THE FATE OF THE ARMENIAN-TURKISH BORDER
Stepan Grigoryan
Turkish Daily News
June 26 2008
A few weeks ago in the Turkish press there was reference to the
conference, by the NGO I lead, the Analytical Center on Globalization
and Regional Cooperation, organized in Yerevan. I would like to
share the findings of the opinion surveys conducted as part of the
same project, between October 2007 and December 2007, with support
of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation and USAID. The interviews
were conducted with representatives of political parties, NGOs and
the academic community in Armenia and demonstrated that the views
of the Armenian elite concerning the future of Armenian-Turkish
relations is indeed changing profoundly.A majority of respondents
felt that applying pressure on Turkey through third countries or
international organizations was not the right way to solve the
problems in the relationship. It was widely considered unacceptable
that international structures use the Armenian genocide issue as
leverage against Turkey in pursuit of their objectives. By the same
token, it was also noted that Turkey’s position, which connects
normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations with the resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is undesirable.
Enough empty declarations:
The closed Armenian-Turkish border is useful for certain third
countries, mainly for Russia. The fact that this was expressed
demonstrated the change in Armenian elites’ approach: There is a
more critical perspective regarding Russia’s policies in the South
CaucasusThere is a positive attitude toward Turkey’s accession to
the European Union. Seventy-two percent of the respondents noted that
Turkey’s EU accession would have a positive impact on Armenian-Turkish
relations. It was also noted that as an EU member state, Turkey
would become more democratic and predictable, thus Armenia would feel
more secure. Armenia would also benefit from Turkey’s EU membership
because having a common border with the EU would make EU accession more
within reach for Armenia in the future. Armenian experts noted that
the EU should not demand more from Turkey than it demanded from other
candidate states during their accession process. Nearly 40 percent
of the respondents thought that bringing up the issue of the 1915
Armenian genocide is an obstacle to establishing Armenian-Turkish
relations, thus it would be better not to put it on the agenda in
view of normalizing the relationship. Cooperation in the cultural
realm could create a basis for improvement of Armenian-Turkish
relations and the establishment of diplomatic relations (many noted
that Armenians and Turks have many similar songs, similar cuisine,
etc.). Restoration of the Armenian Holy Cross Church on Akdamar
Island by the Turkish government’s decree was mentioned as a positive
example of intercultural cooperation. It was proposed that Armenian
and Turkish architects might jointly restore the medieval bridge in
Ani.Most wish to see real actions aiming toward the normalization of
the Armenian-Turkish relationship, and not just empty declarations
of governments.
Who decides for Armenia?:
The role of the attitude of the Armenian diaspora regarding
Armenian-Turkish relations was not asked as a stand-alone question;
however, it is noteworthy that the respondents did not seem to factor
this issue into their answers. In fact, one Armenian expert said
that in some countries (mainly in France, Russia and the U.S.),
the Armenian diaspora is so well-organized that it takes action
on its own, without taking into consideration the attitudes of the
Armenian government and society. In this respect, Yerevan’s official
position is very important: the foreign policy priorities and positions
regarding Armenian-Turkish relations must be clearly formulated. So
if Armenia’s government declares its readiness to cooperate with
Turkey without preconditions, some adequate, consistent actions should
follow, permitting Turkey to see the difference between attitudes of
official Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora.It is regrettable that we
have not been successful in holding just and transparent elections
in Armenia, thus the changes of public opinion are not reflected in
the National Assembly and other structures. Indeed, in the present
National Assembly only 5 percent of MPs represent the opposition,
while all recent polls have demonstrated that the opposition’s
constituency is at least ten times larger; its opinion, however,
does not influence the decision-makers.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
