Is Ukraine Next? Georgian War Exacerbates Russia-Ukraine Relations

IS UKRAINE NEXT? GEORGIAN WAR EXACERBATES RUSSIA-UKRAINE RELATIONS
Richard Weitz

World Politics Review
15 Aug 2008

World Politics Review Exclusive

The War in Georgia has seriously exacerbated relations between Russia
and Ukraine’s pro-Western government. On Aug. 12, Ukrainian President
Victor Yushchenko joined the leaders of four other former Soviet states
in Tbilisi to show solidarity with Georgia and its embattled president,
Mikheil Saakashvili. Yushchenko told the crowd that had assembled in
Tbilisi’s central square: "You will never be left alone! . . . We
have come to reaffirm your sovereignty, your independence, your
territorial integrity. These are our values. Independent Georgia is
and independent Georgia will always be!"

The following day, President Yushchenko boldly imposed severe
restrictions on the movement of Russian military units in
Ukraine. Specifically, he directed that Russian warships, warplanes,
or other military units give 72 hours’ notice before moving within
Ukrainian territory. The order also applies to ships of the Russian
Black Sea Fleet seeking to reenter their home base at Sevastopol. The
Russian Foreign Ministry attacked the measures as a "serious, new
anti-Russian step."

Ukrainian officials claimed that the restrictions were not a direct
result of the Russian military intervention in Georgia. Instead, they
maintain that they had long sought to regulate more effectively Russian
operations at the Sevastopol base, but that Moscow had repeatedly
delayed commencing talks on the issue by arguing that it had no plan
to employ the Black Sea Fleet in foreign military operations.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry had stated at the onset
of the war that they would not necessarily allow Russian warships to
return to Sevastopol if they supported military operations against
Georgia. "We have information confirmed by our specialists that
several vessels of the Black Sea Fleet left Sevastopol and either made
their way or were making their way toward the territory of Georgia,"
Ukraine Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko explained while in Georgia
on Aug. 10. "Obviously, if this is confirmed we will have to reconsider
the conditions under which these vessels would be able to be stationed
on the territory of Ukraine."

On Aug. 13, moreover, the Ukrainian Security Council issued a statement
declaring that the presence of foreign warships in its waters "poses a
potential threat to Ukraine’s national security, particularly if parts
of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet are used against third countries." The
Ukrainian government has long insisted it will not renew Russia’s
lease regarding Sevastopol when it expires on May 28, 2017.

For their part, Russian officials denounced the Ukrainian government
for siding with Saakashvili, who Moscow holds responsible for starting
the war and committing war crimes against Russian citizens in South
Ossetia. After the Georgian War began, Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s
minister for emergency situations, expressed indignation that,
"One week before these events, we send a column of humanitarian
aid to Ukraine to help flood victims and the next we find they’re
offering military aid, arms for the destruction of civilians." One
month prior to the invasion, Ukrainian troops participated in a large,
multinational military exercise in Georgia, "Immediate Response 2008"
which also involved Azeri, Armenian and American soldiers.

After the war ended in an overwhelming Russian military victory,
former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, who as the last Soviet
foreign minister helped dismantle the Soviet Union — a development
that Putin called the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the
20th century — warned that "Ukraine most likely’" would be the next
country to experience increased Russian military pressure to abandon
foreign and defense policies opposed by Moscow.

There are certainly many disturbing parallels in the situations Ukraine
and Georgia find themselves with respect to Moscow. Pro-Western
governments came to power following popular revolutions in both
countries — in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004. Along with
Georgia, the Ukrainian government is seeking to join NATO. At this
April’s NATO summit in Bucharest, the alliance’s communique said that
both countries "will become NATO members" eventually. The Georgian
and Ukrainian governments also have collaborated to pursue energy
transit routes linking the Caspian Sea to Europe that bypass Russia.

Unfortunately, Ukraine shares some of Georgia’s vulnerabilities as
well. The Ukrainian region of Crimea has a majority Russian-speaking
population. Some of its members would like to join Russia. The
peninsula also hosts an important naval base that Russia does not want
to relinquish. The Kremlin might be able to instigate a pro-Russian
uprising in the Crimea in which the insurgents, following the South
Ossetian precedent, would appeal for Russian military intervention
to protect them from Kiev.

Various Russian leaders have suggested that, if Ukraine actually joins
NATO or attempts to expel the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol,
then Russia might annex the Crimea. After the Bucharest summit,
Putin told a news conference that, "The appearance on our borders of a
powerful military bloc . . . will be considered by Russia as a direct
threat to our country’s security." Army Gen. Yury Baluyevsky, chief of
the Russian General Staff, said that the entry of Ukraine or Georgia
into NATO would lead Moscow to "undoubtedly take measures to ensure
its security near the state border. These will be both military and
other measures." Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov likewise said Moscow
"will do everything possible to prevent the accession of Ukraine and
Georgia to NATO." These statements appear aimed at stoking tensions
with Ukraine to exacerbate the country’s internal differences and
reinforce West European reluctance to allow Ukrainian entry into NATO.

Nevertheless, there are certain major differences between Georgia and
Ukraine. First, the Ukrainian armed forces are much stronger than those
of Georgia. Whereas Georgia’s prewar military had approximately 37,000
soldiers under arms, the Ukrainian military numbers over 200,000. The
Russian armed forces is still five times larger, but would find
a war with Ukraine, with a population — which, though divided
about NATO membership, would presumably rally to defend Ukraine’s
territorial integrity — some 10 times larger than that of Georgia,
a much greater challenge.

In addition, the United States and some other NATO countries have
belatedly sought to reinforce their political-military position
in the former Soviet bloc. The Bush administration appears to have
accepted Saakashvili’s warning that the weak U.S. response to the
Russian intervention was creating a situation in which "America is
losing the whole region" to Russia.

After days of supporting the Georgian position with nothing but
rhetoric, President Bush announced on Aug. 13 that the U.S. military
would conduct a relief operation in Georgia. Whatever humanitarian
assistance it might provide the Georgian people would pale in
significance to the deployment’s symbolic importance as reaffirming
Washington’s continuing role and interests in Russia’s neighborhood.

The announcement that NATO would hold a special meeting on the
conflict, as well as the long-awaited consummation of a Polish-American
deal on basing U.S. missile interceptors in Poland, also signaled
that Washington and some of its allies were now determined to shore
up their presence in the region to dissuade further Russian predations.

Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World
Politics Review contributing editor.