Irish Times, Ireland
Aug 18 2008
HEAD TO HEAD
Is the conflict in Georgia a sign of renewed Russian aggression?
Daragh McDowell agrees with the motion, but Seamus Martin disagrees
Russia deliberately provoked the war in Georgia as part of a wider
strategy of bringing ex-Soviet states to heel, writes Daragh McDowell
YES: THE GEORGIAN attack on Tskhinvali, the "capital" of the
self-declared republic of South Ossetia on the night of August 7th,
was the trigger for the horrifying events we are witnessing in the
Caucasus. It also marked the beginning of serious coverage of the
conflict in the western media. Its previous neglect has meant that the
full story of the run-up to this war has been obscured.
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the newly independent state of
Georgia began to chart a foreign policy course towards the West. It
refused to join the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that
Russia hoped to use to maintain its glavniy (primacy) in the
post-Soviet "near abroad" (to use the Russian terminology). Moscow
refused to accept Georgia’s right to remain outside the CIS, and began
arming and supporting separatist groupings in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia as a means of destabilising the Tbilisi government and
forcing it into compliance.
The plan worked, creating two so-called "frozen conflicts" on Georgian
territory. Russia used these to place military forces on Georgian
territory under the guise of "peacekeepers", to extend its
influence. Since then, Russia has made little secret of its desire to
annex the two breakaway regions, dismembering Georgia and undermining
its independence. This strategy of "armed suasion" as the Russian
defence establishment called it, was also used in the Transdniestrian
region of Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan – two countries
that showed unwillingness to bend to Moscow’s will once they achieved
independence.
This situation has become increasingly intolerable for Georgia over
the past few years. In the Rose Revolution of 2003, its people removed
the discredited Eduard Shevardnadze from power and replaced him with
Mikheil Saakashvili. They gave him a mandate to reunify the country
and to reorient its foreign policy away from Russia. Putin and his
cabal of siloviki (former security-service apparatchiks) despise
Saakashvili and, as a result, have spent the last five years
attempting to secure his downfall, and to end Georgian defiance.
The recognition of Kosovan independence by the West earlier this year
convinced the Kremlin to increase the tempo of its plans for
Georgia. The Russians began taking steps towards recognition of Abkhaz
and South Ossetian independence as well as increasing economic and
military aid. It issued Russian passports and citizenship in both
regions in preparation for formal annexation and, as we now know, as a
cynical means of manufacturing a casus belli. Over the past few
months, Russian fighters have invaded Georgian airspace, destroyed
Georgian reconnaissance drones and dropped dummy bombs in an attempt
to provoke a Georgian response.
In the week leading up the invasion, South Ossetian forces, backed by
Russia, initiated a "sniper war" against Georgia, firing on its towns
with mortars and small arms. A unilateral ceasefire declared by
Saakashvili on the night of August 7th was ignored by the other
side. Faced with few other options to defend his country and its
citizens, Saakashvili made the fateful decision to invade. He was
foolish to walk into an obvious Russian trap. This raises questions
about his leadership, but he faced a Russian act of aggression.
If all this was not enough to serve as proof of Russia’s intentions,
the conduct of the war should be. Russian forces have moved well
beyond the original conflict zone, opening a second front in Abkhazia
and moving into Georgia proper. They have initiated a de facto naval
blockade and invaded the strategic towns of Poti and Gori. They have
demanded effective annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as the
price of peace. They plan to remove Georgia’s legitimate government
and again make it a vassal state. While Russia has made bloodcurdling
claims of Georgian war crimes, the only independent investigation at
time of writing (by Human Rights Watch) has found evidence only of
ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and of Russian use of cluster munitions against Georgian
civilians. Russia has poured hundreds, if not thousands, of
irregulars, modern-day Black and Tans, into Georgia to spread terror
and chaos.
Finally, Russia has inserted into Georgian territory two SS-21
"Scarab" short-range missile launchers. The only possible use for
these in a conflict of this type is for delivery of tactical nuclear
weapons. They are Russia’s insurance policy, deterring those who would
come to Georgia’s aid to prevent it being torn asunder by the
Kremlin’s war machine.
This was a calculated, deliberate war of aggression initiated by
Moscow. Russia’s actions over the past week were designed to
demonstrate to its other former dominions that dissent will not be
tolerated, that those who do not accept Russian glavniy (such as
Ukraine or the Baltic states) will suffer a similar fate. While
formulating its response, Europe would do well to remember that.
Daragh McDowell is a doctoral student researching post-Soviet foreign
policy at the University of Oxford. He blogs at
Georgia launched a sneak attack on South Ossetia while the world
watched the Olympics opening ceremony, writes Seamus Martin
NO: THE PEOPLE who gave you "Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction" now
want you to believe in "Russia’s invasion of Georgia" and "Moscow’s
disregard of the ceasefire agreement". It has emerged, however, that
Russian troops are patrolling parts of Georgia proper as part of the
six-point agreement brokered by France.
Having let down its Georgian friends in the real war, the US and its
Nato allies have now offered the Georgians the silver medal of a
propaganda victory. The Russians have already taken gold.
Let’s look at some facts. Georgia, under the presidency of Mikheil
Saakashvili, launched a sneak attack on the disputed region of South
Ossetia while the attention of the world was on the opening of the
Olympic Games in Beijing. The western media woke up later that day and
reported the Russian response but ignored the initial massive
escalation from the Georgian side.
Russia replied vigorously in the way the United States would if its
citizens and soldiers had come under the same sort of aggression. The
Georgians were routed. The propaganda war began shortly after Georgia
lost the real war. On Monday, August 11th, we were bombarded with
official statements from Tbilisi, all of which were untrue.
The most serious was that Russia had deliberately targeted civilians
in the town of Gori. Just a few kilometres from South Ossetia, Gori
had been the main staging point for the Georgian attack. Russia
targeted military positions there using conventional means and a small
number of cruise missiles. Some apartment buildings were accidentally
hit and civilians were killed. In war, terrible things such as this
can happen. Ask the staff of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade or the
surviving journalists from the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad.
We are now being told that Russia is breaking the ceasefire agreement
by posting troops outside South Ossetia. If you read the agreement,
you will see that this too is open to question.
Point number five of the six-point agreement brokered by France, while
calling on Russia to "withdraw to the lines prior to the start of
hostilities" also allowed Russia, "while awaiting an international
mechanism", to "implement additional security measures".
On seeing this proposal, the Georgians immediately recognised it as
allowing Russia to patrol the main highway from Tbilisi to the
west. Negotiating from a position of weakness due to the calamitous
and botched intervention by Mr Saakashvili, they tried to limit
Russian activity to a six-month period. They failed. Full details of
this can be found in the New York Times of August 13th under the
headline "Peace Plan Offers Russia Rationale to Advance".
Until the Georgian attack of August 8th, despite constant skirmishing
over the years, the South Ossetia question had settled into what is
known in diplomatic circles as a "frozen conflict". With the
full-scale Georgian attack, a very delicate equilibrium was upset. The
frozen conflict became a hot war. The indigenous people of North and
South Ossetia who had suffered the massacre of their schoolchildren in
Beslan now saw their southern regional capital in ruins.
I hold no brief for Russia or its leaders. In my time as a staff
correspondent for this newspaper in the countries of the former Soviet
Union, I have been critical of many of Russia’s actions, including
conduct of the two wars in Chechnya. I have been in the Caucasus on
numerous occasions, in Georgia itself and in its other "frozen
conflict" area of Abkhazia. I know the place I am writing about and I
like the warm, friendly Georgian people. They deserve better than
this.
My most recent visit to Georgia earlier this year was as an
international observer at the presidential elections. I am not
permitted to write about my own experiences in that election. I can,
however, quote from the report on the election by the OSCE’s Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. It is in the public
domain for anyone who wants to study it in full at
I raise this to bring some clarity to the suggestions that Mr
Saakashvili is totally committed to western-style democracy. The
report verifies instances of intimidation of members of the public
service and the democratic opposition, suggests that Mr Saakashvili
used state resources in his election campaign and is critical of
vote-count and tabulation procedures, as well as the complaints and
appeals process. The election was forced by the country’s democratic
opposition following demonstrations on the streets of Tbilisi that
were brutally put down by Mr Saakashvili’s special police.
Nato should be wary of admitting a country that has not completely
committed itself to democracy and is prone to military adventures. The
Atlantic Alliance is well equipped with lethal weaponry. The last
thing it needs is a loose cannon.
Séamus Martin is the retired International editor of The Irish
Times. His memoir Good Times and Bad was published earlier this year
© 2008 The Irish Times
/2008/0818/1218868019292.html