LESSONS OF THE CAUCASUS CONFLICT
By Anton Caragea
World Press Review
Aug 24 2008
What Did the U.S. Really Know About Georgia’s Intentions?
Six days of war in the Caucasus (a war that started without a
declaration and ended without a peace treaty) has transformed the
geopolitical map of Europe and maybe the world. The implications
of the war transcend well beyond the region of the Caucasus. Many
questions still need answers. Was it possible for President Mikheil
Saakashvili of Georgia to launch an attack into South Ossetia without
the knowledge of the United States?
This is highly unlikely. According to independent sources in Georgia,
there are American military advisers, political trainers, and civil
contractors–more than 1,000 people–all well placed and connected
to Georgian political decision makers. In the last five years, the
United States has invested more than $180 million in Georgian military
compatibility with NATO standards and more the 100 top-level officers
from the Georgian army and security services have received training
in the United States.
This high level of involvement in the Georgian political landscape
makes it improbable that the United States did not know that Georgia’s
military had concentrated troops and prepared a massive attack against
South Ossetia.
It is clear that the Russian reaction surprised the United States. It
is possible that many in Washington had felt that Russia would have
the same reaction as in the Kosovo crises: inflammatory remarks,
strong language, and political pressure but no military response. In
this case, this was a severe miscalculation.
Why Did Russia Intervene Militarily?
For Russia, there was no option but a strong military reaction. If
South Ossetia had fallen to Georgian troops, the unfolding of the
events would have being very clear: Georgia’s next move would be to
send troops to Abkhazia (international observers in the region had
reported an important Georgian military buildup for this next phase
of the operations).
The fall of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would have undermined the
entire Russian geopolitical plan in the Caucasus.
In the next stage, the pro-American power in Baku, Azerbaijan, would
send troops in a similar operation against Armenia and Russian-backed
separatists in Naghorno Karabah. After such a blow the pro-Russian
government in Yerevan, Armenia, already under strong pressure, would
reorient his policy toward Russia. The Caucasus would then be lost
for a long period to Russian influence. This scenario could not be
tolerated by Moscow and will not be tolerated in the future either.
What Are Russia’s Next Options?
Russia has already sketched the next steps here: internationalization
of the problem of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, organizing local
referendum to decide for independence and to recognize the independence
after the Kosovo model. Serghei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister,
has already explained that Russia recognizes only the sovereignty of
Georgia not its territorial integrity–a very clear message that it
supports South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s bids for independence.
If Russia’s position is very clear, the conflict in Georgia has
also drawn further diplomatic lines in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia. Even as the war raged in Georgia, the Baltic States, Poland,
and Ukraine took a strong position condemning Russian military
reactions and going to Tbilisi to offer moral and political support
to Saakashvili. So in the former sphere of influence of the Soviet
Union, we see the building of a new entente to keep Russia out of the
region. Also, Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan supported Russian actions and condemned Georgia as
provocative, a signal that they will remain allied with Russia. The
closing of the confrontation with Georgia marks the opening of a new
chapter in the fight for predominance in Eastern Europe: Ukraine.
Ukraine: The Second Chapter of the Drama?
Like Georgia, Ukraine is a very vulnerable ally of the United
States. Ukraine has an important Russian minority (almost 20 percent
of the population) and a massive pro-Russian alliance of political
parties. The sovereignty over Crimea is disputed and the possibility of
a civil war is very high in Ukraine offering to Russia the possibility
to use this liability for its involvement in the region. The Georgian
drama will be just a prelude to a Ukraine one if the leadership in
Kiev is not able to reach a compromise with Russia over Ukraine’s
bid to join NATO.
What Are the Conclusions of the Six-Day War in the Caucasus?
Russia is ready to use not only political pressure but also military
means to protect what it calls an integral part of its sphere of
protection: the Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus, and Central Asia. Any
further interference in this region will mean the restart of the cold
war–an eventuality that I hope no one wants.
Also, Russia has adopted a new diplomatic doctrine that must be
seriously taken in account: the right for intervention in any former
Soviet area if it is required to protect the lives and dignity of
Russian citizens (as announced by President Dmitry Medvedev). This
concept will further be used to pressure Ukraine.
The diplomatic pressure being applied by the United States is clearly
directed at dissuading Russia from any further intervention in Ukraine
and any further use of this Russian citizen protection doctrine. The
effect of this pressure on Russia remains to be seen.
The Georgian crisis has dramatically changed the map of Eastern Europe
and caused Russian-American relations to descend to a level not seen
in the last 20 years.