UKRAINE AND THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH OSSETIA
By Roman Kupchinsky
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Monday, August 11, 2008
DC
In the morning of August 10, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
informed its Russian counterpart that in order to prevent Ukraine from
being drawn into an armed conflict, Ukraine might take measures to
prevent the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) vessels from returning to
their base in Sevastopol in the Crimea if they were involved in combat
operations against Georgia. This ban might last until the conflict in
South Ossetia is "regulated," the website of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine stated.
Two days earlier, on August 8, the, troop landing ship Yamal left
Sevastopol for the Russian port of Novorossiysk, according to a report
on the website which also noted that a large contingent
of ships from the RBSF that had taken part in the military exercise
Caucasus-2008 in late July did not return to Sevastopol but remained
in Novorossiysk (, August 10).
Western media reported that on the night of August 9, Russian troops
had been put ashore from warships into the disputed territory of
Abkhazia.
On August 9 the flagship of the RBSF, the cruiser Moskva, with the
commanding admiral of the fleet, Alexander Kletskov aboard, sailed
from Sevastopol. It was accompanied by the destroyer Smetlivy and the
anti-submarine ships Muromets and the Aleksandrovets, along with an
assortment of support vessels.
As the situation on the ground in South Ossetia rapidly deteriorated,
Georgian National Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia told
the media that the Russian navy was blocking Georgian ports and
preventing ships laden with grain and fuel from entering. Meanwhile,
Interfax reported that "The navy was ordered not to allow supplies
of weapons and military hardware into Georgia by sea."
On August 10, however, Novosti Press Agency quoted an unnamed, highly
placed source in the General Staff of the Russian navy as saying that
the role of the RBSF in the conflict was to merely "provide aid to
refugees" and strongly denied that Russian ships were blockading the
Georgian coast. "A blockade of the coast would mean that we were at
war with Georgia…which we are not," the source was quoted as saying.
The question of what type of humanitarian role the cruiser Moskva,
armed with 16 cruise missiles, torpedoes and an assortment of other
sophisticated weaponry, could play was not raised.
Ukraine’s threat elicited a quick response from the Russian
side. Anatoly Nagovitsin, the deputy head of the General Staff of the
Russian armed forces, was quoted by UNIAN press agency on August 10
as saying that the Ukrainian statement "needed reworking," adding that
thus far the RBSF was not engaged in military actions against Georgian
ships but that this could possibly change along with the situation.
Later that day, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory Karasin told
a press conference in Moscow that the Russian foreign ministry would
begin talks with Ukraine on the return of the RBSF to Sevastopol,
adding that Russian ships were close to Abkhaz territorial waters in
order to prevent a situation similar to the one in South Ossetia from
taking place in Abkhazia (UNIAN, August 10, 2008).
Russian statements took on more ominous tones later that evening
after Russian troops began an assault on the Georgian city of
Gori. The Ukrayinska Pravda website quoted a spokesman for the
Russian Foreign Ministry as saying, "The actions by the Ukrainian
side are contrary to Ukrainian-Russian agreements and are hostile to
the Russian Federation." At approximately the same time, Interfax,
citing information released by the Russian navy, reported that a
Georgian military ship had been sunk by the Russian fleet off the
coast of Abkhazia.
The Ukrainian move seems to have come as a nasty surprise for the
Kremlin and the Russian General Staff, but it is also a risky one
for Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. Throughout Yushchenko’s
presidency, Ukraine and Georgia have been exceptionally close. They
both applied for a Membership Action Plan in order to join NATO as
part of their pro-Western policies, and both were rejected. Ukrainian
arms sales to Georgia have been bitterly criticized by Russia, which
claims that the arms were being used by Georgia for "ethnic cleansing."
As recently as mid-July, Ukrainian, Azeri, Armenian and U.S. troops
took part in a large scale Georgian military exercise, "Immediate
Response 2008," which was planned by the U.S. Armed Forces European
Command and financed by the U.S. Defense Department.
If the Ukrainian leadership goes through with its threat to close
off Sevastopol to Russian ships returning from the Georgian coast,
a host of problems might arise.
The political situation on the Crimean peninsula, never favorable
for Kyiv, could deteriorate further and increase calls by Russian
politicians not to renew the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation,
and Partnership by which Russia recognized the present borders of
Ukraine and which is due to expire in December 2008.
If the treaty expires, the consequences could be severe, since this
treaty, in addition to Nikita Khrushchev’s handover of the territory
to Ukraine in 1954, legalized Ukrainian claims to the Crimea. This
could pave the way for renewed calls by Russian politicians and
military leaders to annex the peninsula.
Another problem that is sure to become aggravated is the continuing
dispute between Kyiv and Moscow over the Russian lease of the RBSF
base in Sevastopol, which is due to expire in 2017. Ukraine does not
want to extend the lease, and the Russians insist that it be prolonged.
But the main question worrying the West and the Ukrainian leadership
is that an emboldened nationalistic Russia might decide to come to the
"rescue" of the predominantly Russian population in the Crimea just
as it "came to the rescue" of the South Ossetians and Abkhaz.
Such a scenario could conceivably force Kyiv to defend its territorial
integrity and declare war on Russia, which would have enormous
repercussions around the world.