EUROPE’S CAUCASIAN MOMENT
By Borut Grgic And Alexandros Petersen
Wall Street Journal
19011381.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
Aug 5 2008
The European Union is getting closer to the security concerns of
the Eurasian landmass, in particular the "frozen conflicts" in
Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. And it’s not just due to the EU’s
expansion to the Black Sea. If Europe wants to reduce its dependency
on Russian energy, it will need alternative oil and gas supplies from
the Caspian region. But those strategic pipelines are only kilometers
away from hotspots like Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia.
Over the weekend, six people were killed in firefights between
separatist South Ossetian militia and Georgian forces. This new
outbreak of violence threatens to further complicate peace efforts
in nearby Abkhazia. After years of neglect, EU heavyweights are
finally taking action there. Last month, German Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier developed a three-step strategy to resolve
the Abkhazia dispute.
This statelet in northwestern Georgia is run by an ethnically distinct
minority that demands formal independence from Georgia. Lacking
international recognition, the Abkhaz — just like the South Ossetians
— won de facto independence with Russian support through a chaotic
conflagration amid the breakup of the Soviet Union. During a 1992-1993
war, the secessionists defeated the Georgian army and forced the
majority ethnic Georgian population to leave. The enclave’s isolated
economy is fueled by Russian business interests, which sit comfortably
behind a shield of so-called Russian peacekeepers that divide the
territory from the rest of Georgia.
So it is no surprise that the conflict plays out in confrontations
between Tbilisi and Moscow. A Russian aircraft was recently filmed
shooting down a Georgian surveillance drone. Moscow’s "peacekeepers"
frequently harass ethnic Georgians in the breakaway region, demanding
protection money or, like last year, forcing them to vote in separatist
elections. These provocations serve a greater strategic agenda:
keeping Georgia out of NATO. The unresolved conflicts of the two
breakaway regions are the greatest obstacles to Georgia’s ambitions
to join the alliance. Moscow holds the trump card.
Mr. Steinmeier’s plan was ambitious but realistic. It envisioned a
stage of confidence-building measures leading to a gradual return
of displaced peoples, followed by economic revitalization with
European help. Abkhazia’s final status was to be determined in the
last stage. In a nod to Moscow, Mr. Steinmeier’s plan did not demand
the internationalization of the peacekeeping force.
Russia gave the plan a green light in private meetings, only to
reject it when the German foreign minister made it public. Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin and his successor as Russian president,
Dmitry Medvedev, see it as in Moscow’s interest to preserve the
simmering status quo. By publicly ambushing the plan, Moscow hopes
to put an end to what it considers as European meddling in its own
backyard. Russia wants to sow confusion about its true intentions,
thus delaying any resolution of the conflict.
While the first attempt of the German peace plan failed, it nonetheless
indicates a growing realization among the EU’s power brokers that
it is time to get serious about resolving festering conflicts in
the union’s new neighborhood. Berlin’s leadership is particularly
notable as Germany is closest to Russia among the EU’s major member
states. And yet Berlin’s peace initiative showed that it considers
its diversified investments and diplomatic interests in the Caspian
region important enough to strengthen Europe’s relations with Georgia.
There is now no time to lose to draft an improved plan that will
better provide for Abkhaz demands to shape their own destiny, without
jeopardizing Georgia’s sovereignty, democratization and Western
integration. Any stepped-up effort must include the separatist Abkhaz
leadership. Isolated and increasingly overshadowed by Moscow, the
leaders in Sukhumi are no more enthusiastic about Russian dominance
than the Georgians are. True, the Abkhaz depend on Moscow’s support in
their fight against Tbilisi. But they are worried that in the process
of getting independence from Georgia, they are being integrated
into Russia. That’s why they have quietly reached out to Western
capitals. An EU high representative, with a significant staff and
peacekeeping contingent, would likely be welcomed by the Abkhaz.
By seeking a resolution to the conflicts, Europe is facilitating
stability and prosperity in its neighborhood. Reducing tensions
in the region also benefits Russia. Violence in Abkhazia has been
linked to unrest in Russia’s North Caucasus republics of Chechnya,
Dagestan and Ingushetia. If Russia got bogged down in a confrontation
in Abkhazia, violent separatists in the North Caucasus would step up
their own rebellions.
Therefore, achieving peace may not be an insurmountable task. The key
to a resolution in Abkhazia is to convince Russia that stability on its
southern border is more important than a violent veto over Georgia’s,
and possibly Abkhazia’s, Western integration.
Mr. Grgic is director, and Mr. Petersen policy adviser, at the
Institute for Strategic Studies in Brussels.