WILL TURKEY ABANDON NATO?
By Zeyno Baran
Wall Street Journal
Aug 29 2008
Will Turkey side with the United States, its NATO ally, and let more
U.S. military ships into the Black Sea to assist Georgia? Or will it
choose Russia?
A Turkish refusal would seriously impair American efforts to support
the beleaguered Caucasus republic. Ever since Turkey joined NATO in
1952, it has hoped to never have to make a choice between the alliance
and its Russian neighbor to the North. Yet that is precisely the
decision before Ankara. If Turkey does not allow the ships through,
it will essentially be taking Russia’s side.
Whether in government or in the military, Turkish officials have
for several years been expressing concern about U.S. intentions to
"enter" the Black Sea. Even at the height of the Cold War, the Black
Sea remained peaceful due to the fact that Turkey and Russia had
clearly defined spheres of influence. But littoral countries Romania
and Bulgaria have since joined NATO, and Ukraine and Georgia have
drawn closer to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Ankara has expressed
nervousness about a potential Russian reaction.
The Turkish mantra goes something like this: "the U.S. wants to
expand NATO into the Black Sea — and as in Iraq, this will create
a mess in our neighborhood, leaving us to deal with the consequences
once America eventually pulls out. After all, if Russia is agitated,
it won’t be the Americans that will have to deal with them."
Nonetheless, Ankara sided with fellow NATO members in telling Georgia
and Ukraine that they would be invited to join the alliance — albeit
without any time frame. But now that Russia has waged war in part over
this decision, the Turks will have to pick sides. Deputy chief of the
Russian general staff Anatoly Nogoivtsyn already warned Turkey that
Russia will hold Turkey responsible if the U.S. ships do not leave
the Black Sea. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will travel to Ankara
on Monday to make clear that Russia means it.
Russia is Turkey’s largest trading partner, mostly because of Turkey’s
dependence on Russian gas. More important, the two countries share what
some call the post-imperial stress syndrome: that is, an inability
to see former provinces as fellow independent states, and ultimately
a wish to recreate old agreements on spheres of influence. When
Mr. Putin gave a speech in Munich last year challenging the U.S.-led
world order, Turks cheered. The Turkish military even posted it on
its Web site. President Abdullah Gul recently suggested that "a new
world order should emerge."
Turkey joined Russia at the height of its war on Georgia in suggesting
a five-party "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform." In other
words, they want to keep the U.S. and the EU at arm’s length. Both
Russia and Turkey consider Georgia’s American-educated president,
Mikheil Saakashvili, to be crazy enough to unleash the next world
war. In that view Turkey is not so far from the positions of France
or Germany — but even these two countries did not suggest that the
Georgians sign up to a new regional arrangement co-chaired by Russia
while the Kremlin’s air force was bombing Georgian cities.
Two other neighbors — Azerbaijan and Armenia — are watching the
Turkish-Russian partnership with concern. Azeris remember how the Turks
— their ethnic and religious brethren — left them to be annexed by
the Soviets in the 1920s. Armenians already fear their giant neighbor,
who they consider to have committed genocide against them. Neither
wants to have to rely on Iran (once again) as a counterbalance to
Russia. Oh, and of course, Iran had its own sphere-of-influence
arrangements with the Soviets as well.
Though Turkey and Iran are historic competitors, Turkey has broken with
NATO countries recently by hosting President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad on a
working visit. As the rest of NATO was preoccupied with the Russian
aggression in Georgia, Turkey legitimized the Iranian leader amidst
chants in Istanbul of "death to Israel, death to America."
A few days later, Turkey played host to Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, who is
accused of genocide by the rest of NATO — but not by Russia or Iran,
or by the Muslim-majority countries who usually claim to care so much
about Muslim lives.
Where is Turkey headed? Turkish officials say they are using their
trust-based relations with various sides to act as a mediator between
various parties in the region: the U.S. and Iran; Israel and Syria;
Pakistan and Afghanistan, etc. It may be so. But as more American
ships steam toward the Black Sea, a time for choosing has arrived.
Ms. Baran is senior fellow and director of the Center For Eurasian
Policy at the Hudson Institute.