ABKHAZIA VIOLENCE AND REGIONAL REDEFINITION
Kuwait Times
July 02, 2008
Kuwait
There has been a recent uptick in violence in the Georgian secessionist
region of Abkhazia, with six people suffering injuries June 30 when two
small bombs went off in trash bins in a parking lot across the street
from a market in the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi. On the previous day,
another six people were injured when two small bombs exploded in the
Abkhaz Black Sea resort city of Gagra. Abkhaz authorities immediately
blamed Georgians for the attacks, and they quickly announced that the
border between Geor gia and Abkhazia would close July 1 in response.
Violence and random attacks occur frequently inside Abkhazia and
across the border in Georgia proper. This sudden spike in violence
is most likely not random, but an attempt by the Abkhaz to sabotage
a new opening of Georgia-Russia negotiations. Georgia has two
separatist enclaves, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that achieved de
facto independence in 1993 and have benefited from Russian protection –
including the presence of Russian peacekeepers – ever since. Abkhazia
is the more militant of the two.
Tensions have been high in the region for many years, with Russia using
its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to push back on Georgia,
which has been pro-Western since its Rose Revolution in 2005 – much
to Russia’s ire. Since then, the West (mainly the United States)
has seen Georgia as its closest ally in the region. Over the past
few years, a series of militant and military squabbles has escalated
the situation. In addition, Russia has increased its troop presence
in Abkhazia, and Georgia has sough t NATO membership as part of the
West’s overall protection. But Tbilisi has learned in the past year
that the West has much more significant issues on its plate. The
European Union is in internal chaos over the Lisbon Treaty, and the
United States is bogged down with Iran and Iraq.
Moreover, Georgia has felt increasingly isolated by the West’s
abandonment in the face of Russia’s growing aggression. In the past
month, it has also seen a symbolic consolidation of relations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan with Russia. New Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev has met with the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders at least
twice in the past month, and another trip to Baku is slated for the
week of June 30. Unless it wants to commit geopolitical suicide by
taking on Russia by itself, Georgia now ha s only one real option: It
must strike a deal with Moscow. One is already on the table, according
to leaks in the media. It includes the Georgians partitioning Abkhazia
and allowing refugee Georgians, who fled in the early 1990s during
the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, to return. But Russia has nixed this
deal outright.
According to Stratfor sources, however, there is another deal in the
works. It would allow Georgian refugees to return to a small section in
Abkhazia just north of Gali in exchange for the Kodori Gorge region,
the only part of Abkhazia that is under Georgian control. This deal
could actually work for both the Abkhaz and the Georgians in that both
get back a small sliver of what they claim as their territory. Georgia
might be comfortable giving up Kodori because it includes a small
ethnic group called the S vans-fierce fighters who are pro-Georgian
– who would be capable of keeping watch on Abkhaz and Russians
in the region for Tbilisi. But the deal has to go through Russia,
which has its own hook: It wants Tbilisi to renounce its bid for
NATO membership. The Georgians could go along with such a demand,
since they know the West currently has little interest in their
country. Georgia also knows that a deal with Moscow could be broken
in the future, just as others have been broken in the past.
But in this case, the details do not really matter. Whether Tbilisi
accepts this deal or another also matters less than what this situation
says about the overall power play that is unfolding. Russia has
resumed its authority. The fact that Georgia might be scrambling for
a deal before a crisis erupts marks the return of Russian authority,
and a redefinition of the balance of power in the region. Currently,
the West does not have the wherewithal to confront Russia. If it did,
a defining confrontation woul d have unfolded. The West has passed
on that opportunity, leaving Georgia to fly solo and at the mercy
of Russian will. But this inaction signals a greater understanding
by the West – that Russia’s power will not remain in Georgia, but
expand to other regions and beyond.- Stratfor