How Orange Networks Work.

17. 05.2008

Andrei ARESHEV

On `Orange Networks From Belgrade to Bishkek’.

Ñ?егÐ&# xB8;: color revolutions, Orange Networks, Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, USA
We have seen well-organized mobs – allegedly acting in the name of the
`protesting people’ – occupy parliament buildings in Belgrade and
Tbilisi, paralyze Mensk and Budapest, launch noisy campaigns in the
streets of Kyiv, and riot in the downtown Bishkek and Yerevan. The
events have taken place sufficiently long ago to realize that the color
revolutions have not led Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia to prosperity.
They did transform the political landscape in the post-Soviet space
though, and the consequences they have for the neighboring countries,
especially for Russia, such as the drift in Ukraine’s foreign politics
which followed the developments of 2004, can prove long-lasting and
dire.

The phenomenon of `color revolutions’ has been examined by the Russian
political science in a number of point studies, particularly those
which dealt with the 2004 events in Ukraine. However, until recently,
there was no broad study of the of the `non-violent’ coup d’état
technology. `Orange Networks From Belgrade to Bishkek’, a collection of
essays prepared by the Historical Perspective Foundation and published
in Saint Petersburg by Alateya Press in 2008, is intended to fill the
gap.

Altogether, the essays comprise a detailed investigation of the
technologies employed in the `color revolutions’ first in Serbia in
2000 and later in several FSU Republics. The political dynamics in the
post-Soviet space (the essays were written by an international team of
authors) leaves no doubt as to the timeliness of the studies. The
collection was in press in March, 2008 when the crisis erupted in
Armenia – in many respects the tragic events in the country can be
regarded as a failed `color’ coup – and entailed fatalities. Efforts to
similarly destabilize other countries, particularly Belarus, are being
made continuously, and developments like the Andijan unrest in
Uzbekistan and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan cannot be ruled out.
The forces which organized the upheaval in Bishkek in 2005 failed to
take into account the specific features of the local situation, and
their initial objectives largely remained unaccomplished. Most
importantly, they failed to push Kyrgyzstan out of the orbit of the
political and military cooperation with Moscow (as discussed in the
essay by A.Sh. Niyazi). Another theme touched upon in `Orange Networks
From Belgrade to Bishkek’ is the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon and a
number of other crises of the same origin. Student protests in Iran in
2003 could also be considered in the context, but the authors mainly
focused on the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and on Russia.

The range of political and social circumstances responsible for the
radicalization of public protests is well-known. The most significant
destabilizing factor in the post-Soviet Republics is the course of
radically liberal economic reforms, which was adopted in the early
1990ies largely under the influence of Western advisers. The
ideological vacuum, the dominance of petit bourgeois philosophy in
public life, a catastrophic social stratification, mass poverty
plaguing entire social strata, the disorganization of key
administrative institutions (a phenomenon oftentimes erroneously
regarded as limited to corruption), the de facto loss of a significant
part of sovereignty by Republics all tend to ignite public discontent
and a longing for change and justice, and to fuel the desire to see
immediate transformations and to shape history `right here and right
now’. The younger generation which is also the most politically active
part of the population in any country is particularly affected by the
atmosphere. Definitely, the situation is well-understood by Western
consultants seeking to manipulate the population’s protests so as to
achieve their own objectives.

Color revolution strategies and scenarios are generated by various
Western think tanks. Their genesis and operations are analyzed by
President of the Historical Perspective Foundation N.A. Narochnitskaya.
The ideological doctrines formulated in think tanks are imposed on
sovereign Republics regardless of their actual national interests.
Organizations such as the Carnegie Foundation, the Heritage Foundation,
the Brookings Institution and others teach local elites to view local
politics through the prism of `global thinking’, but the efforts of the
US think tanks are aimed exclusively at promoting the interests of the
US. In addition to making inroads into local elites, the main task
performed by the US think tanks internationally is to export
ideological concepts and myths which the organizers of color
revolutions plant in the minds of the populations of the targeted
countries.

In his essay, J. Laughland, a British political scientist and writer,
examines the key theoretical provisions and the field practice of
overthrowing the legitimate authority in various countries. He marshals
an impressive array of factual data to prove that the color revolutions
are a new coup d’état technique developed by the US think tanks in
cooperation with the CIA. Though revolutions of the kind – the ones in
Serbia, Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia, and the failed one in
Uzbekistan – are routinely portrayed as the results of public protests,
Laughland argues that in reality the developments were carefully
planned operations in many cases including disinformation via mass
media, and that the operations were funded and carried out by
transnational networks serving as instruments of the Western influence.
The range of pertinent activities spans covert operations, threats to
resort to military intervention or even a direct use of military force,
smear campaigns, secret political leverage, bribing journalists, public
disinformation, and the use of other methods not excluding political
assassinations. For example, reconnaissance and target identification
were a part of the actual mission carried out by agents of the CIA and
other Western intelligence agencies in the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer
Mission in 1998…

Irina Lebedeva, a US-based journalist and translator, focuses on the
role played by `angered youths’ in protest movements at least for the
last 40 years. Already in 1967, prominent social scientist Fred Emery
of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations argued that by the late
1990ies specific models of behavior typical for younger people would
possibly be used to destabilize sovereign countries. From this
standpoint, the progress in communications technology opens extensive
opportunities. Global media, cell phones, mass SMS messaging, blogs,
and web sites are convenient tools for real-time guiding of the youth
mob and for ascribing great political significance to any event, no
matter real or imaginary. The potential of propaganda under the current
conditions was exemplified by the developments around the Racak village
in Kosovo…

In 2000, Serbia became the starting point of a wave of color
revolutions. The authors of the essays in `Orange Networks From
Belgrade to Bishkek’ see the NATO attack on Yugoslavia and the October,
2000 unrest in Serbia as links in the chain of events organized not
only to overthrow the political regime in Belgrade but also to induce
an irreversible partition of the country. In his essay, Belgrade-based
political scientist and historian Petr Ilchenkov supplies unique
information concerning the preparations for the protests which led to
the ouster of S. Milosevic. Serbia was the proving ground for many of
the techniques which were subsequently refined and employed in later
color revolutions. The techniques include the creation of mass
opposition movements and golem parties, the extensive application of
communication technologies to mobilize mass public support, the pouring
of large funds into spreading protest movement logotypes, acts of
individual terror against authority figures, the formation of armed
support groups backing the protests presented as `non-violent’ by mass
media, etc. Notably, the revolution in Serbia did not translate into
the country’s prosperity, and most of its activists dropped out of
politics after having played their roles.

Lawyer S.B. Mirzoev describes in detail the activities of Western NGO’s
during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The facts he presents show
that the US and Canada, as well as international organizations, both
public and governmental, were directly involved in the crisis of the
Ukrainian sovereignty. A key role in the power seizure in the country
was played by the mechanisms of the `international legitimization’ of
the candidate supported by the West. The activity of a large number of
West-funded Ukrainian organizations was synchronized with that of their
Western peers. For example, an institute led by V. Yuschenko’s
political ally and future Ukrainian Defense Minister A. Gritsenko gave
Yuschenko an 11% lead on the basis of its exit polls in the immediate
wake of the second-round run-off. The figure has never been confirmed,
and the same is true of Yuschenko’s alleged 15% lead in the
illegitimate third round. Nevertheless, the 11% became a street
campaign slogan already on November 21, that is, before the ballots
were actually counted…

Dr. A.B. Krylov, a historian from the Institute for World Economy and
International Relations of the Russian Academy of Science, convincingly
disproves the official version of the Rose Revolution in Georgia.
According to this version, the Revolution resulted from mass protests
provoked by the official election results which were perceived as
grossly rigged in favor of the political regime. Following the Rose
Revolution, Tbilisi’s politics lost the last signs of independence and
ability to maintain balance between various centers of power. The
dynamics of the developments around Abkhazia and North Ossetia shows
that the radically pro-US course adopted by Georgia can have extremely
negative consequences. Saakashvili’s popularity is dwindling, and, like
his Ukrainian colleague, he has to turn to his foreign patrons for
legitimization and stirs a nationalist hysteria by groundlessly
portraying Russia as an enemy of Georgia.

In an essay entitled `Orange Technologies in Armenia…’ A. Areshev
from the Strategic Culture Foundation addresses the developments in the
country in 2004-2007. Though the essay does not cover the events in
Armenia in February and March, 2008, many of the negative tendencies in
the Republic which stemmed from the implementation of an extremely
liberal economic model were already evident at that time. The
discontent due to these tendencies made it possible for the opposition
to openly proclaim breaking the country’s statehood machine as its
goal. The atmosphere in Armenia – aggressive rallies which continued
for days, the instigation of political divisions in the army and law
enforcement agencies, the incitement of hostility towards the people
from a particular region – combined the most repulsive aspects of the
scenarios which had materialized in Serbia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. An
attempt to stage an armed coup disguised as nonviolent civic
disobedience left the shaky Armenian statehood on the verge of a
serious crisis and made the country vulnerable to a plenitude of
challenges.

A. Yunusov, Head of the Conflictology and Migration Department of the
institute for Peace and Democracy, traces the strengthening of the
positions of the US and other Western countries in Azerbaijan in the
1990ies-2000ies. In his opinion, the West outplayed Russia in the
country by the early XXI century without any serious political or
financial efforts and met with no considerable resistance from Moscow
in the process. Several hundred experts in the US Administration, the
Congress, the CIA, and US research centers monitored the situation in
the Caspian region and in Azerbaijan in particular and formulated the
US Caspian strategy. However, the growing Western influence in the
Republic led to the emergence of a political system of a colonial type
in the Republic with a parasitic elite exploiting its oil riches. The
data provided by the author shows that the population in Azerbaijan is
deeply disappointed in Western values and is turning increasingly
anti-American. Actually, the same trend can be found in most of the
countries which survived color revolutions and have elites politically
dependent on Washington, for example, in Georgia. This sentiment cannot
be attributed entirely to ongoing political crises and persisting
economic problems – largely the situation is due to the falsehood of
the very values aggressively marketed by the forces behind the color
revolutions.

* * *
The probability of a color revolution in Russia continues to draw the
attention of politicians, experts, and media. Currently, Russia appears
politically stable. Nevertheless, in our turbulent epoch both the
domestic and the international challenges grow increasingly diverse and
also increasingly coordinated. The essay by I. Dobaev, Head of the
Geopolitics and Information Analysis Sector of the Southern Research
Center of the Russian Academy of Science, surveys the network
organizations active in Russia’s Caucasus. Over a hundred pro-Western
NGO’s, foundations, and monitoring networks function in Russia’s
Southern Federal District alone. Many of them are openly oppositional
and attempt to maximally mobilize the support of the younger people and
other politically active social strata. E. Popov, a writer who has
authored a number of books on Russian politics, examines the activity
of Ukrainian NGOs in Russia. Their main objective is to consolidate the
Ukrainian community in Russia, which numbers approximately 5 mln
people, and to boost their ethnic self-awareness. Notably, at the same
time we witness intense attacks on the positions of the Russian
language and culture in Ukraine.

Probably, we should expect new attempts to destabilize the situation in
Russia. Such attempts necessarily have to be preceded by a unification
of various opposition groups and a centralization of their funding from
abroad, as it has happened in Serbia. Efforts in this direction, albeit
unsuccessful, have been observed. Adequately to the situation,
amendments to the federal legislation regulating the activity of NGOs
in Russia were made in 2006. In his April 26 Address to the parliament,
Russian President V. Putin explained why the step quite natural for a
sovereign country had to be taken. He said that the steady progress
made by Russia is bad news for certain forces and that there are those
who would be happy to bring back the recent past under the guise of
democratic rhetoric, some – to loot Russia’s national wealth as they
used to do in the past, others – to undermine Russia’s economic and
political independence. President Putin also said that increasing
amounts of money are poured from abroad to intervene in Russia’s
domestic affairs. He noted that even in the colonial epoch major powers
played a civilizing role, but these days their only objective is to
gain unilateral advantages and to secure their own profits.

The forces interested in color revolutions see high mobility and
network structure as prerequisites for their success. They will make
efforts to carefully organize their work with target population groups
(young people, women, intellectuals, taxi drivers, salespersons at
newspaper stands). Political network marketing attempts have been noted
in the run-up to the 2007 parliamentary elections, but they were fairly
unsuccessful. The same is true of the attempts to discredit the results
of the vote. Still, skilled media manipulation and efforts aimed at
creating an impression of high attendance of protest rallies
(especially in the country’s capital, as it was done in Armenia) can
yield certain undesirable results. Practically any events – not
necessarily important elections or key political developments – can be
used as pretexts for mass opposition rallies. Less significant
occasions like `unorganized’ strikes or unexpected price hikes for
prime necessities would do as well. The first developments of the kind
have already taken place in Saint Petersburg. Interested parties can
try to capitalize on certain social strata’s traditional mistrust of
the authority (especially of its lower and intermediate segments), or
on the widening gap between the rich and the poor in Russia. Such
factors were present in all the counties which fell victims of color
revolutions, and in many cases in greater proportions than in Russia.
Difficulties experienced by the global economy (the growth of food
prices worldwide combined with Russia’s risky dependency on
agricultural import being just one of a number of potential
vulnerabilities) and the conflicts provoked both within Russia and
along its borders will hardly leave our country unaffected in the
future. Western intelligence agencies have started to show interest in
extremist groups currently active in Russia. Minor street skirmishes
between allegedly warring Russian youth groups have long been
overstated by global and some of the domestic media. They have also
become a recurrent theme in information wars in Internet. Russian
security agencies say that attempts are underway to organize the
funding of fascist groups in Russia via various foundations, as it has
been done previously in the case of Muslim fundamentalists in Russia’s
North Caucasus1. Hence the importance of the issues discussed in the
essays by E. Popov and I. Dobaev.

Aggressive style of propaganda is another factor of great importance.
The cases of the countries neighboring Russia showed that even when the
authorities retained control over most of the media, they traditionally
relied on the administrative leverage and were completely unable to
arrange their own informational defense. Moreover, instead of acting
adequately in order to overcome domestic political problems, the
authorities in some countries worried excessively about the way they
were perceived internationally, as they were used to believing that the
source of their legitimacy (from the political support to financial
interests and the possibility of winning grants like the Millennium
Challenge) lay in the West rather than in their own countries. If
Republic leaders remained defiant, the West resorted to direct threats
to use military force. For example, the NATO forces backed the
opposition in Serbia during its conflict with law enforcement agencies
– NATO threatened to intervene in the case of open hostilities in the
country. At that time British Foreign Minister R. Cook openly warned
the Serb authority against forgetting about NATO’s permanent presence
all along Serbia’s borders. Thus, the domestic pressure on the regime
is typically synchronized with outside threats. Russia should pay
special attention to this circumstance now that NATO is moving closer
to its borders (the NATO `responsibility zone’ has already spread over
the Baltic countries and can span Ukraine and Georgia in the
foreseeable future).

The authors of the `Orange Networks From Belgrade to Bishkek’ are by no
means a team of conspiracy theorists. Nor do they call for total
control over mass media and for political or cultural isolationism
(rather, it is fair to say that this approach is practiced in the
countries where color revolutions have taken place). They simply
suggest viewing things realistically and without illusions. Authority
institutions must be adequate to the emerging challenges and threats
faced by sovereign countries in the early XXI century. They must be
ahead of the events, not lag behind them. They must be strong and
united. Such is the necessary condition for putting to practice the
ambitious economic and political modernization plans in Russia. This is
the main conclusion one comes to upon reading `Orange Networks From
Belgrade to Bishkek’.

_________________

1 A. Medvedev. Playing Against All Sides.
Http://vesti7.ru/news?id=12177