ARMENIA VOICED ITS POSITION TO THE KREMLIN
Kirill Gavrilov

Eurasian Home Analytical Resource
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Sept 9 2008
Russia

President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan is the first state leader who
visited Russia after Moscow had recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s
independence. On September 2, at the meeting with Russia’s President
Dmitry Medvedev in Sochi Serzh Sargsyan was as cautious about the
Russian-Georgian conflict as always: he only expressed condolences
to Dmitry Medvedev in connection with deaths of the Russian citizens
and peacemakers in South Ossetia and focused on the humanitarian aid
issues. He did not give Armenia’s official view on the recognition
of the independence of the two republics.

The goals, which the parties seemed to pursue at the negotiations,
make the Armenian President’s approach understandable.

At present, Russia tries to persuade its closest allies to follow
Moscow’s example and to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s
independence. Armenia, which depends on Russia in terms of economy
(Russia is a major investor in the Armenian economy, an exclusive
energy supplier, etc), could be the first CIS country to support
Moscow’s decision. Apart from that, if to recall the words of Speaker
of Russia’s State Duma Boris Gryzlov, who called Armenia an outpost
of Russia in the South Caucasus, it would be logical to assume that
Armenia could become one of the first countries recognizing (after
Russia) Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s sovereignty. Since September 5,
Armenia holds the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization)
presidency. If to take into consideration that Russia is going
to insist on collective recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
by the CSTO member states and on the republics’ admission to this
Organization, Moscow should enlist Yerevan’s support.

However, Armenia is extremely interested in keeping its ‘uncertain’
position. Although it is not confirmed officially, one can surmise that
Serzh Sargsyan took part in the negotiations first and foremost to make
a simple thing clear for the Russian authorities: currently Yerevan
cannot afford to recognize the sovereignty of the two republics. There
are two main reasons.

Firstly, recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Armenia will make relations with Georgia worse, which will most likely
lead to rupture of the relations and to cessation of the communication
between Armenia and Georgia. At a time when Armenia’s frontiers with
Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed, this will affect the situation in
Armenia. The recent events showed that even suspension of the railway
service between Georgia and Armenia may deprive Armenia of grain and
fuel within days. The Russian gas is supplied to the republic also
via Georgia. To all appearances, during the negotiations the Armenian
party voiced this stance, as later on Aide to the Russian President
Sergei Prikhodko said that the parties had discussed the creation
of new transportation routes, the interaction in the fuel and energy
sphere and the railway communication. It is said that the project of
the building of the railway from Iran to Armenia was discussed. If the
relations between Armenia and Georgia worsen, the Iranian-Armenian
border would be the only place to break through the transport
blockade. The second part of the gas pipeline from Iran is being
constructed and an oil pipeline construction is being discussed. But
even if those projects are implemented, they will unlikely compensate
the possible closing of the border between Armenia and Georgia.

Secondly, recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence may
make the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict more difficult
for Armenia. The point is that the co-presidents of the OSCE
(Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Minsk Group,
which settles the conflict, are (besides Russia) the USA and France
that condemned Moscow’s recognition of the independence of the two
republics. The decision of the Russian authorities itself questioned
the normal functioning of the OSCE Minsk Group. If Armenia takes
similar steps, I doubt that Azerbaijan, as the other conflict party,
will have any reason to conduct the talks in the previous format. The
issue is said to have been examined at the meeting of the presidents
too. Then Aide to the Russian President Sergei Prikhodko said that
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue had been raised and Dmitry Medvedev had
supported "the direct Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue". Evidently, if
Armenia recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
such a dialogue is unlikely to be carried on.

Apparently, Armenia’s position has been clearly voiced by former
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Vardan Oskanyan: "Armenia
must have stated that it was not going to choose between its friends
since Russia was Armenia’s strategic ally and Georgia was its natural
one. Both the countries are of vital importance to us". Although it
was not reported officially, Serzh Sargsyan might express the similar
point of view during the negotiations with Dmitry Medvedev.

Besides the situation in the Caucasus, the Armenian-Russian
negotiations might cover some other issues, for example, the economic
projects concerning the uranium extraction in Armenia, the extension
of the functioning term of the operating Armenian (Metsamorskaya)
Nuclear Power Station and the construction of a new nuclear power unit.

It is possible that Yerevan turned to Russia in the process of the
normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. It is remarkable, that
President of Turkey Abdullah Gul visited Yerevan on September 6. Moscow
might help Yerevan in the negotiations with Ankara. On the day of
the Armenian-Russian negotiations, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov arrived for a short-term visit in Turkey. But whether Russia
acted as an informal mediator in the Armenian-Turkish talks is unclear.

It is not known if Moscow has put a question point-blank: either
the promotion of investments in the Armenian economy, the following
of the loyal energy price policy, the help in settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the assistance in solving the problems
with Turkey in exchange for Yerevan’s recognition of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia’s independence, or nothing. The question was unlikely raised
in that way. Because if it was, the answer (regardless of Armenia’s
concrete choice) would be highly conducive to catastrophic consequences
for the economy and political system of this republic. As a result,
Armenia would intensify the cooperation with the West, as many other
former Soviet republics did.