Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Sept 15 2008
Lesser: Turkey to face tough foreign policy choices
Ian O. Lesser, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund
(GMF) of the US, has said Turkey’s foreign policy choice of engagement
over priority setting is threatened by the changing world order,
which, he states, will force Turkey to take sides and make some tough
choices.
"Turkey has had the luxury of not having to choose, for example,
between Eurasia and the West, between the Muslim world and Europe,
etc. In coming years, Turkish foreign policy would be more about
priority and less about general activism," he said in
Ä°stanbul. For Monday Talk, Lesser elaborated on the recent
course of Turkish foreign policy and said engagement was not a wrong
strategy when it was adopted and that it had some very important
positive consequences.
"The entente with Greece, openings with Syria and even with Iran, the
prospect of a real opening with Armenia. These are meaningful things
but these are all things in Turkey’s neighborhood," he noted.
According to Lesser, a John McCain presidency may be more difficult
for Turkey since McCain is likely to be more interventionist and
demanding of its allies, such as Turkey.
Lesser also responded to our questions related to the latest
Transatlantic Trends survey of the GMF released last week. It has a
section called `Turbulent Turkey,’ and among its key findings are:
Turkish respondents remain the most critical of US and EU leadership
in world affairs and feel Turkey should act alone in international
matters; religiosity does not shape views of transatlantic ties; and a
large majority opposes banning headscarves at universities.
About 48 percent of Turkish respondents said Turkey should act alone
in international matters. What does this signify?
It’s a striking result but it is not really surprising. If you asked
the question in the United States, I think the answer would be similar
because Americans are unilateralist in their perspectives. The result
reflects a certain suspicion on the part of many Turks about
intentions of Turkey’s international partners. It reflects a certain
sense that no one is helping Turkey with its problems, like the
[Kurdistan Workers’ Party] PKK. It’s not necessarily correct but
that’s the perception. There is a unilateralism tradition in Turkey
but it doesn’t necessarily mean an argument for unilateral
intervention, indeed, it could mean an inward looking, isolationist
preference.
In the survey only 3 percent of respondents said Turkey should
cooperate with the United States on international matters. What do you
think of that result?
It’s a low number. It’s quite depressing. But it’s in line with the
general public attitudes in recent years toward the United States. The
number for those who would be open to cooperation with the European
Union is much larger.
It’s 20 percent¦
Yes.
Wouldn’t you think that the Turkish public would view the United
States more positively following the bilateral cooperation against the
PKK?
Yes, you would think that as government to government cooperation
increases on key issues like that, it would be reflected in public
opinion, but it isn’t. This is not so unusual. One of the big
conclusions from the Transatlantic Trends survey this year looking at
US-European Union relations as a whole is that public opinion on both
sides of the Atlantic has really not kept up with the significant
improvements in Transatlantic relations over the last couple of
years. The public still remains very doubtful about transatlantic
relations, and in a more dramatic way in Turkey.
Just 1 percent of the respondents feel that Turkey should cooperate
with Russia, despite tremendous improvements in trade and tourism. Is
this surprising?
It is striking, especially considering that this survey was done in
June before the Georgia crisis; so presumably there is even more
weariness about Russia now. It’s very surprising. In recent years
there has been a lot of discussion in Turkey about developing
strategic relations with Russia and a Eurasian option and so on. But
apparently the public remains very weary of Russia.
Among Americans, the percentage who viewed Turkey’s EU membership as a
good thing declined 8 percentage points to 32 percent. Is this a
significant result?
At the official level, the United States will always be a big
supporter of Turkey. The results reflect the public opinion. It is the
public, a random survey of 1,000 people. I wouldn’t attach too much
significance to that result. First of all, the decline is not large,
and secondly, the number of people who don’t know about the issue is
very large.
`McCain likely to be more hawkish, more activist, more
interventionist’
A lot of Turkish observers are convinced that a Barack Obama
leadership with his vice presidential choice of Joseph Biden won’t
serve the interests of Turkey. What do you think of this perspective?
There are many in Turkey who believe that in terms of key issues that
Turkey has worried about — the Armenian resolution, northern Iraq,
and so on — that Turkey would be more comfortable with John McCain
because McCain understands the geopolitics of Turkey. It’s also worth
considering that foreign policy under an Obama presidency will look
very different probably from the Bush experience and very different
from McCain. So there are issues like relations with Russia and
relations with Iran that Turkey might in fact be more comfortable with
an Obama administration.
Why?
Because McCain is likely to be more hawkish, more activist, more
interventionist in the Caucasus, in the Black Sea and with Iran. That
would make Turkey more uncomfortable. That’s not a simple choice for
Turkey. It has now become much more important because the race is
extremely tight. We really don’t know what the outcome will be.
Do you have a guess?
I really don’t. We did polling but we did it in June, and in terms of
favorable attitudes and unfavorable attitudes toward the two
candidates, the people we asked in the survey were pretty much
even. Now the polls show that McCain is ahead but things can change
again. Turks should be prepared for either possibility.
In your various analyses of Turkish foreign policy, you have noted
that Turkey has chosen engagement over priority setting in its foreign
policy and said Turkey will have to think in terms of priorities in
coming years. Could you elaborate on that?
That’s a strategy that will become more difficult for Turkey. I don’t
say that it was a wrong strategy when it was initiated, and it had
some very important positive consequences: the entente with Greece,
openings with Syria and even with Iran, the prospect of a real opening
with Armenia. These are meaningful things but these are all things in
Turkey’s neighborhood. If you look at the scope of Turkey’s foreign
policy activism in recent years, it does sometimes seem as if Turkey
is trying to do all things at once and be all things to all
people. Under certain conditions, that could be a perfectly valid
approach. When I look ahead, I see the climate for Turkey becoming
more difficult and less encouraging to that kind of strategy. Turkey
has had the luxury of not having to choose, for example, between
Eurasia and the West, between the Muslim world and Europe, etc. In
coming years, Turkish foreign policy will be more about priority and
less about general activism.
`International developments would force Turkey to choose its allies’
Why do you think it will be more difficult for Turkey? Is it because
of the recent crisis in the Caucasus?
That’s a very good example of ways in which Turkey is going to face
dilemmas. Turkey is going to be forced to choose. Turkey doesn’t want
to choose; I understand that but things have changed in the world and
Turkey could find itself having to make big strategic choices as
Turkey did during the Cold War. I am not saying we’re going back to
the Cold War but it’s certainly a much more competitive relationship
between the West and Moscow and it would cause Turkey to make some
choices.
What else could change that would lead Turkey to have to make these
choices?
An American-Israeli confrontation directly, militarily with Iran would
force Turkey to make some choices. There are other things we can
imagine like that.
Do you think such developments would make the US see Turkey more
strategically?
Washington always perceives Turkey strategically but the problem is
whether or not the strategic relationship is working.
Is it working?
The United States has been a prisoner of geopolitics or
geography. Turkey has been seen as very important because of where
Turkey is. There is some truth to this but that is not the whole
story. We also have to consider what Turkey does and what the United
States does with Turkey. It’s just similar to the Turkish perspective
that the United States is important because of who we are as a
superpower but from a Turkish perspective it’s equally important what
we do in Turkey’s region. So I think this could reinforce what is
already an interest in Turkey’s strategic importance but we have to
think much more seriously beyond geography to joint policy planning on
Russia, on Iraq, on Iran and so on.
What else can the two allies do in those areas?
For example, on Iraq, the issue of the PKK is clearly very important
and there has been a lot of progress; but it’s not just about the PKK,
it’s also about the long-term future of Iraq. The United States is not
going to stay as a military presence in Iraq forever. What kind of
Iraq are we going to have after that? There is not very much thought
by Turkey about that. It’s all been about the PKK. Actually, Turkey is
a huge stakeholder and could be quite influential in the future of
Iraq as a whole.
`US-Turkish relations not diversified’
What is it that prevents Turkey and the United States from
diversifying their relationship?
Traditionally, the relationship has been all about security and
defense and not enough about other things. That’s been a problem
because it means that the constituency interested in Turkey in the
United States is too small. Cooperation is measured in very limited
ways, such as how to use Ä°ncirlik [air base located in Turkey
used by the Americans]. Obviously we need more than that. If hard
security issues with Russia, with others come back to the forefront
again, beyond Iraq it makes it harder to have this kind of
diversification because the security issues again will be
essential. The other problem is the global economy. If you want to
have more economic relations between the two countries, a rapidly
growing economy, a positive international climate helps. If you don’t
have those things, if you have a much slower growth, and if you have
stresses in economy not just here but also in the United States, it’s
going to be much harder for emerging markets like Turkey to attract
that kind of attention from Wall Street.
In your observations about Turkey following the Constitutional Court’s
decision not to close the governing Justice and Development Party (AK
Party) but sanction it, you noted that you expect to see either
moderation or polarization in the country. Where do you think Turkey
is headed domestically?
I’m looking at it as an observer from Washington so I am not as close
to it as Turks are. I do have a sense that there is a very unfortunate
and growing polarization in the country. Whether this is the result of
exaggerated perceptions or not, it is very difficult to judge. But I
do sense as a visitor here is that the people I speak to are more and
more concerned. That’s true regardless of their preferences.
What do you see as the most contentious area?
It is obviously over the space of religion in society and the role of
religion in politics. But it goes beyond that. When you look at the
foreign policy issues, you have people with a global outlook versus
inward outlook; people with Western orientation versus Eurasian
orientation. All of these things are present. They are present in a
lot of societies. My own country has strong debates about
this. Religion in politics is a hot issue in the United
States. Unilateralism versus multilateralism is a hot issue in the
United States. But I detect a certain very stark polarization here
which is very pronounced at the moment. And I don’t see that going
away. And as a friend of Turkey, I find it very disturbing.
Dr. Ian O. Lesser
He is a senior transatlantic fellow based in Washington, D.C., for the
German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States, a nonpartisan public
policy and grant-making institution dedicated to promoting greater
cooperation between North America and Europe. He focuses on
Mediterranean affairs, Turkey and international security issues. Prior
to joining the GMF, he was a public policy scholar at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Lesser is also president
of Mediterranean Advisors, LLC, a consultancy specializing in
geopolitical risk. In the past, he spent more than a decade at the
RAND Corporation as a senior analyst and research manager specializing
in strategic studies. From 1994 to 1995, he was a member of the
secretary of state’s policy planning staff at the US Department of
State, responsible for Turkey, southern Europe, North Africa and the
multilateral track of the Middle East peace process.
15 September 2008, Monday
YONCA POYRAZ DOÄ?AN
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress