SCENARIOS
by Aleksei Matveyev

DEFENSE and SECURITY
May 21, 2008 Wednesday
Russia

WILL NEW CIS LEADERS REMAIN LOYAL TO MOSCOW WITH THE NEW PRESIDENT
OF RUSSIA IN OFFICE?; The new president will have to rearrange the
post-Soviet zone.

Russia strengthened its positions in the post-Soviet zone in eight
years under President Putin. Military integration in the Commonwealth
was particularly energetic these last 2-3 years

What will await Russia’s military-political and military-technical
cooperation with the CIS countries?

Six countries are all Russia has in terms of allies. They are members
of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. Will their
political leaders remain loyal to Russia under its new President,
Dmitry Medvedev? Let us consider each country individually.

Belarus. This country remains Russia’s principal strategic
ally in the post-Soviet zone. Problems with the Union remain
unsolved. Rapprochement between the economies and legislatures of the
two countries takes too long, their integration actually questionable
since both countries insist on their sovereignty. The introduction
of a monetary unit of the Union is postponed. Establishment of
Russian-Belarussian joint air defense has been talked about for
six years already with little to show for it. As a matter of fact,
military integration has been accomplished. Developing a joint
defense zone with Minsk, Russia will keep subsidizing Belarussian
military needs. Two thirds of the Union budget provided by Russia,
13% of the budget is to be spent on military-technical cooperation,
law enforcement, and security.

Kazakhstan is one of Russia’s major allies. Its leadership promotes
an independent policy. Kazakh servicemen serve in the international
contingent in Iraq. The United States and other NATO countries help
Kazakhstan with rearmament. Astana doubled its military expenditures
since 2006. They remain under 1% of the GDP, but rearmament is pursued
energetically.

The new president of Russia will have to keep Astana from falling
under NATO’s influence and prevent it from advancing active
military-technical cooperation with the West in general and the United
States in particular.

Kyrgyzstan. It is one of the poorest republics of the late Soviet
Union. It lacks stability. Russia and the United States have military
bases in Kyrgyzstan. The installation of a pro-Western regime in this
country is unlikely.

Armenia. Second to Belarus alone in faithfulness to Russia. Armenia
elected its new president earlier this year. The election was won by
pro-Russian Serj Sarkisjan, former premier and defense minister. The
possibility of renewed hostilities with Azerbaijan compel Armenia
to rely on Russia. This is why even the opposition in Armenia
(Justice bloc and National Unity) and Robert Kocharjan’s followers
are pro-Moscow.

Tajikistan. One of the poorest CIS countries heavily relying on
Russian aid. This country enjoys an important geopolitical location
in the post-Soviet zone. Drugs from Afghanistan reach Russia and
Europe via Tajikistan. The liquidation of the Russian border guards
contingent in this country was a mistake. The new president of Russia
may find it necessary to make additional decisions concerning the
Tajik-Afghani border.

Uzbekistan. Political upheavals in this country remain a
possibility. Its President Islam Karimov’s pro-Moscow orientation
is quite iffy. There was a period several years ago when Uzbekistan
was in GUAM and actively pursued relations with the United States. It
is in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization now, allegedly
advancing relations with Moscow.

Neutral Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Moldova may be listed as
potential allies. As a matter of fact, Azerbaijan and Moldova
and members of GUAM, a regional organization that is in serious
trouble. Anyway, Moldova is actively pursuing relations with Moscow
and Azerbaijan constantly emphasizes its neutral status and never
speaks about membership in NATO the way other GUAM members (Georgia
and Ukraine) do. In fact, these two countries are Russia’s principal
opponents in the post-Soviet zone.

The new president of Russia will have to drive a hard bargain in
relations with Kiev and Tbilisi. Forcing Ukraine and NATO to abandon
their plans to join NATO is Medvedev’s primary military-strategic
objective. Where the Russian-Ukrainian relations are concerned,
Medvedev will have to elicit from Kiev the permit to leave the Black
Sea Fleet in the Crimea. Moldova and Azerbaijan might get invitations
to join the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. Where
relations with Turkmenistan are concerned, Moscow had better remember
that it is a major exporter of gas and that the future of Russian
geopolitical interests depends to a considerable extent on the routes
of Turkmen gas export to Europe and China.