Magyar Nemzet, Hungary
Aug 13 2008
The Caucasian game
by Gabor Stier
Why did Georgia launch a war if it could be well predicted that such a
decision would put them into a difficult situation? How could the
politicians in Tbilisi decide on taking a suicidal step forcing Moscow
to an inevitable reaction, and thus pushing far away the Georgian
chances of regaining the breakaway territories as well as acquiring
NATO membership? Why did the United States choose not to step in so as
to halt the suicidal and genocidal action when they do have their
military experts present in the region, and it is hard to believe that
Mikheil Saakashvili could have acted or done anything without their
prior consent? To answer all these questions, according to many
experts, we have to look at the picture more closely and examine the
context of the game in the Caucasus, assuming that the United States
would not make such a bold move as to score a big self-goal in a
region that is so very important for them because of geopolitical
reasons.
It has been obvious ever since Afghanistan and Iraq that the main
objective of the United States is to control the area that expands
from the Near East to the Caspian region and which is extremely rich
in energy resources. The biggest obstacles to this are currently Iran
in the Middle East, Russia in the region of the Caucasus, and Central
Asia. The attempts to weaken Russia’s impact on the region have been
going on for quite a while now, and Washington’s most important ally
in this effort is Saakashvili’s Georgia. In other words, in this
geopolitical game, Tbilisi is only a small player, and so the
interests of the more important players can eventually override
Tbilisi’s and Saakashvilis’s efforts. Otherwise, in case of serious
players, it is hard to think of anything else when facing the events
of the last couple of days. There is some logic to find in the
schedule of the events, if those who worked out the details of
attacking Tskhinvali and the Russian peacekeepers counted on Moscow’s
inevitable reaction of entering the war. Because Russia had no other
choice, for them it was the only possible thing to do. If we follow
this logic, pulling Russia into a long and chaotic war, into the swamp
of the Caucasus, could even serve Washington’s best interests.
The situation could develop even further, as Azerbaijan, a country
rich in oil dollars, would not mind to "restore the constitutional
order", and another war in the Karabah region would open up a new
front for the Armenia-friendly Russia. The chaotic situation could
well lead to the destabilization of the whole North-Caucasian
region. This cynically evil scenario could serve the opportunity to
bog Russia, to make Russians get involved in wars using up their
energies, thus torpedoing their chances to carry out any modernization
plans. If Moscow could be kept busy with performing an aggressor’s
role, it could have no energy to deal with such issues as NATO
enlargement, building some alternative energy transport routes, or
deploying missiles. In the long run a prolonged conflict in the
Caucasus could well lead to an increased US influence in the
region. It would not take long for the NATO peacekeepers to appear in
the conflict-region, and Georgia, that has lost its breakaway
territories, could join NATO and become a member of the organization,
and at the same time, by way of controlling the region, Washington
could have the chance to prop itself against Iran, cut the North-South
energy route, and also contribute to developing alternative European
transport routes.
Therefore, there is no question about Moscow’s best interests which
are served if the Russians are able to prevent such a scenario by all
means. The best way for them to do that is to settle the conflict with
a quick win.
[translated]