RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE GEORGIAN WAR: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and Lajos Szaszdi, Ph.D.
Heritage.org
Aug 21 2008
DC
While all the facts of last week’s Russian-Georgian war are not clear,
enough information–including eyewitness accounts–has been reported
in the media to draw initial conclusions about the performance of
Russian military forces and the implications of these operations for
U.S. defense policies. Unquestionably, the war is a reminder that
"conventional" military operations as an instrument of modern combat
are far from obsolete. The U.S. and its allies must retain a robust
conventional capacity to deter aggression and assist in the defense
of its treaty obligations to NATO and other allies.
Lightning War
While terrorism remains a 21st century scourge, the Russian incursion
serves as proof that the age of conventional warfare is far from
over. After weeks of mortar attacks and shootings by rebel forces in
secessionist South Ossetia targeting Georgian villages and outposts,
hostilities escalated on the evening of August 7 with a Georgian
artillery and rocket barrage against rebel positions. On August 8,
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered forces into Tskhinvali
to put an end to the South Ossetian fire and to restore control over
the rebel capital. That same day, Russian mechanized forces began to
pour into South Ossetia. Operation "Clear Field" pushed back Georgian
military forces from South Ossetia. The number of Russian military
involved in the operation–reportedly as high as 25,000 troops
backed by over 1,000 armored vehicles, artillery, rocket forces,
and airpower[1]–overwhelmed Georgian forces.
On August 13, Russian land forces advanced from South Ossetia and
entered Gori, south of South Ossetia and straddling Georgia’s main
central highway and railway line. The conflict quickly expanded into
Georgia’s rebel region of Abkhazia along the Black Sea coast. There,
the Russian forces, with the help of Abkhazian irregulars, marched
south. By August 18, Russian forces established positions only 40
kilometers from the Georgian capital. The Black Sea Fleet blocked
Georgia’s main commercial port of Poti, and Russian airborne troops
coming from Abkhazia occupied the port, effectively closing the
main entry point for imports not just for Georgia but also for
Armenia and Azerbaijan. A Russian armored column then advanced
to within 50 kilometers of Kutaisi, the country’s second largest
city. Using overpowering force, the Russian incursion faced no
effective opposition.
Assessment of Russian Military Operations
The war appears to reflect comprehensive and systematic planning
by the Russian general staff. As a result of this planning, the
combined operations were well prepared and well executed, employing
combat, support, and logistical forces as well as pre-positioned
ships and planes. Most likely employing deception to mask operational
preparations, the Russian offensive achieved a strategic surprise. The
Russian army conducted a two-pronged offensive against Georgia from
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. By conducting more than one offensive
operation, the Russians prevented the Georgians from concentrating
their forces, a military tactic representative of classic Russian
operational art.
The main Russian ground forces involved in the invasion of Georgia
belonged to the 58th Army and are veterans of the 1999 invasion and
ongoing occupation of Chechnya. Ground forces also included elite Guard
divisions and "special forces" such as airborne troops and Spetsnaz
(special operations forces). Many of the tanks, armored personnel
vehicles, and armored personnel carriers used by the 58th Army are
older Soviet models but were employed in overwhelming numbers. Some
of the older tanks, like the T-62, have been photographed with recent
bar armor to protect against anti-tank rocket propelled grenades,
while T-72 tanks have been provided with explosive reactive armor
protection. Several units were made up entirely of professional
soldiers–as opposed to conscripts–and most likely represented a
test of all-contract soldier units in major military operations. (For
force structure, see table below.)
The air force carried out close air support operations, primarily
using SU-25 ("Frogfoot") fighter-bombers–which belong to Front
Aviation–to neutralize Georgian forces on the ground. Other missions
included the bombing of strategic targets such as Georgian air
and military bases, radar and communications sites and civilian
buildings and the failed attempts to bomb the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) oil pipeline. Supersonic Tupolev Tu-22M3 ("Backfire") strategic
bombers–belonging to the Long-Range Aviation–also participated in
the bombing raids. Transport Aviation ferried airborne forces and
supplies to the theaters of military operations.
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet carried out operations with the participation
of the fleet’s flagship, the guided-missile cruiser Moskva. Fleet
units reportedly sunk a Georgian patrol boat in combat. The Russian
military has blown up eight Georgian naval ships at the port of
Poti. According to Georgian sources, Russia used amphibious landing
ships to transport troops to Abkhazia. In addition, logistic support
ships were reported to have transported relief supplies for refugees.
The Russian military has used over a dozen of Tochka-U (SS-21 "Scarab")
short-range ballistic missiles and possibly Iskander SRBM (SS-26
"Stone") on targets throughout the Georgian theater, including the
BTC pipeline and the town of Gori.
Along with the use of conventional weapons, Russia conducted
information and psychological warfare, though the full extent of these
operations remains unclear. Georgian officials reported cyberattacks
on government websites as well as Internet servers. Allegations of
widespread efforts to spread disinformation, intimidate the population,
and foster criminal activity (such as looting, rape, kidnapping,
and ethnic reprisals) have also been made.
Lessons Learned
The age of conventional warfare is far from over. For the U.S. and NATO
to maintain both a credible conventional deterrent and the capacity
to aid friends and allies, each must retain the "traditional" robust
capacity to meet conventional threats, including the following:
Marshalling the "strategic enablers" that allow for the projection
of military power including gaining and maintaining sea control, air
supremacy, rapid strategic transport, expeditionary logistical support,
and the means to defeat "anti-access" strategies that seek to prevent
the deployment of forces into a theater; Improving the capability to
rapidly strike mobile armored forces; Developing the means to defeat
mortar, artillery, rocket, and missile forces that can be targeted at
both military forces and civilian populations; and Sufficient forces
to meet multiple deployment requirements on short notice.
In addition, instead of preparing for "asymmetrical" or
"unconventional" threats (such as terrorism and cyberwarfare) as
alternatives to conventional conflict, the U.S. and NATO defense
policies must recognize that future conflicts could well be an
admixture of both. Thus, military modernization and readiness should
not sacrifice preparation for conventional conflicts in order to
plan for new ways of war. Modern militaries must prepare for both. In
particular, NATO and the U.S. must each:
Improve capacity to conduct both offensive and defensive cyberwarfare;
and Place renewed emphasis on psychological operations, deception,
and other forms of information warfare in all types of conflict.
Next Strategic Steps
Revitalizing the conventional capabilities of NATO forces to be part
of an integrated geo-strategic effort sends an unequivocal message
that naked territorial aggression is unacceptable against members of
the alliance and other friendly and allied countries.
As President George W. Bush has stated, "aggression should not
stand." Subsequently, the U.S. should do the following:
Rebuild the unity of NATO by bringing together all members with shared
defense concerns; Proceed with the building of a missile defense system
in Central Europe; Accept Ukraine’s offer to include its early warning
radars into the ABM system; and Proceed with issuing NATO Membership
Action Plans (MAPs) for Georgia and Ukraine.
After an almost 20-year hiatus, the United States and NATO allies
may once again prioritize Russia as a potential threat to the common
European security. NATO should send a strong signal to Moscow that
its aggression will not stand. This should be done through diplomacy,
international organizations, and inventive economic measures. The
U.S., its allies, and Europe must do everything possible to reverse
Russian aggression against Georgia and to prevent hostile action
against European countries.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian
Studies and International Energy Security and James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies and Senior Research Fellow for
National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The
Heritage Foundation. Lajos Szaszdi, Ph.D., is a consultant at the
Davis Center.
[1] Jenny Percival and James Meikle, "Georgia agrees
to ceasefire with Russia," The Guardian, August 15, 2008, at
rgia.russia2?gusrc=rss&feed=networkfront
(Augu st 19, 2008).
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
