between Turkey and the KRG is also
a U.S. policy, which needs the alliance of both the KRG and
Turkey in its policy in Turkey. Mainstream Turkish commentators
stressed that Turkey is under pressure by the U.S. to recognize
the KRG. Such semi-recognition of the KRG in that sense would ease
Turkish-U.S. relations, which are under strain mainly due to Turkish
policy toward Iraqi Kurds.

Whatever reason(s) push Turkey to make semi-official relations with
the KRG, it would be imperative for the KRG not to jump in and hastily
make official relations with Turkey and capitalize on it. The KRG
must have well-thought and worked-out plans that define parameters
of any official or non-official relations with Turkey. Any official
relations with Turkey without doubt would require some compromises
on the KRG’s part. It is essential for the KRG to have its red lines
on some critical issues that should send strong signals to Ankara and
other capitals that the KRG is not open for negotiations or prepared
to bargain on these red lines issues.

Here are some suggestions to draw parameters of KRG’s relation
with Turkey. Under any context, the KRG should not bargain on the
territory of Kurdistan as a whole. This requires the KRG to continue
its insistence on Kirkuk and other disputed areas of south Kurdistan.

The KRG should refrain itself under any condition from proposing
officially any political solution to the Kurdish national question in
Turkey. In other words, the KRG should not be a partner in dealing with
the Kurdish question in Turkey. The solution to the Kurdish national
question in Turkey primarily depends on the Kurds in the north, and
what kind of political solution that is aspired to ultimately is up
to the Kurds in Turkey.

The question of the PKK presence in Iraqi Kurdistan is a serious
issue and without doubt Turkey would ask the KRG to denounce the
PKK as a terrorist organization and uproot them in territory under
the jurisdiction of the KRG. This issue must be tackled by Kurdistan
Parliament and should not be a topic of negotiation between Turkey
and the KRG.

Iraqi Kurdish leaders should realize that in their relations with
Turkey, the KRG has the upper hand. The KRG has been recognized
by a number of international bodies, and more than 10 embassy
and consulates opened in Erbil including France, Britain, U.S.,
Iran, and Russia. Relations with Baghdad are better now than ever
before. Iran’s attitude toward the KRG is more positive than Turkey. In
that sense, the KRG does not really need an exit route via Turkey
to the world. Turkey, on the other hand, is in serious trouble with
internal crises and the Kurdish national question of Turkey has never
been so internationalized. The current Turkish policy toward the Kurds
has never been under scrutiny by international powers. Under these
circumstances, the KRG can utilize this Turkish move but should not
have any illusion of its outcome.

Without radical democratic reforms and a genuine U-turn policy in
its Kurdish national question, Turkey will remain a serious threat
for the future of south Kurdistan. There are no solid indicators to
expect strong bilateral relations to be developed between the KRG and
Turkey. Rather than emphasizing and wasting energy on establishing
relations with such a difficult "neighbor," the KRG must spend its
energy and resources on further democratization of its institutions,
the betterment of livelihood of its population, and it must invest in
a healthy development of the national identity of the Kurdish nation.