The Canberra Times, Australia
Aug 18 2008

Beyond David and Goliath

ARIS GOUNARIS
18/08/2008 9:36:00 AM

When push came to shove, Georgia never stood a chance of defending
these parts of its territory (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) against the
military might of its northern neighbour, Russia. Arguably, the
decision of Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili to forcibly wrest
control of South Ossetia from so-called Russian peacekeepers was
foolish in the extreme. In David-versus-Goliath battles like this,
Goliath usually wins.

Russia has violated Georgia’s territorial integrity. But whether it
was justified in doing so is yet to be determined. Much of the
analysis and debate triggered by this conflict centre on the recent
actions and consequences of the Russian and Georgian military
forces. The violation of Georgia’s sovereign rights, it is argued, is
bad. Defending democracies against the threats posed by authoritarian
states, the argument follows, is good.

Such views are, of course, simplistic. Sovereign rights are not
inviolable. There are sometimes good reasons for violating a state’s
territorial integrity, particularly as a remedy against systematic
human rights abuses. Russia has justified its actions along these
lines. But our knowledge of the facts on the ground before the
outbreak of war remains sketchy. It is therefore difficult to assess
the validity of Russia’s claims properly.

I do not defend Russia’s actions. Instead, I make a broader point
about the justifiability of unilateral secession, that is, the
forcible break-up of a sovereign state. Perhaps if there were some
consensus among policy-makers about the circumstances in which
separatism should be supported, there might be less of an ad hoc
approach to the recognition of breakaway states such as South Ossetia
and Kosovo.

International law states that nations or ”peoples” have a legal
right to self-determination or statehood. But this runs counter to the
legal principle of sovereignty, which permits states to defend their
territory with deadly force. Russia, China, Turkey, Burma, Thailand,
Indonesia and the Philippines, among others, have sought to justify
the suppression of separatist forces in their respective countries by
reference to sovereign rights.

States should retain the right to defend their territory. But, if the
cost of doing so is the continued oppression of minority groups, we
need an exception to this rule. After all, a state’s primary function
is to protect the basic rights of its citizens. If it fails to protect
these rights, a state’s legitimacy is compromised. Aggrieved citizens
and groups would then be entitled to take remedial action in defence
of their basic rights.

In extreme cases, secession may be the only way to defend the rights
of oppressed groups in the long term. Sovereign rights must give way
to human rights. What does this mean in practice? It means that third
parties should not stymie an oppressed group’s attempt to be
self-determining. It also means that third parties would be justified
in aiding the separatists.

Consider the Georgian example. If it could be shown that the citizens
South Ossetia or Abkhazia were systematically oppressed by Georgia
(notwithstanding the presence of Russian forces in these breakaway
regions), then Russia would be justified in supporting the
separatists, assuming its intentions were noble. If, on the other
hand, Georgia’s rule were benevolent, there would be no justification
for unilateral secession.

Georgia is a fledgling democracy. It is also a multi-ethnic state
which has been accused of paying lip service to rights. Saakashvili
promised ”equal opportunity” to all Georgian citizens, irrespective
of ethnic identity. The Government has also adopted many conventions,
including the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities.

But in Georgia word does not match deed. Those who do not speak
Georgian find it harder to access justice, education and employment
than those fluent in Georgian. For example, the Azeri and Armenian
minorities of Georgia are compelled to have official documents
translated into Georgian a language in which they lack proficiency
before submitting them to courts or administrative bodies (something
they did not need to do as Soviet citizens).

University entry is also difficult for Georgia’s ethnic minorities,
given that national exams for higher education include a compulsory
Georgian-language test. For many ethnic Armenian and Azeri students,
studying abroad is the only option.

The International Crisis Group believes that the political will to
protect and promote minority interests and rights in Georgia is
lacking. Many ethnic Armenians have publicly protested against what
they deem to be ”Georgianisation” policies and have called for
limited autonomy.

These are serious shortcomings for a state that claims to be
democratic. If such discrimination is not ameliorated by a more
enlightened approach to policy-making there is a real chance that
political tensions will persist, leading to more separatist violence.

Arguably, Georgia’s inadequacies are indicative of a long and
difficult transition from one-party rule to liberal democracy. Under
communist rule, they say, you could speak any language so long as you
didn’t criticise the regime. Under post-communist rule, you can say
what you like provided that you use the state’s official language.

For now, the world’s gaze is fixed on the war in Georgia. Sensational
images from the warzone continue to be flashed across the
world. Short-term solutions have been sought. US President George
W.Bush, has indicated his desire to see a return to the status quo of
before August 6. France, for its part, has brokered a ceasefire. Early
reports suggest it’s failing to hold.

I suspect that this conflict will disappear off the media radar as
soon as the violence stops. But the underlying problem of how the
international community ought to deal with separatist conflict
persists. Powerful states such as Russia will continue to act of their
own accord. But middle-ranking powers, such as Australia, must adopt a
principled approach rather than simply throw in their lot with a
powerful ally as these crises arise.

The remedial principle which holds that systematically oppressed
groups may secede if other modes of redress are unavailable provides a
useful framework for assessing the justifiability of secession in
particular cases. This framework looks beyond the immediate causes of
violent conflict to properly identify both victim and culpable
aggressor.

If middle-ranking powers were to allow this framework to inform their
foreign policy, they might, through force of numbers, show up the
Goliaths of this world who often justify their aggression on
humanitarian grounds. More consistency in this area of international
relations might also serve to expedite the resolution of violent
separatist conflicts which continue to rage in parts of many parts of
Asia, Africa and Europe.

Aris Gounaris is a PhD candidate at La Trobe University. His doctoral
dissertation in philosophy and history examines theories of secession
and self-determination. Case studies include Kosovo, Chechnya and
Aceh.