RETURN OF LEGAL BOOMERANG

Noyan Tapan

Au g 15, 2008

YEREVAN, AUGUST 15, NOYAN TAPAN. "On August 8 Georgian military
sub-units began, as official representatives stated, "establishing
constitutional order" in the territory of its former insurgent
autonomy, currently – the Republic of South Ossetia unrecognized by the
international community. A number of sources claim this armed operation
was allegedly provoked by the Ossetian side. However, we have not
yet found any confirmation of this circumstance by independent sources.

The Georgian army, which at the moment of starting the military
operation had a considerable superiority over the Russian peacekeepers
and the military units of South Ossetia both in terms of their number
and heavy armement, at the first stage of operations managed to take,
without much difficulty, control of most of the dominant heights over
Ossetia’s capital of Tskhinval/Tskhinvali and launched an attack on
the city where half the population of that unrecognized repubublic
lives. The onslaught on the city was accompanied by the massive use of
large-calibre artillery, "Grad" ("Hail") units and tanks. Meanwhile,
the Georgian army rushed to the Roki tunnel in order to gain control
of the tunnel linking Russia and South Ossetia. To all appearances,
the blitzkrieg envisaged restoring Tbilisi’s power over South Ossetia
through "enthronement" of the government of Ossetian collaborationist
Dmitry Sanakoyev.

However, Georgian troops stuck in street battles in Tskhinval with
a Russian peacekeeping battalion and Ossetian regular and irregular
sub-units that offered fierce resistance. The Georgian army also failed
to reach the intended boundary lines in the area of the Roki tunnel.

In response to the actions of the Georgian side, Russia sent motorized
units, tanks and aircraft to help its peacekeepers in South Ossetia. At
the same time Russia reinforced its peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia
and brought the maritime boundaries of this republic (unrecognized by
the international comunity) under control. The flagship of Russian
Black Sea Navy – "Moscow" rocket cruiser arrived from Sevastopol
to Novorossiysk.

During several days Russian troops forced Georgian sub-units from South
Ossetia and established full control of the zone of peacekeepers’
responsibility. They also hit the whole military infrastructure
of Georgia within the framework of the operation on "enforcement
of peace". On August 12 the operation was completed, and on August
13 Russia began withdrawing its troops from Zugdidi and Gori, two
Georgian cities at the front.

It is also noteworthy that performing their duty as an ally of
Ossetins, the sub-units of Abkhazian armed forces succeeded in
distracting part of the Georgian army and carried out a successful
special operation of driving Georgian troops out of Abkhazia’s Kodori
gorge which Georgian sub-units entered in 2006 in violation of the
1994 Moscow Agreements.

Like in the previous years of intensification of Georgian-South
Ossetian confrontation (1990-1992 and 2004), it was the civilian
population of South Ossetia that suffered the greatest losses as
a result of hostilities: by unspecified data, more than 1,600 were
left dead, while the number of Ossetian refugees from the conflict
zone exceeded 30 thousand. 74 Russian servicemen, including about
15 peacekeepers, were killed. By some expert estimates, the Georgian
side’s losses made 170-180 people. The number of South Ossetian troops
killed is being specified.

The United Nations Security Council held discussions on a resolution
presented by France. To all appearances, the principles, which were
agreed on during a meeting of French President Nicolas Sarkozy with
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow, will form a basis for
the resolution.

We will try to sum up the above mentioned developments:

– we can assess the actions of official Tbilisi and president Mikhail
Saakashvili as unsufficiently considered and badly calculated which
have put Georgia in a very difficult position. The matter concerns
not only its undermined military infrastructure and irrecoverable
losses but also the fact that in essence, all the achievements in
the country’s sociopolitical and economic life gained thanks to
the 2003 "revolution of roses" are now in question. The Georgian
residents who lived in the zone of the conflicts had to leave their
homes. Anti-Georgian moods in North Caucasus have reached quite a
high level.

– the unreasoned force operation of Tbilisi resulted in the fact that
Georgia questioned its ability to settle its conflicts with Abkhazia
and South Ossetia without methods involving force,

– given the existence of the Kosovo precedent, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia took a significant step to realization of their plans of
secession from Tbilisi,

– many today ask themselves the question about whether Mikhail
Saakashvili’s actions were sanctioned by Washington or not. Strange
as it may seem, in both cases this can be seen as failure of
the U.S. policy in the South Caucasus. If Americans sanctioned
M. Saakashviki’s actions, it turns out that they were mistaken in
their military and political forecasts, while on the other hand they
did not give the appropriate support to their ally. If the action
was not sanctioned by Washington, it turns out that M.

Saakashvili has involved the Bush administration in an extremely
dangerous adventure and questioned some important positions of the
U.S. in the region.

How expedient is it to deal with such a hardly predictable leader?

– the readiness of numerous volunteers from North Caucasus to take
part in military operations against Georgia on the side of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia showed once again that North and South Caucasus are
two parts of one geopolitical system. Thus, any political planning
in the region of Greater Caucsus is doomed to fail when it does not
take this circumstance into consideration,

– as a result of its strict response actions against Georgia, Russia
has considerably strengthened its positions in North Causasus – at the
time these positions were undermined by two wars in Chechnya. Moreover,
Russia’s rating has risen not only in the Russian regions of the South
Federal Okrug but also in such regions as Adygei, Karachai-Cherkess,
Kabardino-Balkaria, and certainly North Ossetia. Besides, the
demonstration of Moscow’s force capacities in its confrontation
with Georgia became a convincing argument for radicals in Chechnya,
Ingushetia and Dagestan. We do not state that these actions have
resulted in final liquidation of the danger of separatism in North
Caucasus but it is definite that the number of its supporters will
not grow in the foreseeable future,

– Russia’s use and demonstration of force will make Baku consider
everything seriously before taking a decision on solution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem by force,

– the "problemness" of Georgia may slow down the development of
projects on realization of hyfrocarbon raw material supply routes
from Central Asia to the West via the South Caucasus by bypassing
Russia. This in its turn means tendencies of strengthening positions
of Russia in Central Asia. Baku and Central Asian countries will think
over South Caucasian routes for supply of power-bearing substances
and the possible actions of Moscow in a crisis situation,

– in the foreseeable future the U.S. can hardly use bridgeheads in
the South Caucasus for military operations against Iran,

At the moment Russia is being accused of violating a number of rules
of international law. There may be some grounds for it but the fact
remains that it is Georgia and not Russia that began the military
operation and that Tbilisi acted in violation of the 1992 Dagomys
Agreements.

On the other hand, what can be done about the precedents of violation
of international law in former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Kosovo which were
set at the time by the U.S, West and the same NATO? At the time they
did much so that the right of force rather than the force of law
could triumph in a number of conflicts. Now the legal boomerang is
coming back.

It can be stated that the currently forming situation in the South
Caucasian region will cause Washington and the West to use considerable
resources for restoration of the previous (before the recent conflict
in South Ossetia) status quo.

Meanwhile the regional players, including official Yerevan, which had
sustained a long pause throughout the conflict, hurried to demonstrate
their loyalty to the winner – Moscow. However, until recently president
Serzh Sargsyan tried to maneuver between the West and Russia because
of the not simple internal political situation."

David Petrosian, political correspondent of Noyan Tapan center.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress