THE CURRENT SITUATION IN GEORGIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Daniel Fried

US Department of State
Sept 9 2008
DC

Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, Members of the Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss with you today the implications
of Russia’s attack on Georgia.

On June 18, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
I outlined a series of examples of increasing Russian pressure on
Georgia and expressed concern that these activities risked igniting
a wider conflict.

Today, with regret, I must report to this Committee that these concerns
have been realized. Russia’s intensified pressure and provocations
against Georgia – combined with a serious Georgian miscalculation –
have resulted not only in armed conflict, but in an ongoing Russian
attempt to dismember that country.

The causes of this conflict – particularly the dispute between
Georgia and its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia –
are complex, and all sides made mistakes and miscalculations. But
key facts are clear: Russia sent its army across an internationally
recognized boundary, to attempt to change by force the borders of a
country with a democratically-elected government and, if possible,
overthrow that government – not to relieve humanitarian pressures on
Russian citizens, as it claimed.

This is the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union that
Moscow has sent its military across an international frontier in
such circumstances, and this is Moscow’s first attempt to change the
borders that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is
a troubling and dangerous act.

Today I will seek to explain how we got here, how we’re responding,
and the implications for our relationship with Russia.

Background to the Conflict

First, some history.

The dissolution of empires is frequently violent, and the break up
of the former Soviet Union was no exception. The collapse of the
USSR was marked by ethnically-based violence, especially in the
South Caucasus. This involved clashes between Azeris and Armenians,
Ossetians and Ingush, Russians and Chechens, Abkhaz and Georgians, and
others. These clashes deepened into a series of wars in the early 1990s
that ended without lasting solutions. Uneasy truces followed, and the
conflicts in areas outside Russia became known as "frozen conflicts."

Two of the disputed regions lie within the internationally-recognized
territorial borders of Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In 1992, following two years of armed conflict between Georgians
and South Ossetians, an armistice was signed by Russian, Georgian,
and South Ossetian leaders. The leaders also agreed on the creation
of a tripartite peacekeeping force of 500 soldiers each from Russia,
Georgia, and North Ossetia, a territory which lies within the borders
of Russia. In practice, however, the North Ossetian peacekeeping
contingent ended up being staffed by South Ossetians. Fighting in
Abkhazia was brutal in those years and, as a result, large numbers
of ethnic Georgians were expelled from their homes in Abkhazia;
before the fighting, the ethnic Abkhaz had been a minority – under
20 percent – in Abkhazia.

The next year, 1993, South Ossetia drafted its own constitution,
and three years after that, in 1996, South Ossetia elected its own
"president" in an election in which mainly ethnic Ossetians – not
ethnic Georgians – voted.

In 2001, South Ossetia held another election and elected Eduard
Kokoity as president, again with most ethnic Georgians boycotting the
election. The following year, in 2002, he asked Moscow to recognize
South Ossetia’s independence and absorb it into Russia.

Throughout this period, Russia acted to support the South Ossetian
and Abkhaz leaderships, sowing the seeds of future conflict. That
support was not only political, but concrete, and never more so than
through the continued presence of Russian military forces, including
those labeled as peacekeepers.

Georgia emerged from these post-Soviet wars in weak condition. While
then-President Shevardnadze deserves credit for helping end the
fighting, Georgia could not find its feet; its economy remained weak
and its government relatively ineffective. By the early years of
this century, Georgia was in danger of becoming a failed state, with
a deteriorating economy and a political system near collapse. In the
autumn of 2003, President Shevardnadze acquiesced in an attempt by a
local Georgian strongman – Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze – to steal
Georgia’s parliamentary election. This triggered a popular uprising
of hundreds of thousands of Georgians, leading to the so-called Rose
Revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili’s election as president.

It is important to note that Eduard Shevardnadze was a close friend and
partner of the United States and our NATO Allies, enjoying near-heroic
status. His ouster was not something the United States favored. Yet,
when the Georgian people spoke and demonstrated their democratic right
of peaceful protest, we did not stand in their way. We also did not
encourage the protests. But Georgians’ thirst for democracy ran its
course, and we accepted and supported the outcome.

Following his 2004 election, Saakashvili and his government moved
swiftly and effectively to improve governance in Georgia, reducing
corruption, pushing through economic reforms, and welcoming foreign
investment. The Georgian economy started to grow rapidly. At the same
time, Saakashvili made clear his intention that Georgia follow the path
of other successful post-communist democracies and draw closer to,
and eventually join, NATO and the European Union. Although they have
developed significantly in the past few years, Georgian democratic
institutions remain weak and much work needs to be done to deepen
democratic practices and continue economic reforms; authoritarian
practices still exist alongside more democratic ones. We have made
known, and made clear in public, our concerns with some of these
democratic deficits. Still, Georgia appeared to be following the
general contours of successful post-communist transformation we have
seen since 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe.

This progress, however, was paralleled by increasing tensions between
Georgia and the Russian-supported breakaway territories.

After the Rose Revolution, more clashes occurred between Georgians and
South Ossetians, and between Georgians and Abkhaz. Then in 2006, South
Ossetians voted for a split from Georgia in a referendum that was,
again, largely boycotted by ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia. Although
there were efforts to resolve the differences through negotiations,
by late 2007 talks had essentially broken down.

As Georgia’s ambitions to draw close to Europe and the transatlantic
community became clearer, its relations with Russia deteriorated. In
the summer of 2006, tension increased between Tbilisi and Moscow,
as Georgia arrested several Russian military intelligence officers
it accused of conducting bombings in Gori. Moscow responded with
a vengeance, closing Russia’s only road crossing with Georgia,
suspending air and mail links, imposing embargoes against exports
of Georgian wine, mineral water, and agricultural goods, and even
rounding up people living in Russia (including school children) with
ethnic Georgian names and deporting them. At least two Georgians died
during the deportation process.

Russia’s provocations escalated in 2007. In March 2007, what we believe
were Russian attack helicopters launched an aerial assault, combined
with artillery fire, on the Georgian Government’s administrative
offices in Abkhazia’s Upper Kodori Valley. In August, Russian fighter
jets violated Georgian airspace, then unsuccessfully launched a
missile toward a Georgian radar station.

This past year, although Moscow lifted some of the economic and
transport embargoes, it further intensified the political pressure
by taking a number of steps toward establishing an administrative
relationship with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In March 2008,
Russia announced its unilateral withdrawal from Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) sanctions on Abkhazia, thus removing the CIS
prohibition on providing direct economic and military assistance. Then
in April, following the NATO Summit in Bucharest where NATO leaders
declared that Georgia would one day be a member of the alliance,
then-President Putin issued instructions calling for closer official
ties between Russian ministries and their counterparts in both of
the disputed regions.

Russia also increased military pressure as Russian officials and
military personnel were seconded to serve in both the governments and
the armed forces of the separatist regions. South Ossetia’s "prime
minister," "defense minister," and "security minister," for example,
are all seconded Russian officials. And while Russian peacekeepers
in Abkhazia were specifically mandated to facilitate the return of
internally displaced persons and refugees, we saw no net return of
Georgians to Abkhazia in over a decade.

On April 20, the Russian pressure took a more ominous turn when a
Russian fighter jet shot down an unarmed Georgian unmanned aerial
vehicle over Georgian airspace in Abkhazia. Russia also increased its
military presence in Abkhazia without the required consultation with
the Government of Georgia. In late April, Russia sent highly-trained
airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia, ostensibly as part
of its peacekeeping force. Then in May, Russia dispatched construction
troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad link to Russia.

During this buildup of tension, the United States frequently called
on Moscow to reverse Russian actions and to participate with us
and key European allies in a diplomatic process to resolve these
conflicts. In June and July, for example, the UN Friends of Georgia
group, which included the United States, Germany, the UK, and France,
urged fellow Friend Russia to engage in invigorated negotiations to
advance Georgia’s peace plan for Abkhazia. Yet Russia resisted, in one
case even failing to show up for a meeting in mid-June that President
Medvedev promised Russia would attend. In July, Georgia accepted the
Western Friends’ request that Russia and Georgia join the UN Friends
and the Abkhaz for discussions to reduce tension and advance the peace
process. But once again Russia’s Foreign Ministry refused to send a
representative, this time saying that "everyone was on vacation."

During this time, we urged Georgian officials both publicly and
privately, on many occasions, to resist the temptation of any military
reaction, even in the face of repeated provocations, which they were
clearly facing. President Saakashvili did, to his credit, offer
extensive autonomy to Abkhazia, including a guarantee that a Vice
President of Georgia would be from Abkhazia. In July, Secretary Rice
traveled to Tbilisi to seek to intensify diplomatic efforts to reduce
the growing tensions. Working closely with counterparts from Germany,
France, and the UK, she called for intensified diplomatic efforts
on an urgent basis. While expressing support for Georgia, she also
cautioned President Saakashvili against any temptation to use force
to resolve these conflicts, even in the face of continued provocations.

Unfortunately, Russia resisted these European-American efforts to
intensify diplomatic efforts to stave off a wider conflict. After
Russian military aircraft overflew Georgian airspace in July, in
violation of Georgia’s sovereignty, while Secretary Rice was visiting
Tbilisi, President Saakashvili recalled Georgia’s ambassador to Moscow.

August began with two bomb explosions in Georgian-controlled territory
in South Ossetia, injuring five Georgian policemen. On August 2, a
firefight broke out in South Ossetia that killed six South Ossetians
and one Georgian policeman. On August 3, Russia declared that South
Ossetia was close to a "large-scale" military conflict, and the next
day, South Ossetia evacuated hundreds of women and children to Russia.

On August 5, Moscow issued a statement saying that it would defend
Russian citizens in South Ossetia. It is important to note that these
so-called Russian citizens were mainly South Ossetians – that is to
say, Georgian citizens – to whom Russia had simply handed out Russian
passports. Russia has carried out this potentially destabilizing
practice of distributing Russian passports to citizens of other
neighbors from the former Soviet Union for years.

On August 6, both Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of
opening fire on villages in the region.

The Assault on Georgia

Throughout this period, the United States worked with both Georgia
and South Ossetia, and with Russia, seeking to tamp down the growing
conflict. On August 7 Georgia’s minister for conflict resolution
traveled to South Ossetia for negotiations, but his South Ossetian
counterpart refused to meet with him and his Russian colleague
failed to show up, claiming his car had broken down. On the night of
August 7, those pressures rose to heights never before seen. Shooting
broke out between Georgia and South Ossetian armed forces in South
Ossetia. Georgia declared a ceasefire, but it did not hold. The
Georgians told us that South Ossetians had fired on Georgian villages
from behind the position of Russian peacekeepers. The Georgians also
told us that Russian troops and heavy military equipment were entering
the Roki Tunnel border crossing with Russia.

We had warned the Georgians many times in the previous days and weeks
against using force, and on August 7, we warned them repeatedly not
to take such a step. We pointed out that use of military force, even
in the face of provocations, would lead to a disaster. We were blunt
in conveying these points, not subtle. Our message was clear.

Georgia’s move into the South Ossetian capital provided Russia a
pretext for a response that quickly grew far out of proportion to the
actions taken by Georgia. There will be a time for assessing blame for
what happened in the early hours of the conflict, but one fact is clear
– there was no justification for Russia’s invasion of Georgia. There
was no justification for Russia to seize Georgian territory, including
territory well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia in violation of
Georgia’s sovereignty, or to attack and destroy infrastructure.

But that is what occurred. On August 8, the Russians poured across
the international border, crossed the boundaries of South Ossetia
past where the conflict was occurring, and pushed their way into
much of the rest of Georgia. Several thousand Russian forces moved
into the city of Gori and other areas far from the conflict zone,
such as Georgia’s main port of Poti, over 200 kilometers from South
Ossetia. Russia also used the fighting as an excuse to seize the last
Georgian-held portion of Abkhazia, where there had been no fighting.

The full story of that invasion and what occurred when the Russian
forces dug in and allowed "irregular" South Ossetian militias to
rampage through the lands Russian forces had seized, is still not
fully known. We have received evidence of the burning of Georgian
villages in South Ossetia. Russia’s invasion resulted in a large number
of internally displaced ethnic Georgians who fled South Ossetia to
Tbilisi and other Georgian towns. Although Russian forces attempted
to prevent access to the area by humanitarian aid workers, some Human
Rights Watch researchers were able to reach the area and reported that
the Russian military had used "indiscriminate force" and "seemingly
targeted attacks on civilians," including civilian convoys. They
said Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in populated areas and
allowed looting, arson attacks, and abductions in Georgian villages by
militia groups. The researchers also reported that Georgian forces used
"indiscriminate" and "disproportionate" force during their assault on
South Ossetian forces in Tskhinvali and neighboring villages in South
Ossetia. Senior Russian leaders have sought to support their claims
of Georgian "genocide" against the South Ossetian people by claiming
that 2,000 civilians were killed by Georgian forces in the initial
assault. Human Rights Watch has called this figure of 2,000 dead
"exaggerated" and "suspicious." Other subsequent Russian government and
South Ossetian investigations have suggested much lower numbers. We
are continuing to look at these and other reports while we attempt
to assemble reliable information about who did what in those days.

The Ceasefire, Russia’s failure to honor it, and recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia

In the days that followed the Russian invasion, our attention
was focused on halting the violence and bringing about a
ceasefire. President Bush spoke with a number of European leaders
as well as with President Saakashvili, President Medvedev and Prime
Minister Putin in an effort to halt the fighting. Secretary Rice
dispatched Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza to Tbilisi to
maintain contact with the Georgian leaders, working with Ambassador
John Tefft. She herself worked with the Georgians and Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov, and with key Europeans including the French as EU
President, and Finnish Foreign Minister Stubb, in Finland’s role as
Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, to seek to halt the fighting.

On August 14, Secretary Rice flew to France to consult with President
Sarkozy, and then flew to Georgia to seek – and successfully obtain –
President Saakashvili’s signature on a ceasefire agreement. President
Sarkozy had negotiated a six-point agreement which included the
following:

No resort to force.

A definitive halt to hostilities.

Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance.

Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they are usually
stationed.

Russian forces must withdraw to their positions prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian
peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures.

Opening of international discussions on security and stability
modalities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The U.S. role in this process was central and timely. The Georgians
had questions about the ceasefire agreement, so we worked with the
French who issued a clarifying letter addressing some of Georgia’s
concerns. Secretary Rice conveyed the draft Ceasefire Agreement and
the letter to President Saakashvili the next day. Based on these
assurances, some additional assurances from the French, and the
assurances of our support, President Saakashvili signed the ceasefire
agreement on August 15.

The Ceasefire Accord provides for the withdrawal of Russian forces from
Georgia to their positions before the hostilities began, and allows
for peacekeepers in South Ossetia, limited to the numbers allowed
under previous agreements, to conduct patrols a few kilometers from
the conflict zone in South Ossetia, not including any cities and not
in ways that impede freedom of movement.

Here is what the Ceasefire Accord does not provide: it does not
establish a buffer zone; it does not allow the Russians to set up
checkpoints around Georgia’s ports or along Georgia’s main highways
and other transportation links; and it does not allow the Russians
to have any forces whatsoever in places such as Poti, 200 kilometers
from South Ossetia.

This agreement was signed – and should have been honored immediately –
by Russian President Medvedev, who had promised to French President
Sarkozy Russia’s immediate withdrawal upon President Saakashvili’s
signature of the Ceasefire. Yet Russia has still not lived up to
the requirements of the Ceasefire Agreement requirements. In these
circumstances, with Russia’s having failed to honor the terms of
the Ceasefire Agreement and its promise to withdraw its forces,
Secretary Rice flew to Brussels for an emergency NATO meeting on
August 19 and, with our Allies, produced a statement in support of
Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty – a statement that
was stronger than anyone thought possible.

Russia, still failing to honor the Ceasefire Agreement, again escalated
the conflict on August 26 when it recognized the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It did so in defiance of numerous United
Nations Security Council resolutions that Russia approved and that
explicitly affirmed Georgia’s territorial integrity. And that the
underlying separatist conflicts must be resolved peacefully, through
international negotiations. This outrageous and irresponsible action
was condemned by the European Union, NATO’s Secretary General, key
Allies, and – in an unprecedented move – the foreign ministers of the
G7 countries. Other than Russia and the South Ossetia and Abkhazia
separatist regimes themselves, Nicaragua is the only country that
has recognized these territories as independent countries.

Following the European Union Summit on September 1, President Sarkozy
traveled to Moscow on September 8 to again seek Russia’s compliance
with the Ceasefire.

This has been a fast-moving situation, but that is where we find
ourselves today.

Our Strategic Response

In the face of this Russian assault on Georgia, the United States is
pursuing three key objectives.

First, we must support Georgia. We seek to stabilize the situation on
the ground; help the country recover and thrive economically; preserve
Georgia’s sovereignty; maintain our support for its territorial
integrity, and democracy; in the early stages of the conflict, Foreign
Minister Lavrov asserted that Russia sought the removal of President
Saakashvili, a democratically-elected leader. Russia has not succeeded.

We are active, working with our European allies, in putting pressure
on Russia to adhere to the Ceasefire. Russia must withdraw its
military forces from Georgia, back to the lines of August 7; Russia
is allowed limited patrolling rights by its recognized peacekeepers
in the immediate vicinity of South Ossetia only until such time as
an international mechanism is developed to take their place. So we
are working fast with the European Union and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to put in place just such a
mechanism. We are also preparing to launch international discussions
on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, again working closely with our European
partners.

We have already taken immediate steps to address Georgia’s humanitarian
needs. The United States has provided more than $38 million worth of
humanitarian aid and emergency relief, including food, shelter, and
medical supplies, to assist the people of Georgia. U.S. aircraft made a
total of 62 relief flights to Georgia from August 13 through September
4, and on August 24 and 27, 115 tons of emergency relief commodities
arrived in Batumi on the USS McFaul and the USCGC Dallas. In addition,
a third ship, the USS Mount Whitney anchored in Poti on September 5,
delivering an additional 17 tons of emergency relief commodities that
will be delivered by USAID non-governmental organization partners. On
September 3, UNHCR reported that 90,500 individuals have returned
to places of origin, following the August conflict. However, UNHCR
staff note that the number of returnees may be significantly higher
due to the passage of time, as well as the difficulty of accurate,
in-field returnee counts. According to UNHCR, approximately 30,000
individuals may be displaced in the long term.We have been working
with the Government of Georgia and seven relief organizations to
ensure that our assistance gets to internally displaced people and
other conflict-affected populations.

On September 3, Secretary Rice announced a major effort to help meet
Georgia’s pressing humanitarian needs, repair infrastructure damaged by
Russia’s invasion, sustain commercial confidence, and restore economic
growth. $570 million, the first phase of a $1 billion United States
economic support package, will be made available by the end of 2008 and
will include emergency budget support to the Georgian Government. We
will be working extensively with Congress in the days to come to fine
tune how the assistance will be delivered. We are hopeful that there
will be strong bipartisan backing for a second phase of support,
an additional $430 million to be provided in future budgets.

Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to
defend itself and to deter renewed aggression. The Department of
Defense has sent an assessment team to Tbilisi to help us begin to
consider carefully Georgia’s legitimate needs and, working with our
Allies, develop our response. For several years, the United States
has played a significant role in preparing Georgian forces to conduct
counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to help Georgia
rid its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen and other extremists and then as part
of multinational coalition efforts. NATO’s North Atlantic Council
decided on August 19 to develop a NATO-Georgia Commission aimed at
supporting Georgia’s relations with NATO. NATO has also decided to help
Georgia assess the damage caused by Russia’s invasion, including to the
Georgian Armed Forces, and to help restore critical services necessary
for normal public life and economic activity. NATO has already sent an
advisory support team to Georgia and its Special Representative for
the Caucasus and Central Asia. The North Atlantic Council Permanent
Representatives plan to visit Georgia in the near future. Finland’s
Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, showed
strong and effective leadership in working with French Foreign Minister
Kouchner to lay the diplomatic foundation for the ceasefire agreement
and activate the OSCE’s crisis response mechanisms.

Our second key objective is to prevent Russia from drawing a line down
the center of Europe and declaring that nations on the wrong side
of that line belong to Moscow’s "sphere of influence" and therefore
cannot join the great institutions of Europe and the transatlantic
family. President Medvedev’s recent statement of Russia’s foreign
policy principles implies such a claim.

The United States does not believe in or recognize "spheres of
influence." Since 1989, the United States – under the leadership
of Presidents George H. W. Bush, President Clinton, and President
George W. Bush – has supported the right of every country emerging
from communism to chose the path of its own development, and to
choose the institutions – such as NATO and the European Union –
that it wants to associate with and join. Each country must show
itself ready to meet the standards of the institutions it seeks to
join. That is its responsibility, and Georgia and Ukraine should be
treated no differently than other European countries seeking to join
European and transatlantic institutions.

NATO and EU enlargement has been the institutional embodiment of the
slogan, "Europe whole, free, and at peace." A Europe whole, free, and
at peace has been good for Europe, good for the countries on Europe’s
periphery, and, I would argue, good for Russia, which now faces the
most benign set of countries to its west in all of its history.

Europe whole, free, and at peace should include Russia; and throughout
this process the United States and Europe sought to deepen ties with
Russia in parallel with the growth of Western institutions throughout
all of Europe. But Europe whole, free, and at peace certainly does
not mean that Russia gets to veto the right of independent countries
to choose their future, and especially not through intimidation and
threats. We want to respect Russia’s legitimate interests. But we will
not sacrifice small nations on the altar of great power expediency.

Implications for relations with Russia.

Finally, our strategic response must include the longer-term
consequences of the invasion of Georgia for our relationship with
Russia. Since 1991, three U.S. administrations have based policy
toward Russia on the assumption that Russia – perhaps in fits and
starts, imperfectly and in its own way – sought to become a nation
integrated with the world: a "normal nation," that is, part of the
international system and its institutions. For its part, since 1991
Russia has asserted its own interest in becoming a part of the world
and a part of international institutions. And Russia had made progress
in this regard, with American and European support.

But with its invasion of Georgia, its continuing refusal to implement
the Ceasefire it has signed, and its apparent claim to a "sphere of
influence," Russia has put these assumptions under question and these
aspirations at risk.

Russia’s behavior in Georgia recalls bad traditions of years we had
believed behind us: 1979 and Afghanistan, 1968 and Czechoslovakia,
1956 and Hungary, 1921 and Georgia, and numerous Russian imperial
interventions in the 19th century. Russia’s assault on Georgia follows
other troubling signs: threats against Poland, including the threat of
nuclear attack; suspicious poisonings and killings of journalists and
those deemed "undesirable" persons such as Aleksandr Litvinenko, Anna
Politkovskaya, and even President Yushchenko of Ukraine; the apparent
use of energy for the purposes of political pressure against Ukraine,
Lithuania and the Czech Republic; the concentration of political
power in one party and focused in the Kremlin; and the creation in
the state-controlled Russian media of an "enemy image" of the United
States. Many believe that there is a relationship between these
troubling events and increasing government control of and pressure
on what should be independent institutions in Russia, including the
parliament, political parties, non-governmental organizations, the
media, and the courts.

We can speculate on the sources of such Russian behavior. We in
the United States looked on the period of the 1990s as one of hope
for Russian democratic reform and international integration in the
immediate post-Soviet period. But Russians do not look back on the
1990s with nostalgia, and certainly not with regret. They look on
this decade as a period of chaos and impoverishment at home, and
humiliation and decline of influence abroad. Most Russians welcomed
what they believed was stability and greater international respect
that then-President Putin gained for Russia in the world. They welcome
Russia’s steady economic growth, even if many realize this is to a
great extent no more than a function of high oil and gas prices;
and they welcome what they see as Russia’s return to a period of
greater order at home and more respect abroad. They believe that
it is only right that Russia should assert its interests in its
immediate neighborhood.

We should understand the sources of such views. But to understand
them is not to accept or excuse them. It is not a mark of return to
national greatness to have launched an invasion of a smaller, weaker
neighbor, or to use language of threats and intimidation against
other neighbors. Worse, in an echo of the Brezhnev Doctrine’s right
of intervention, some Russian officials have suggested a right to
intervene on behalf of Russian citizens anywhere in the former Soviet
Union and beyond. If Russia is simply creating these "citizens"
by handing out Russian passports to non-Russians in neighboring
countries, as it did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, then this is a
formula that can be abused, and is perhaps designed to be abused,
to justify aggressive purposes.

There is another and more constructive side to Russian official
thinking. Earlier this year, Dmitriy Medvedev made an eloquent speech
in which he presented his vision of a Russia governed on the basis
of the rule of law, and fully integrated in the 21st century global
economy. He spoke persuasively of a modern Russia, rooted in the rule
of law – strong, to be sure, but strong in the measure of power for the
21st century, not the 19th century. We in the West, and many Russians,
took encouragement from his words – words that now ring hollow.

Russia has a choice to make. It can seek to be a nation at peace with
itself and its neighbors, a modern nation establishing its power and
influence in modern and constructive ways, as President Medvedev’s
post-election vision suggested.

Or Russia can chose to be a nation whose standing in the world is based
not on how much respect it can earn, but on how much fear it can evoke
in others. Russia cannot have it both ways. Russia, sadly, seems to
be seeking to build national power based on attempts to dominate and
the threat or use of force or pressure against its neighbors. By its
actions in recent weeks, Russia has put itself in opposition to Europe
and the transatlantic community with which it claimed partnership.

We hope Russia, even now, can choose a better path. But we must
also contend with the Russia that lies before us, and the signs are
not good.

How shall the West respond?

I have already spoken of our support for Georgia and our efforts
to blunt Russian attempts to draw a new line, or curtain, through
Eastern Europe. But we must also respond to Russia itself.

First, we must help Russians understand that the course they are
now on is already leading to self-isolation in the world. Russia has
been condemned by the European Union, the Chair of the OSCE, and for
the first time ever by its G8 partners, by the foreign ministers of
G7 countries. If Russia continues its current course of defiance and
failure to honor its agreements, this self-isolation will deepen, with
profound implications for Russia’s relations with key international
institutions.

Second, the West must work and act together. The United States and
its European allies have responded in coordinated fashion to the
Georgia crisis, and must continue to do so. The United States and
Europe working together will have far more impact on Russia than we
will have by working alone. Europe and the United States also need to
show solidarity and determination to resist Russian pressure on other,
smaller European nations on its border, whether this takes the form
of military threats, cyber attacks, or economic intimidation using
energy as a weapon. We shall consider specific steps thoughtfully and
in light of Russia’s behavior in the coming weeks, including whether
it adheres to the Ceasefire Accord or if it continues to fail to
comply with its terms, as Russia is now doing.

Third, as we look ahead at our relations with Russia, we must be
steady, determined, and patient. It will take time for the Russian
people and their leaders to comprehend the cost of Russia’s growing
isolation. The recent flight of billions of dollars from Russian
equity markets is only an initial sign of the costs to Russia over
time of its behavior.

Fourth, our response must keep open the possibility of Russian
reconsideration of its current course, and keep doors open for
cooperation. There are areas where we and Russia have overlapping
interests – this was true before Russia invaded Georgia and it is
still true now, whether it is in Iran, counterterrorism, Afghanistan,
or other issues.

Fifth, we must also remember that Russia may choose to continue its
aggressive course, particularly against neighbors who have aspirations
for closer security relations with us and NATO. Prime Minister Putin
has questioned Ukraine’s territorial integrity as well as Georgia’s,
and President Medvedev has threatened to use "military means" to
stop Poland’s plans to host missile defense components. Russia will
be ill-advised to pursue a course of continued threats against its
neighbors. As British Foreign Secretary David Miliband put it, we do
not want a new Cold War; Russia has a responsibility not to start one.

We do not seek, and are not doomed to have, a bad relationship with
Russia. Russia’s development in the 21st century will require it to
have a cooperative, not antagonistic, relationship with Europe, the
United States, and the developed world. For better or worse, Russians
value their place in the community of European nations. Moreover,
Russia must contend with its serious problems at home: a shrinking
and aging population, a lopsided economy, and now international
isolation. Russia is poorly positioned to sustain a bad relationship
with Europe and the United States.

Wiser heads in Russia understand this, and may themselves realize that
long-term self-isolation will not prove to be a successful strategy
for Russia. The Russian economy will require investment, access to
capital and technology, and, over time, greater adherence to the
rule of law than is the case today. Investors will make their own
decisions. But they generally seek a stable relationship with their
economic partners and a predictable climate for their investments. And
the message Russia has sent by its recent actions is that this kind
of stability and predictability can no longer be assumed.

Russia is not doomed to authoritarianism at home and aggression
against its neighbors. Those are the choices that Russia’s leaders
are currently making. Unless they change their path, we are in for
a difficult period ahead.

But even in the Soviet period, we maintained both channels of
communications with the Russians and a relationship in hope of better
times. And in time, our relations did improve as the internal weakness
of the Soviet system became more obvious and the West stood firm
against Soviet expansionism.