A COMMON QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY OR SOMETHING MORE? (1)
MEHMET KALYONCU*
Today’s Zaman
June 1, 2008
Turkey
Given the variety of opinions on the subject, it is obvious that
the question of what kind of relationship exists between the Gulen
movement and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) intrigues
not only foreign observers of Turkey but also some Turks.
While foreign observers categorically associate the Gulen movement
and the AK Party with one another, most Turks see the two as natural
allies in promoting democracy and liberties in the country and some
marginal commentators speculate that the two pose a threat to the
secular regime of the state.
An article in the Economist magazine ("A Religious Revival," Jan. 31,
2008) wrote: "Turkey’s richest Islamic fraternity is helping the AK
[Party] to win more Kurdish votes. [The Gulen-admirers] distributed
meat to some 60,000 families during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice
in December." Another one ("A farm boy on the world stage," March 6,
2008) explained, "The [Gulen-admirers] have lots in common with the
ruling Justice and Development Party, and they cooperate, but their
interests are not identical." One report in the Guardian daily
("Islamic scholar voted world’s No. 1 thinker," June 23, 2008)
refers to an alliance between the AK Party and the Gulen movement:
"The AKP, which is allied to Gulen, is contesting a case brought by
Turkey’s chief prosecutor to shut it down and ban it from politics
for allegedly … [breaching] the country’s secular constitution."
Many Turkish intellectuals and academics point rather at the
common values that bring the Gulen movement and the AK Party
together. Muhammed Cetin argues that Fethullah Gulen has always favored
democratic institutions and free elections while opposing the use
of Islam as a political ideology and a party philosophy. Ahmet Kuru
suggests that Gulen gradually brought about change in the Turkish
attitude toward the European Union, which was previously perceived
as a "Christian club" and a threat to Turkish national and Muslim
identity. According to Nevval Sevindi, Gulen struggles to promote a
democratic, pluralistic and free society. Along similar lines, Å~^ahin
Alpay contends that Gulen’s efforts to build bridges of dialogue within
the society have put the religion in its rightful place and prevented
the society from polarizing into believers and nonbelievers. Therefore,
these and many other intellectuals have perceived the Gulen movement’s
interaction with political parties, most notably with the AK Party,
as an attempt to consolidate democracy in Turkey.
Deeper than it seems?
However, the controversy over the relationship between the ruling AK
Party and the diffused social network, which happens to be called —
for brevity — the Gulen movement, goes beyond the issue of merely
exchanging opinions on policy matters and promoting democracy and
liberties. Though so far has no solid evidence surfaced regarding the
existence of a possibly deeper relationship between the AK Party and
the Gulen movement, certain marginal groups and media commentators
have frequently alleged that bureaucratic positions, especially within
the judiciary and police force, are filled with "Gulen followers" and
that the AK Party government has been complicit, if not instrumental,
in this happening. In addition, it has been alleged that those "Gulen
followers" in the judiciary and the police are behind the two most
critical organized-crime operation in republican history. One is
the Å~^emdinli case, following which a court case extended in 2005
against Chief of General Staff Gen. YaÅ~_ar Buyukanıt, then the
land forces commander, for his alleged role in a plot that seemed
to aim at instigating the ethnic-Kurds in Å~^emdinli, a southeastern
province in Turkey.
The other is the Ergenekon operation, which is technically ongoing,
and yet pretty much stalled due to the closure case against the AK
Party. It is a police operation against the so-called "deep state,"
an organized criminal network of corrupt judges, military and
police officials, senior bureaucrats, diplomats, politicians and the
mafia, which is believed to have perpetrated a number of political
assassinations and frequently obstructed the democratization process
in the country. As a matter of fact, the Å~^emdinli case was thought
to be the first attempt to crack down on the "deep state." Yet it was
suddenly aborted and the prosecutor, Ferhat Sarıkaya, was banned
from practicing law by the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges
(HSYK) due to his allegedly having insulted the Turkish military by
opening the case. No need to mention that the same marginal groups and
commentators labeled liberal prosecutor Sarıkaya a "Gulen follower"
in the due process leading to the revoking of his law credentials.
The Å~^emdinli case is not the only one that saw its investigation
and prosecution processes stalled. The investigations into the
assassinations of Catholic priest Andrea Santoro, Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink and Council of State Judge M. Yucel Ozbilgin have
also been subject to stalling attempts through the bringing of issues
related to Gulen into the picture and diverting attention from the real
suspects. From the status quo protectionists’ perspective, the name
"Fethullah Gulen" is certainly quite a lucrative one to exploit. Gulen
has such a wide public recognition in the country that whenever his
name is involved in any discussion, at least for a while, the topic
shifts from the main point. As the record hitherto indicates, Gulen
prefers not to get involved in such day-to-day debates and scandals
and, hence, not to respond to his accusers with attacks. This makes
it even more tempting for the status quo protectionists to exploit
his name on every likely and unlikely occasion.
Based on this unfair treatment of Gulen and the Gulen movement by
the status quo protectionists, one may be tempted to conclude that
these very same status quo protectionists are making up allegations
one after another about an instrumental or symbiotic relationship
between the Gulen movement and the AK Party. However, such a quick
conclusion may also hinder one’s ability to explore the true nature
of the relationship between the Gulen movement and the AK Party.
Similarities, differences, obligations: possible interpretations of
the relationship
There are similarities and differences between the Gulen movement and
the AK Party’s positions on various social, economic and political
matters, and hence multiple ways of interpreting the relationship
between the Gulen movement and the AK Party. Also, there are contextual
obligations that bring the two together. On the one hand, the Gulen
movement and the AK Party seem like they share a similar vision for
Turkey. First of all, having bitter experiences with the status quo
protectionists’ strict interpretation and practice of secularism,
both the Gulen movement and the AK Party have interest in promoting
participatory democracy and civil liberties at all levels, and hence
in creating a vibrant civil society. According to Jill Carroll
of the University of Houston, Gulen envisions a society in which
freedom of thought and conscience is guaranteed, which is tolerant in
matters of religious belief and practice and which allows vigorous
inquiry and debate on all issues. The initial steps in search of
such a society were taken in the mid-1990s by the Gulen-inspired
Journalists and Writers’ Foundation’s Abant Platform, in which Turkish
intellectuals from all camps (leftist, rightist, liberal, conservative
and atheist) gathered together and contested their opinions. Among
those intellectuals were politicians who later on took part in the
formation of the AK Party. One may speculate that the "conservative
democracy" discourse of the AK Party was inspired by those series of
intellectual gatherings. It is hard to know for sure whether or to
what extent the founders of the AK Party were inspired by the ideas
presented at the platform. They may well have benefited from the Abant
Platform or from the other idea platforms in the media initiated by
Gulen-admirers, as these platforms have been quite active in fostering
debate in the public sphere and in creating knowledge. However, one
thing is certain: Today the status-quo protectionists accuse some of
the government ministers and senior members of being "Gulen-followers"
just because they participated in the Abant Platform and the like.
Second, both the Gulen movement and the AK Party commonly share Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk’s vision of bringing Turkey up to the level of the modern
civilizations, namely creating a new Turkey that is politically and
economically capable of competing in the global arena. In his public
speeches and writings, Gulen often notes that he had very much resented
the fact that Turkey’s opinion is not regarded in any international
platform. Accordingly, both the Gulen movement and the AK Party seem
to agree that creating a strong Turkey regarded by other international
actors is possible only through full integration with the West via EU
membership and a strong alliance with the United States. At the same
time, they both recognize Turkey’s potential in Central Asia, the
Caucasus and the Middle East. Unlike the status quo protectionists’
one-dimensional foreign policy, which was based on an unconditional
attachment to the West only, the AK Party’s multi-dimensional foreign
policy is guided by the belief that Turkey can and should develop
strong relations not only with the West but also with the East, the
North and the South. Guided with the same belief, but long before
the AK Party, the Gulen movement seems to have been working toward
that goal. One can hardly deny the contribution of the Gulen-inspired
Turkish schools in making Turkey a point of attraction in more than
100 countries across the globe and of the movement’s some 9,000-member
Turkish Confederation of Industrialists and Businessmen (TUSKON)
in boosting Turkey’s export rates in recent years. Founded in 2006,
TUSKON has already brought Turkish industrialists together with their
counterparts in Eurasia, the Pacific and Africa in several business
summits where the parties signed billion-dollar business contracts.
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